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Abstract 
Research supporting cost reduction in wind energy technology benefits from the study of certain 
elements with strong impact on the formation of the cost of energy. In this context, the objective of 
this doctoral research is to explore some of the techno-economic aspects influencing wind energy 
development and deployment and to assess their impact on the technology. 
The research follows two strings of work: a technology and a deployment string. The former 
included an analysis of time reduction in the installation of wind farms offshore and another on the 
technological effects of repowering wind farms onshore. The later focused on globalisation of the 
sector with a focus on wind farm developers and turbine manufacturers, and then more specifically 
on the process of internationalisation of the latter. 
The research collected data from public and commercial sources, and a small amount of 
confidential data was used that originated from the network of contacts of the author.  Varied 
modelling tools were applied depending on the needs of each of the four individual pieces of 
research. The article exploring the reduction of the installation time in offshore wind farms used 
Visual Basic (VB) macros in MS Excel applied to the key milestones of project installation in order to 
unveil to what extent time reduction had been realised during the period 2000-2017. In the article 
on the technological impact of repowering, Excel, VB models and statistical regression analysis with 
Minitab were used in turn. The article on globalisation focused on contrasting data publicly 
available but not normally investigated together thus unveiling trends not seen previously. Finally, 
the analysis of internationalisation of wind turbine manufacturers resourced to indicators that, 
while widely used in the literature, needed to be adapted to the wind turbine manufacture sector. 
The very significant cost reductions in electricity from wind energy that have surfaced following 
recent auctions and tenders is justified in part by (offshore) the reduction in the time of installation 
and (onshore) the increased production from repowering. Regarding trade and globalisation, the 
research found that European wind turbine manufacturers lead globally while they are more 
diversified and protected against the ups and downs of the different markets. Moreover, they have 
been able to grow supply chains in many countries while still maintaining the bulk of the 
employment at home. 
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Resumen y conclusiones de la tesis 
La necesaria investigación sobre reducción de costes de la tecnología de producción de electricidad 
a partir del recurso eólico debe partir de los elementos que más impactan la formación del precio 
de esa energía. Por ello, el objetivo de este estudio doctoral es explorar e investigar algunos de los 
aspectos tecno-económicos que más influyen en el desarrollo y la comercialización de la energía 
eólica, y evaluar su impacto en la misma tecnología. 
Mi trabajo sigue dos líneas principales, una tecnológica y otra sobre la comercialización global. La 
primera incluye un análisis de la reducción de tiempo en la instalación de plantas eólicas en el mar, 
y otro sobre los efectos tecnológicos de la repotenciación de parques eólicos en tierra. La línea 
sobre comercialización se centra en el análisis de la globalización del sector y en particular de sus 
dos principales actores, los promotores de parques eólicos y los fabricantes de turbinas, para 
terminar explorando en profundidad cómo se internacionalizaron estos últimos. 
Esta investigación se ha basado en datos públicos o proporcionados por entidades que los 
comercializan, y de una pequeña cantidad de datos comunicados privadamente al autor por su red 
de contactos en el sector. Diversos modelos han sido usados dependiendo de la necesidad de cada 
investigación individual. La investigación sobre tiempo de instalación en el mar se modeló con 
macros de Visual Basic (VB) en MS Excel aplicados a los diferentes hitos de la instalación, de esta 
forma descubriendo la reducción en tiempo de instalación lograda en el periodo 2000-2017. La 
investigación sobre el impacto tecnológico de la repotenciación de turbinas eólicas se modeló con 
VB, Excel y el software de análisis de regresión estadística Minitab. La investigación sobre 
globalización se basó en contrastar series de datos de forma innovativa, extrayendo conclusiones y 
descubriendo tendencias que no se habían publicado hasta entonces. Finalmente, el análisis de 
internacionalización de los fabricantes de turbinas utilizó indicadores ampliamente utilizados en la 
literatura sobre internacionalización pero que tuvieron que ser adaptados a las particularidades del 
sector - por ejemplo, el uso de capacidad instalada en lugar de volumen de ventas. 
Las recientes subastas y licitaciones de electricidad eólica y/o renovable han revelado reducciones 
de costes muy significativas que se justifican en parte por la reducción en el tiempo de instalación 
(en el mar) y por el aumento de la producción eléctrica en el caso de la repotenciación (en tierra). 
Con respecto a comercio internacional y la globalización, esta investigación mostró que los 
fabricantes europeos de turbinas lideran el mercado global a la vez que están más diversificados y 
protegidos contra los vaivenes de los diferentes mercados. Es más, han sido capaces de formar 
cadenas de suministro en muchos países a la vez que mantenían la mayor parte del empleo en 
Europa. 
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1. Thesis description 
The current document presents a PhD thesis by publication that includes the following 
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The objective of this doctoral research is to explore some techno-economic aspects influencing 
wind energy development and deployment and to assess their impact on the technology.  
In 2009 the European Union (EU) set itself the objective of a 20 % penetration of renewable 
energy in final energy consumption for this year, 2020 [2]. Specifically for electricity, the EU28 
generated around 13.5 % of its total electricity generation from wind energy in 2019, some 
432 TWh [3]. This is only 9.25 % shorter of the foreseen 476 TWh for 2020 [4]. 
Wind energy is therefore expected to play an increasingly significant role in the European 
electricity system. It is a mature technology yet there was - and still is - an important margin for 
cost reduction, and more so at the time this doctoral research was defined. In this context, it is 
important that the key elements for cost reduction are investigated and exposed. For the 
engineering-oriented research community a particular focus is those reduction based on 
technology improvements. 
The basic hypothesis of this doctoral research is that general research supporting technological 
cost reduction would benefit from the study of certain elements with strong impact on the 
formation of the cost of energy. Those elements, both technological and economic in nature, 
particularly affect offshore wind. Besides, the internationalisation of wind energy and its impact 
on the European economy are considered important aspects affecting price formation in a 
sector that is naturally global. 
This doctoral research is therefore structured into two strings: techno-economic research on 
key cost-reduction issues on the one hand, and deployment-focused (i.e. globalisation of the 
wind sector) research on the other. 
The first string of the research acknowledged from the beginning that wind energy technology 
is a very large engineering sector yet it is clearly divided in two subsectors: offshore and 
onshore. Thus, the natural decision was to tackle one important technological aspect to help 
reducing the cost of wind electricity that is significant in each of the sectors. The aspects chosen 
were the recent reduction in time (and therefore costs) of installing offshore wind farms [5] , 
and the technology-derived effects of repowering wind turbines on land [6]. 
The second string of the doctoral research, the deployment of wind energy technology, gave 
place to two specific aspects of research. First the globalisation of the industry was explored, 
with a view on the contribution of European companies [7]. The conclusions of this research led 
to further deepening the subject with an attempt to measuring its internationalisation, for 
which it was necessary the definition of specific internationalisation indices [8]. 
The research uses data available or that have been available and were collected from the 
Internet by the PhD candidate since 2009 during his work at the Joint Research Centre (JRC), as 
well as those collected exclusively for this doctoral research. Those data come from official 
publications such as official journals, administrative permits, mandatory reports to authorities 
(e.g. those overseeing the stock markets), energy news, press releases and reports by 
important players (such as developers, turbine manufacturers, installers, sector associations, 
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consultants and research centres), or public communications in Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn 
as main social media channels. 
It was interesting to see how some social media channels could be so important for our 
research. For example, one of the milestones used in [5] was the day that a wind farm builder 
installed the last turbine, and this is an event that workers and managers of the installation 
vessel often publish in Twitter or Facebook even before any official press release is published. 
2.2. Literature review 
Wind energy, both onshore and offshore, is one of the key technological options for a shift to a 
decarbonised energy supply causing, among other benefits, a reduction in fossil fuel use and in 
greenhouse gas emissions[9].  
It is offshore that wind energy has traditionally most been presented as an energy source with a 
huge unrealised potential. To date, this is because of the complexity of the technology and 
project management, the harsh marine environment, and the related high cost of installing 
wind turbines in the seas. However, this is set to change. The technological developments of 
the last ten years, among other factors, have led to significant cost reductions that have 
manifested in recent tender and auction prices. 
The analysis of the evolution of offshore wind farm installation time is all but absent in the 
scientific literature. Schwanitz and Wierling [10] briefly discussed construction time as part of 
their thorough assessment of offshore wind investment, and showed that wind farm offshore 
construction time has increased from 2001 to 2016, but it has decreased in unit term 
(years/MW). One of the data issues shown by this research is the very disperse data set giving 
R2 = 0.05 (see Figure 4 b in [10]), when construction times are “measured as the period 
between the beginning of (…) offshore construction and the date of commissioning”, perhaps a 
relatively low level of detail. Interestingly, these authors also discuss the impact of water depth 
in driving installation costs. 
Based on Benders’ decomposition, Ursavas [11] modelled the optimisation of the renting 
period of the offshore installation vessels and the scheduling of the operations for building the 
wind farm. This author provides interesting information on the impact of weather on 
installation, e.g. “for the Borkum West project the installation of a complete top side of the wind 
turbine generator that MPI achieved was 25 hours yet some wind turbine generators were 
under construction for over 3 weeks due to weather conditions”. This same purpose, the 
modelling of the optimisation of transport and installation, was the result of the research by 
Sarker and Ibn Faiz, concluding that “the total cost is significantly impacted by turbine size and 
pre-assembly method” [12]. 
The objective of this research is to increase scientific knowledge on offshore wind farm 
installation time and its evolution. This is done by exploring and analysing the installation to a 
high level of detail, separately focusing on foundation, turbine and whole-set1 installation. This 
paper quantifies the improvements for the period 2000 – 2017 in terms of days per foundation 
and per megawatt rating of the turbine mounted there (megawatt-equivalent or megawatt for 
 
1 Throughout this document the term "set" is used to reflect the set of one turbine plus all the elements that constitute its 
foundation, e.g. monopile/jacket, transition piece, piles fixing jackets, etc. 
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short). This article provides actual figures for these parameters that could be necessary for any 
further research on cost-reduction of the installation of offshore wind energy. 
Therefore, after a period of cost increases (see Figure 4 in [13]), the cost of offshore wind 
energy started to descend even in a very radical way. The evidence for this, as shown in Table 1, 
is the successive results of tenders and auctions that different European governments used in 
order to foster the development of offshore wind farms. The tenders involve that the winners 
will receive their bid price for a number of years, with or without adjustment for inflation 
depending on the country regulations. 
There are significant differences in the period that the bid price will be received and in other 
key conditions. Also, recent German and Dutch [14] bids at “market price” were awarded 
without any additional subsidy in addition to the wholesale electricity price. 
Date announced Country Project name Size (MW) Winner Bid (€/MWh) Commissioning 
2010/06/22 DK* Anholt 400 Dong Energy 140.00    2012/3 
2013/12/30† UK Dudgeon 402 Statoil et al. 186.10‡ 2017 
2014/04/23† UK Beatrice 588 SSE et al. 173.70‡ 2019 
2015/02/26† UK East Anglia One 714 Vattenfall/SSP 164.72  2020 
2015/02/26† UK Neart na Gaoithe 448 Mainstream 157.17  2023 
2015/02/27 DK* Horns Rev 3 406.7 Vattenfall 103.20  2019 
2016/07/05 NL* Borssele 1 & 2 752 Dong Energy 72.70  2020 
2016/09/12 DK* Vesterhav 350 Vattenfall 63.82  2022 
2016/11/09 DK* Kriegers Flak 605 Vattenfall 49.90  2021 
2016/12/12 NL* Borssele 3 & 4 702 Shell et al.  54.50  2021 
2017/04/13 DE* Borkum Riffgrund West 2 240 Ørsted Market price 2025 
2017/04/13 DE* He Dreiht 900 EnBW Market price 2025 
2017/04/13 DE* Gode Wind 3 110 Ørsted 60.0 2024 
2017/04/13 DE* OWP West 240 Ørsted Market price 2025 
2017/09/11† UK Triton Knoll  860 Innogy 86 2022 
2017/09/11† UK Hornsea 2 1386 Ørsted 64.1 2022 
2017/09/11† UK Moray East 950 EDPR, Engie 64.1 2022 
2018/03/19 NL* Hollandse Kust (Zuid) 750 Vattenfall Market price 2023 
Table 1: Recent offshore wind tenders and auctions, and winning prices in EU countries. Notes: exchange 
rates to Euro correspond to the day the winner was announced; Dong Energy changed name to Ørsted; 
*offshore substation and/or HVDC transformer station, and connection to the shore are provided by the 
transmission system operator and thus not included in the bid price; †date of granting of contract for 
differences or equivalent. Sources: press releases, offshorewind.biz web site and, for (‡), WindEurope 
[15]. Commissioning years have been updated vs. the published article; bold means already operational 
The significance of the cost reductions shown in Table 1 is even greater when compared to 
what the wind energy experts expected as recently as two and half years before. An expert 
elicitation survey of 163 of the world’s foremost wind experts run during late 2015 suggested 
significant opportunities for 24 – 30 % reductions by 2030 [16]. Table 1 shows, for example, 
that reductions already reached 52 % just in the 1.8 years between the Danish Horns Rev 3 and 
Kriegers Flak OWF tenders. 
In order to achieve these prospective cost reductions, offshore wind farm projects need to 
tackle all the elements that make up their cost. These elements are, in essence, depicted in 
Figure 1 copied here from Smart et al. [17] 
R. Lacal Arántegui PhD thesis: Techno-economic aspects of wind energy deployment 
12 
Costs are highly project-specific. 
For example, cable connection to 
the onshore substation used to 
cost around one million EUR per 
km [18], and wind farms 
commissioned in the period 2015-
2017 are placed between 1 and 
115 km from the coast and 
required between 6 [19] and 210 
[20] km of high-voltage export 
cable. For different authors wind 
turbine and foundation 
installation contributes between 
10 - 12% [17] and 16 % [21] of 
capital expenditure (CapEx) of an 
offshore wind farm. The former 
figure corresponds to the 
characteristics of the ones 
installed in Europe during 2014/20152 whereas the latter was reported in 2010 with a focus on 
the UK. 
The installation of foundations and turbines consists essentially of the following actions: (a) 
adaptation of the vessel for the job (an activity called mobilisation); (b) port loading of the 
turbines/foundations on the installation vessel3; (c) transport to the wind farm site; (d) 
installation; (e) vessel returns to port; and (f) removal of the installation equipment (called 
demobilisation). With turbine/foundation installation vessels able to carry a few items per trip, 
actions (b) to (e) above are repeated several times per wind farm [22]. 
Mobilisation and demobilisation are cost elements paid normally as a lump sum. Loading, 
transport to site, installation and return to port are activities whose effort depend on wind 
farm size (i.e. no. of turbines/foundations to install); distances to marshalling harbours, turbine 
and foundation size and type; and most crucially, weather [23]. 
The main installation cost - turbine installation 
vessels- charge daily rates as shown in Table 2 of 
Ahn et al. [24], partly reproduced as Table 2 
here. The main differences are due to vessel 
performance and use. For example, turbine 
installation vessels (TIV) have carried from 1 to 
10 turbines, and a vessel carrying only two full 
turbine sets (tower, nacelle, hub and blades) has 
necessarily to be cheaper than a vessel able to 
 
2 The baseline data represented in this graph corresponds to a 400-MW, 100-turbine model offshore wind farm as 
described by IEA Wind Task 26 documentation (see Smart et al. [17]). 
3 A number of OWF projects transported foundations by floating these and using tugs instead of turbine/foundation 
installation vessels (the latter only did the installation) 
Figure 1: estimated breakdown of the capital expenditure of a baseline 
offshore wind farm in 2015. Source: [17] 
Vessel type Daily rate (USD) 
Turbine installation 
vessel 
150,000 – 250,000 
Jack-up barge 100,000 – 180,000 
Crane barge 80,000 – 100,000 
Cargo barge 30,000 – 50,000 
Tug boat 1,000 – 5,000 
Table 2: indicative costs of vessels involved in 
turbine installation. Source [24] 
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transport ten turbine sets each trip. Nine of the largest eleven wind farm installation vessels 
used in Europe have been built since 20114. 
A turbine installation vessel, MPI Resolution, installed 75 foundation and turbines at Lincs OWF 
(UK) starting 2011, at an average 9.5 days per set. Assuming a rate of USD 150,000/day (she 
was subject to a long let which can be expected to reduce daily rates), the cost of this aspect of 
the OWF installation was 107 M USD (plus mobilisation/ demobilisation costs), or 65.5 M GBP 
at the average exchange rate of 2009 Q4. The declared CapEx at the time of investment 
decision was 725 M GBP and thus this part of the installation is 9% of total CapEx. 
Because the focus of this research was the improvement in installation times, some of the 
factors that complicate or delay installations were mentioned even when they were not 
analysed by the model. In addition to weather conditions (preventing lifts), factors include 
unexpected ground conditions, storm damage to the construction vessels [25], encountering 
unexploded ordnance [26], inexperienced project or vessel team, etc. Some types of 
foundations (e.g. tripiles, jackets) require longer installation time than others (e.g. monopiles), 
whereas different procedures for installing the turbine are subject to more strict wind 
conditions at hub height, and thus have fewer and shorter weather windows for installation. 
Wind energy facilities, as other power generation technologies, are subject to ageing, inducing 
reduction of efficiency, output and availability [27]–[29]. In the case of wind turbines it was 
proposed that they lose up to 1.6 % of their output per each year [30]. There are many reasons 
for decreases in production, including fouling of blades, decreases in the efficiency of the 
gearbox, bearings or generator. In addition, downtime increases as the turbines get older and 
need more maintenance. Even lack of spare parts may become an issue at a certain age [31]. In 
parallel, operational costs increase with time [32]. 
When the asset approaches the end of its operational life, project owners have a number of 
options: decommissioning, repowering, life extension (partial replacement of components), or 
run-to-fail5 [28], [33]. Repowering a wind farm implies dismantling the existing wind turbines 
and installing new turbines of a larger size with new technology [34]. 
Repowering wind turbines (or wind farms) brings a number of benefits. First, and most 
important, repowering will increase performance and electricity production of wind projects 
[27], [29], [32], [35], [36]. Compared to a greenfield project, financing conditions might be 
better for repowering projects since the wind resource is known already and planning costs will 
be lower [33], [37]. In some cases, parts of existing infrastructure might be usable, e.g. the wind 
farm substation and some of the electrical connections. 
A theoretical case study for a wind farm in India showed that energy yield could increase by a 
factor of four [38]. Other studies have reported increase of capacity factor by 10 percentage 
points [33]. As a rule of thumb, a repowered wind farm has approximately half the number of 
turbines, double rated power and triple electricity yield [39] and therefore also uses the land 
available more efficiently.  
 
4 Source: individual vessel specifications. 
5 “run-to-fail” is leaving all turbines to run, with minimum maintenance, until maintenance costs are higher than revenues, 
e.g. because of the failure of a main component. Because not all turbines have major failures at the same time, the wind 
farm would keep running at an increasingly lower capacity until the last turbine stops working. 
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Repowering of wind turbines also offers advantages for the whole electricity system [27] and 
the society at large. In general, repowering will lead to a reduction of reactive power 
consumption and voltage variations [38]. Turbines have evolved to better support the grid by 
adding increasingly-complex features such as low-voltage ride-through. New turbines have 
lower rotational speeds with reduced noise emissions [40]. Bigger rotors and lower rotational 
speeds provide a less visually intrusive and more pleasant view than fast-rotating turbines [41], 
[42]. In terms of environmental effects, wind farm repowering reduces fatalities for raptors and 
other birds, as shown by research in California that found that repowering resulted in a 
reduction of fatalities by 83 % for raptors and 87 % for all birds for the same amount of energy 
generated [43]. Last but not least, local acceptance is also usually higher for repowering 
projects compared to greenfield developments [44]. 
A significant proportion of the installed EU wind fleet will come to the end of its lifetime 
between 2020 and 2030 [45]. Approximately 3.3 GW of the wind turbines installed in Europe by 
the end of 2017 were 20 years and older. This group, along with the approximately 18 GW of 
turbines between 15 and 19 years-old are the obvious candidates for repowering (Figure 2). 
Notwithstanding this, there are cases where younger turbines can be suited for repowering, 
and this would include some of the 33 GW of turbines between 10 and 14 years-old. The largest 
markets for repowering in Europe are Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Italy. The repowering 
market is also large in the United States and India with about 1.1 GW and 0.3 GW of wind 
turbines being 20 years and older. 
Two countries that have been frontrunners in wind energy have vast experience with 
repowering so far: Denmark and Germany [46]. Since 2001, Denmark has supported 
repowering through various incentive programmes, which led to the repowering of a significant 
amount of the oldest wind turbines. 56 % of turbines installed before 2000 and 84 % of turbines 
installed before 1994 had already been repowered by end 2017. More than 3,200 turbines 
were dismantled in Denmark before 2018. Germany is another country where repowering has 
been a significant part of annual installations. About 5,470 MW (about 2,040 turbines) of wind 
power capacity was installed before 2018 in repowering projects. Those turbines replaced 
about 2,900 old turbines (2,280 MW) [47]. Table 3 shows the annual evolution of repowering in 
Germany. 
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Figure 2: Age distribution of wind fleet in selected countries. Sources: [48]–[50] 
 
Table 3: Historical account of repowering in Germany 
Wind turbines <2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
No. dismantled 
turbines 
147 79 108 26 76 140 170 252 416 544 253 336 387 2934 
No. replacement 
turbines 
107 55 45 18 55 90 95 161 269 413 176 238 315 2037 
MW dismantled 155 26 41 10 37 56 123 179 258 364 195 366 467 2277 
MW 
replacement 
190 136 103 24 136 183 238 432 766 1148 484 679 952 5472 
Source: annual and half-year reports "Status of wind energy development in Germany" by Deutsche 
WindGuard on behalf of the German Wind Energy Association [47], for 2017 and previous years. 
Remarks: the source acknowledges that not all repowering activity has been captured in these statistics; 
figures prior to 2006 are obtained through subtracting from the latest cumulative figures. 
 
Until we undertook this research, the efficiency gains and performance improvements of actual 
repowering projects had not been researched in a detailed manner. Some evidence was 
available from theoretical studies [29], [36], [51]. Some case studies had been performed on an 
individual wind farm basis (see, e.g. [51] for a repowering of two wind farms in Spain). The aim 
of this part of the PhD was therefore to fill this gap by analysing the structural and performance 
changes due to wind turbine repowering independent from locational changes in the wind 
resource, whereas taking into account the impact of hub height-related changes in the wind 
resource. The research presented a quantitative analysis of the characteristics of repowered 
and new turbines in Denmark and Germany and the corresponding impacts on turbine 
performance. 
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Globalisation6 has involved huge benefits for humankind, from health improvements to culture 
diffusion and economic growth [52]. In the latter aspect, globalisation is to a large extent 
responsible for the economic growth of entire countries, e.g. Singapore or China [53], [54]. 
However, where local companies could not compete with foreign companies on a level-playing 
field, globalisation has caused loss of jobs and a certain impoverishment locally [55]. 
The most important economic effect of globalisation, after taking people out of poverty and 
reducing the prices for goods, is probably the increase in trade. For example, between 1970 and 
2002 imports as a ratio to world gross domestic product (GDP) increased from around 12 % to 
above 24 % [56]. Other economic effects include foreign direct investment (FDI), e.g. where 
foreign companies either acquire local companies or set up local branches or production 
facilities, and the financing of local investment with foreign funds as seen e.g. in offshore wind 
farms in the North Sea [57]. On the other side, a number of negative effects have affected how 
people see globalisation, from changes in land use resulting in the destruction of forests to 
make room for cash crops [58] to the delocalisation of manufacturing to countries with lower 
labour costs and less-strict environmental regulations [59]. 
One interesting aspect of globalisation that directly affects the object of this research, is the 
interdependence between innovation and trade. Innovation is a competitive instrument, with 
producers trying to fight off rivals with the help of improved products and processes [60]. 
Innovation, referred to improvements in processes and products, is also a driver behind better 
quality and lower cost, the two key competitive elements in any established industry. 
The scope of this research is less ambitious though: because it is focused on an industrial 
sector, wind energy, this research is centred on globalisation of this industry and within it on 
the contribution by European companies manufacturing turbines and developing wind farms. 
As part of the research, some of the economic impacts of these companies at home and abroad 
are analysed. 
Previous research explored globalisation connected to different industrial sectors. Gourevitch 
et al. studied the effects on the hard disk drive (HDD) industry [61]. This industry had, at the 
time, worldwide revenues of $30 billion, which is of similar order of magnitude as the turbine 
manufacture industry at around $53 billion7. Although firms from the US dominated the 
industry in its beginnings, locally manufacturing around 80 % of the world’s HDD and thus 
proved to be the most innovative firms, production moved to Asia by 1995. That year, while 
“over 80% of the world's hard disks were made by US firms, less than 5% of drives were actually 
assembled in the US”. In terms of employment in 1995 “only 20% of the world's employees in 
the HDD industry worked in the United States, yet over 60% of the wage bill paid by US firms 
were earned in the United States.” 
The globalisation of the pultrusion technology industry suggests that already some time ago 
low labour costs stopped being the most significant element behind delocalisation of 
production to emerging economies. In this case, vicinity to significant markets – as the case of 
China – was a major reason [62]. Incidentally, the pultrusion industry is indirectly linked to wind 
energy in that they both use fibreglass, the main material in rotor blades [63]. Interestingly, the 
 
6  In this research “global” is considered equivalent to “international”, and refers to economic activity distributed 
across at least two countries. 
7  Based on 54 GW installed of which 23 GW in China [111], at an average global turbine cost of 1,13M$/MW [85] 
with a 30% discount in China. 
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globalisation of the mechanical industry in Italian industrial clusters shed some additional light 
on the relationships client company – local suppliers that can help understanding how to 
promote a local supply chain [64], something that was reviewed in this research. 
The analysis of globalisation of the energy field can be focused on trade of energy resources 
and fuels or on means of exploring, transforming and exploiting energy – the latter perhaps 
linked more to industrial policy than to energy policy.  The globalisation of conventional energy 
resources (coal, natural gas, nuclear fuel, and oil and oil products) was explored by Overland 
(2016) who found that it is growing and accelerating [65]. Renewable energy resources are 
globally available per nature: solar, wind, water and biomass are present everywhere although 
to a different extent. Energy products from renewable energy sources (e.g. pellets from 
biomass) are traded [66] and thus subject to globalisation. The energy industrial sector is 
significantly globalised with multinational corporations operating worldwide. Further, there is 
evidence of the positive impact of policies in the development of the wind industry [67]. As Kuik 
et al. found, the competitive advantage of the European wind industry is based on the 
pioneering character of the related regulation, and it is long lasting [67], [68]. 
Many theories about the process of firm internationalisation can be found in the literature. 
Among the best known is the Uppsala model, which presents growth in the international 
activities of a company as a gradual process of expansion into new markets [69], [70]. This 
expansion occurs through a series of successive stages that result in an increasing degree of 
international operations. A second approach explains internationalisation as a process of 
learning or the development of company capabilities to recognize opportunities in international 
markets [71]. Researchers have focused on the importance of establishing relationships [70], 
[72]; firm growth is seen as a dynamic process, strongly dependent not only on a competitive 
product or service but also on the opening and strengthening of relations with players in other 
markets. Research has also focused on technical know-how, location [73] and international 
entrepreneurship [74], in which both emerging and consolidated companies can create value 
based on the use of their entrepreneurial skills in their internationalisation processes. 
Time is a key factor of competitive advantage, as the first company entering a new country 
positions itself better in this market. Management of time in terms of the order, timing and 
speed of the process is an essential aspect of a firm’s international expansion [75]. The speed of 
internationalisation is therefore a matter of interest in the study of business globalisation, but 
most studies analyse the process only until the moment the company starts to 
internationalise [76], [77]. However, some researchers have argued that it is necessary to 
consider not only the time a company takes to establish its business in the first foreign market 
but also the time that elapses until it consolidates its international activity [78], [79]. 
Furthermore, some studies have suggested that speed does not always positively influence 
performance [80]. Finally, firm size, firm age and other factors influence the success, measured 
in terms of profitability, of the international activity of a firm [81]. 
In the case of the wind industry, there are hardly any references that address how the 
international expansion processes of the companies occurred [82]. In this sector, there have 
been asymmetric developments in different regions, mainly depending on specific political 
support and the economic and industrial background. On the one hand, Europe has led 
technological development for 40 years, using first the local market for wind energy 
deployment and later expanding to other regions based on the experience gained. Innovation 
has been, and still is, a key factor in the growth of companies beyond their national borders. On 
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the other hand, China has become an important player in recent years, capturing almost half of 
the new capacity installed annually, which has allowed the technological and business growth 
of local companies. 
The wind industry is relatively young, since it has only reached a significant size during the last 
20 years. In terms of its main indicator, cumulative installed capacity in gigawatts (GW), it has 
grown from less than 20 GW in 2000 to 590 GW by the end of 2018 [83]. By considering this 
deployment as well as the unit costs from, for example, IEA Wind [16], [84], Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance [85] and Joint Research Centre [86], I estimate that the approximate equivalent 
cumulative investment reached $50 billion by 2000 and $1370 billion by 2018. 
Some research papers have confirmed that the creation of a domestic market in renewable 
energies has been decisive for the competitiveness and internationalisation of companies [87]–
[90]. This impact of the local market is particularly true in the case of companies in Europe and 
the USA, whereas the large Chinese market has not been decisive for its companies to actively 
participate in the global industry, at least until 2018 [82]. 
Indicators for measuring the degree of internationalisation of firms include the transnationality 
index [91], the network spread index [92], the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and other indices. 
Those indicators have been used to measure the degree of internationalisation intensity, 
geographic extensity or geographic concentration of the firm’s international activity, 
respectively [93] (cited by [94]).  
However, there was little research on the internationalisation of the wind energy industry in 
general and of wind turbine manufacture in particular, and none of the available research 
papers used internationalisation indices. Yet, quantitative assessment is necessary to enable 
robust, unbiased research to identify the international strategies of wind companies and to 
increase the understanding of the historical evolution and current trends. 
The objective of this part of the PhD was to select the appropriate indices for assessing the 
globalisation of the main wind turbine manufacturers worldwide, and to apply them. In this 
way, we addressed the internationalisation effectiveness of these companies that eventually 
resulted in the current global deployment of wind energy. 
The novel contributions of this  research were (a) the proposal of a set of indicators to measure 
the degree of internationalisation of wind turbine manufacturers, indicators which combine 
structural indicators with indices for measuring the speed of internationalisation, and (b) their 
application to data of the installed capacity by the 15 major manufacturers in 112 countries and 
territories over the past 40 years. 
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A B S T R A C T
The most important single event of the last years in wind energy technology is the reduction in the cost of
producing wind electricity offshore, a reduction that can reach 75%, depending on the system boundary con-
sidered, for installations commissioned by 2024. Surprisingly, there is very little scientific literature showing
how this reduction is being achieved.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the evidence behind cost reduction in one of the most significant cost
elements of offshore wind farms, the installation of foundations and turbines. This cost is directly dependent on
the daily rates of the installation vessels and on the days it takes to install those wind farm elements. Therefore,
we collected installation data from 87 wind farms installed from 2000 to 2017, to establish the exact time for
installation in each.
The results show that advances have reached 70% reduction in installation times throughout the period for
the whole set, turbine plus foundation. Most of these improvements (and the corresponding impact in reducing
costs) relate to the larger size of turbines installed nowadays. There is, therefore, not any leap forward in the
installation process, but only incremental improvements applied to turbines that are now four times as large as in
2000.
1. Introduction
Wind energy, both onshore and offshore, is one of the key techno-
logical options for a shift to a decarbonised energy supply causing,
among other benefits, a reduction in fossil fuel use and in greenhouse
gas emissions [1].
It is offshore that wind energy has traditionally most been presented
as an energy source with a huge unrealised potential. To date, this is
because of the complexity of the technology and project management,
the harsh marine environment, and the related high cost of installing
wind turbines in the seas. However, this is set to change. The techno-
logical developments of the last ten years, among other factors, have led
to significant cost reductions that have manifested in recent tender and
auction prices.
The analysis of the evolution of offshore wind farm installation time
is all but absent in the scientific literature. Schwanitz and Wierling [2]
briefly discussed construction time as part of their thorough assessment
of offshore wind investment, and showed that wind farm offshore
construction time has increased from 2001 to 2016, but it has decreased
in unit term (years/MW). One of the data issues shown by this research
is the very disperse data set giving R2 =0.05 (see Fig. 4b in [2]), when
construction times are “measured as the period between the beginning
of (…) offshore construction and the date of commissioning”, perhaps a
relatively low level of detail. Interestingly, these authors also discuss
the impact of water depth in driving installation costs.
Based on Benders decomposition, Ursavas [3] modelled the opti-
misation of the renting period of the offshore installation vessels and
the scheduling of the operations for building the wind farm. This author
provides interesting information on the impact of weather on installa-
tion, e.g. “for the BorkumWest project the installation of a complete top
side of the wind turbine generator that MPI achieved was 25 hours yet
some wind turbine generators were under construction for over 3 weeks
due to weather conditions”. This same purpose, the modelling of the
optimisation of transport and installation, was the result of the research
by Sarker and Ibn Faiz, concluding that “the total cost is significantly
impacted by turbine size and pre-assembly method” [4].
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The objective of this research is to increase scientific knowledge on
offshore wind farm installation time and its evolution. This is done by
exploring and analysing the installation to a high level of detail, sepa-
rately focusing on foundation, turbine and whole-set1 installation. This
paper quantifies the improvements for the period 2000 – 2017 in terms
of days per foundation and per megawatt rating of the turbine mounted
there (megawatt-equivalent or megawatt for short). This article pro-
vides actual figures for these parameters that could be necessary for any
further research on cost-reduction of the installation of offshore wind
energy.
Section 2 extends on specific aspects of the background e.g. giving
details of costs and recent cost reductions, whereas Section 3 presents
the modelling methodology used in this research and the resulting in-
itial picture. The next three sections present and discuss the results for
the three aspects under study: installation of foundations (Section 4),
installation of turbines (Section 5) and installation of the set foundation
+turbine (Section 6). Finally, Section 7 wraps up the results with a
brief summary and conclusion.
2. Background
After a period of cost increases (see Fig. 4 in [5]), the cost of off-
shore wind energy started to descend even in a very radical way. The
evidence for this, as shown in Table 1, is the successive results of ten-
ders and auctions that different European governments used in order to
foster the development of offshore wind farms. The tenders involve that
the winners will receive their bid price for a number of years, with or
without adjustment for inflation depending on the country regulations.
There are significant differences in the period that the bid price will
be received and in other key conditions. Also, recent German and Dutch
[6] bids at “market price” were awarded without any additional subsidy
in addition to the wholesale electricity price.
The significance of the cost reductions shown in Table 1 is even
greater when compared to what the wind energy experts expected as
recent as two and half years ago. An expert elicitation survey of 163 of
the world's foremost wind experts run during late 2015 suggested sig-
nificant opportunities for 24 – 30% reductions by 2030 [8]. Table 1
shows, for example, that reductions already reached 52% just in the 1.8
years between the Danish Horns Rev 3 and Kriegers Flak OWF tenders.
In order to achieve these prospective cost reductions, offshore wind
farm projects need to tackle all the elements that make up their cost.
These elements are, in essence, depicted in Fig. 1 copied here from
Smart et al. [9]
Costs are highly project-specific. For example, cable connection to
the onshore substation used to cost around one million EUR per km
[10], and wind farms commissioned in the period 2015–2017 are
placed between 1 and 115 km from the coast and required between 6
[11] and 210 [12] km of high-voltage export cable. For different au-
thors wind turbine and foundation installation contributes between
10% and 12% [9] and 16% [13] of capital expenditure (CapEx) of an
offshore wind farm. The former figure corresponds to the characteristics
of the ones installed in Europe during 2014/20152 whereas the latter
was reported in 2010 with a focus on the UK.
The installation of foundations and turbines consists essentially of
the following actions: (a) adaptation of the vessel for the job (an ac-
tivity called mobilisation); (b) port loading of the turbines/foundations
Table 1
Recent offshore wind tenders and auctions, and winning prices in EU countries.
Date announcement Country Project name Size (MW) Winner Bid (€/MWh) (Expected) commissioning
2010/06/22 DK* Anholt 400 Dong Energy 140.00 2012/3
2013/12/30† UK Dudgeon 402 Statoil et al. 186.10‡ 2017
2014/04/23† UK Beatrice 588 SSE et al. 173.70‡ 2019
2015/02/26† UK East Anglia One 714 Vattenfall/SSP 164.72 2018
2015/02/26† UK Neart na Gaoithe 448 Mainstream 157.17 2019
2015/02/27 DK* Horns Rev 3 406.7 Vattenfall 103.20 2018
2016/07/05 NL* Borssele 1 & 2 752 Dong Energy 72.70 2020
2016/09/12 DK* Vesterhav 350 Vattenfall 63.82 2020
2016/11/09 DK* Kriegers Flak 605 Vattenfall 49.90 2020
2016/12/12 NL* Borssele 3 & 4 702 Shell et al. 54.50 2021
2017/04/13 DE* Borkum Riffgrund West 2 240 Ørsted Market price 2024
2017/04/13 DE* He Dreiht 900 EnBW Market price 2025
2017/04/13 DE* Gode Wind 3 110 Ørsted 60.0 2023
2017/04/13 DE* OWP West 240 Ørsted Market price 2024
2017/09/11† UK Triton Knoll 860 Innogy 86 2022
2017/09/11† UK Hornsea 2 1386 Ørsted 64.1 2023
2017/09/11† UK Moray East 950 EDPR, Engie 64.1 2022
2018/03/19 NL* Hollandse Kust (Zuid) 750 Vattenfall Market price 2023
Notes: exchange rates to Euro correspond to the day the winner was announced; Dong Energy changed name to Ørsted; *offshore substation and/or HVDC trans-
former station, and connection to the shore are provided by the transmission system operator and thus not included in the bid price; †date of granting of contract for
differences or equivalent. Sources: press releases, offshorewind.biz web site and, for (‡), WindEurope [7].
Fig. 1. Estimated breakdown of the capital expenditure of a baseline offshore
wind farm in 2015. Source: [9].
1 Throughout this document the term "set" is used to reflect the set of one turbine plus
all the elements that constitute its foundation, e.g. monopile/jacket, transition piece, piles
fixing jackets, etc.
2 The baseline data represented in this graph corresponds to a 400-MW, 100-turbine
model offshore wind farm as described by IEA Wind Task 26 documentation (see Smart
et al. [9]).
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on the installation vessel3; (c) transport to the wind farm site; (d) in-
stallation; (e) vessel returns to port; and (f) removal of the installation
equipment (called demobilisation). With turbine/foundation installation
vessels able to carry a few items per trip, actions (b) to (e) above are
repeated several times per wind farm [14].
Mobilisation and demobilisation are cost elements paid normally as
a lump sum. Loading, transport to site, installation and return to port
are activities whose effort depend on wind farm size (i.e. no. of tur-
bines/foundations to install); distances to marshalling harbours, turbine
and foundation size and type; and most crucially, weather [15].
The main installation cost - turbine installation vessels- charge daily
rates as shown in Table 2 of Ahn et al. [16], partly reproduced as
Table 2 here. The main differences are due to vessel performance and
use. For example, turbine installation vessels (TIV) have carried from 1
to 10 turbines, and a vessel carrying only two full turbine sets (tower,
nacelle, hub and blades) has necessarily to be cheaper than a vessel able
to transport ten turbine sets each trip. Nine of the largest eleven wind
farm installation vessels used in Europe have been built since 2011.4
A turbine installation vessel, MPI Resolution, installed 75 founda-
tion and turbines at Lincs OWF (UK) starting 2011, at an average 9.5
days per set. Assuming a rate of USD 150,000/day (she was subject to a
long let which can be expected to reduce daily rates), the cost of this
aspect of the OWF installation was 107M USD (plus mobilisation/
demobilisation costs), or 65.5 M GBP at the average exchange rate of
2009 Q4. The declared CapEx at the time of investment decision was
725M GBP and thus this part of the installation is 9% of total CapEx.
Although the focus of this study is the improvement in installation
times, it is perhaps worth mentioning some of the factors that compli-
cate or delay installations. In addition to weather conditions (pre-
venting lifts), these include unexpected ground conditions, storm da-
mage to the construction vessels [17], encountering unexploded
ordnance [18], inexperienced project or vessel team, etc. Some types of
foundations (e.g. tripiles, jackets) require longer installation time than
others (e.g. monopiles), whereas different procedures for installing the
turbine are subject to more strict wind conditions at hub height, and
thus have fewer and shorter weather windows for installation.
3. Methodology and overall picture
3.1. Units used
The installation unit used for this analysis is "vessel-day", or the
number of days that a given installation vessel spends installing a
foundation, set of foundations, turbine or set of turbine items. Thus, for
example, if one vessel installs all the turbines, the number of vessel-






where Vdt is the number of vessel days per turbine installed; die is the
date turbine installation ends; dis is the date turbine installation begins,
and Nt is the number of turbine installed by the given vessel
In the cases when more than one vessel has been installing the given
item or set of items, it is necessary to take into account the period that










where n is the number of vessels installing any turbine items. For ex-
ample, two vessels that installed the same item (e.g. turbines) during
one week are counted as 14 vessel-days.
These aspects will also be analysed in terms of days per megawatt
installed.
The concept of "vessels" used for this analysis includes only large
installation vessels able to install the heavy items (see below), such as
purpose-built TIV (e.g. Bold Tern [19], Pacific Orca [20]); self-pro-
pelled jack-ups (e.g. Sea Installer [21], Seajacks Leviathan [22]); jack-
up barges which need tugs for propulsion (e.g. JB114 [23]); or heavy-
lift vessels (e.g. Oleg Strashnov [24], Jumbo Javelin [25], or Svanen
[26]).
Items whose installation is considered separately, when information
is available, include: the complete turbine or any of its parts; monopile,
transition piece, gravity foundation, jacket, tripile and anchor piles (for
jackets and tripiles).
3.2. Milestones used
The equations above are based on die and dis, the key date mile-
stones:
– die is the day the last foundation or turbine item is installed.
– dis is the day the vessel leaves the operations, or marshalling, har-
bour towards the wind farm site for installing the first foundation or
turbine component.
whereas die is very often reported in press releases, dis is often not
reported and, instead, the date the first item is installed is reported. In
most of these cases, the data were sought specifically and, when not
available, an allowance was made of 2 days to cover for the first trip to
site.
Appendix A includes the number of vessel-days resulting from cal-
culations by using these milestones.
3.3. Data issues and assumptions
Some key data were sometimes subject to contradictions, and an
attempt was made to verify these data. At times, the contradiction re-
mained and a decision had to be taken based on the reliability of the
different sources.
The data on which this research is based have been collected by the
authors mostly from the following sources:
– Direct communication from companies Muhibbah, MPI, others
– Notice to Mariners sent by email or published from Tom Watson
(Irish Sea), Seafish (English part of the North Sea), or developers
– Web sites of installation companies, including press releases, track
records, annual financial reports and others
– Web sites of developers, wind farms, ports, consultants and other
players.
– Twitter, Linkedin and Facebook, where individuals post information
about specific events
– Sector web sites 4COffshore [27] and offshorewind.biz
– Generalist, but mostly local, web sites such as Daily Post (www.
dailypost.co.uk)
– Official reports such as those from the UK's Offshore Wind Capital
Scheme
Table 2
Indicative costs of vessels involved in turbine installation.
Source [16]
Vessel type Daily rate (USD)
Turbine installation vessel 150,000 – 250,000
Jack-up barge 100,000 – 180,000
Crane barge 80,000 – 100,000
Cargo barge 30,000–50,000
Tug boat 1000 – 5000
3 A number of OWF projects transported foundations by floating these and using tugs
instead of turbine/foundation installation vessels (the latter only did the installation).
4 Source: individual vessel specifications.
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Finally, a small number of data points have been collected from AIS
(Automatic Identification System), based on a beacon emitting vessel
location information [28].
The research includes 89 offshore wind farms that started installa-
tion between 2000 and 2016 as shown in Appendix A. However, there
are some specificities:
– Wind farms that were installed together, as a single project, were
here analysed as a single data point. These include Gunfleet Sands I
& II (UK); Lynn and Inner Dowsing (UK); and Gode Wind I & II
(Germany).
– Wind farms that installed two different kind of foundations were
split into two data points. For example, EnBW Baltic 2 installed 41
turbines on jackets and 39 on monopiles, thus they were considered
2 wind farm projects.
– Only commercial projects were considered whereas experimental/
prototype wind farms were excluded. However, most of the latter
are included in Appendix A for reference.
– Outliers were included in the research as far as they are commercial
projects.
As a result, the number of data points varied depending on the item
analysed. For example, the analysis of turbine installation included 74
data points, whereas there were 59 monopile foundation installations
analysed.
A significant part of the vessel time is lost due to bad weather
making working offshore unsafe, this is called “waiting-on-weather” or
“weather days”. There was no way those days could be identified and
therefore a key methodological decision was not to take them into ac-
count in the analysis. Another reason contributed to this decision: it was
considered that an effect of vessel technology improvement is to reduce
weather days, and thus this effect should be captured in this research.
Time lost due to mechanical breakdown was not discounted either,
unless the vessel left the site for a period longer than two weeks.
Fig. 2 shows the overall picture of wind farms –this time including
most experimental ones- with turbines fully installed from 2000 to
2017, based on the year the first foundation was installed. The figure
includes 57 monopile installations, 11 gravity-base foundations, 9
jackets and 4 tripod/tripile installation for a total of 81 single-entry
offshore wind farms. The first floating OWF, Hywind Scotland, is not
included in the graph.
The vertical axis has been limited to 20 vessel-days in order to allow
better readability. Because of this, prototypes or demonstration projects
such as Belwind Haliade cannot be seen in the graph. OWF installed
prior to the year 2000 are not considered either.
It is interesting to note that the spread of projects with installation
days in Fig. 2, first increasing and lately decreasing, is broadly con-
sistent with the evolution of installation costs [5]. The R-square value of
all projects is 0.0095. However, if experimental installations are ex-
cluded, the R2 value increases to 0.02, it reaches 0.1323 for monopile-
based wind farms, and finally 0.1629 if only a range of monopile in-
stallations (for turbines between 3 and 4MW) is considered.
Time needed for transporting foundation items (typically monopiles
as in Anholt but also e.g. jackets in Alpha Ventus) when transport
vessels were tugs or barges was not accounted for, even when it is ac-
knowledged that this has an impact of reducing the use of larger in-
stallation vessels.
Some uncertainty in some of the data above is due to different,
specific reasons:
• When the milestone was not specified but loosely, e.g. "mid-April".
In this case the middle day of the period specified was taken, e.g. the
16th April in this case.
• When more than one vessel was used and the exact dates were not
published. Different assumptions were made in this case, e.g. com-
paring with installation time of a vessel with similar characteristics.
Fig. 3 shows vessel-days per MW of the set of a turbine plus its
foundation. Figs. 2 and 3 are comparable because the same OWFs are
included with the only exception of the four OWF out of vertical range
in Fig. 2.
Comparing both figures suggests that the bulk of the dots rotates in
a clockwise direction, a result of the effect of increasingly larger tur-
bines in reducing installation time per MW. In other words: installation
of the foundation-turbine set has not reduced time significantly but the
sets are getting larger, thus reducing the installation time per MW.
4. Foundations installation: results and discussion
4.1. Generalities about foundation installation
Offshore wind foundations in Europe is a field dominated by the
simple and well-proven monopile technology. Fig. 4 shows the type of
foundations per installed capacity in the EU, at the end of 2017, based
on offshore wind farms already installed (in green), and in the different
stages of construction or in advanced development.5
Fig. 2. Overall picture of installation (vessel-) days per each set of one turbine
plus its corresponding foundation, with breakdown according to type of foun-
dation. Source: own data. Notes: wind farms that were installed as a single
entity (e.g. Lynn and Inner Dowsing) were counted as a single project; numbers
correspond to wind farms in Appendix A; vertical axis has been triggered to 20
in order to allow better readability, even when this leaves out of range outliers
such as Bard (tripile) or experimental projects such as Beatrice pilot (jacket),
Alpha Ventus (tripod and jacket), and Nissum Bredning (steel gravity).
Fig. 3. Wind farm installation days per megawatt of installed capacity, for the
set turbine+foundations, with breakdown according to type of foundation.
Source: own data.
5 The following situations are defined as “in development”: the project won a tender or
auction; a turbine purchasing agreement has been signed; or the project has consent in
place and is clearly advancing towards taking a final investment decision.
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The domination of monopile foundations is not likely to be chal-
lenged in the near future, even when jacket technology is -at the mo-
ment- a preferred technology for depths between 36 and 60m, and
suction bucket systems are starting to emerge. Projections to 2024 in
Fig. 4 show the decline of tripod and tripile technologies in favour of
jackets and monopiles.
OWFs which are not exactly offshore were included in the Fig. 4 but
not in the detailed analysis below. These include turbines in inner lakes
(e.g. Vanern in Sweden), or physically connected to the coast at the
shoreline (e.g. Irene Vorrink in The Netherlands).
Because some of the last OWFs already finished foundation in-
stallation there are more foundation than turbine data points, 78 and 74
respectively, excluding floating and non-commercial projects. Of the
former, 59 use monopile systems (10 in the 1.5–2.3MW range, 36 in the
3–4MW range and 13 above 6MW), 9 gravity, 3 tripod/tripile, and 6
use jackets.
Fig. 5 shows the overall picture of the evolution of time taken only
for the installation of the foundations, in vessel-days per foundation.
Three phases can be distinguished: an initial phase until 2008 featuring
few installations and very high dispersion, a consolidation phase from
2009 to 2013 when projects became large (up to 175 turbines), sig-
nificant variation in the type of foundation and higher overall in-
stallation time, and the pre-industrialisation from 2014 onwards which
shows significant time reductions.
Figures in Table 36 show that the set of OWF foundations installed
after 2013 took significantly less time to install than the set of foun-
dations corresponding to 2009–2013.
Monopiles installed recently (2014–2017) required only 56% (2.39/
4.24) of the installation time needed during the previous period
(2009–2013). However, if measured in terms of installation time per
megawatt, recent monopiles required only 38% (0.50/1.32) of the time
of the previous period.
Comparing figures per megawatt in the recent period shows that the
set “all foundations” takes longer to install per MW (0.54 vessel-days)
than monopiles (0.50). The difference is minor only because monopile
installations outnumbered non-monopile installations 23 to 4 during
the period 2014–2017
Fig. 5 shows as well that whereas modern monopile-based
installations are the fastest foundations to install, two gravity base
projects very close to the coast also were object of very efficient in-
stallation. However, on average non-monopile projects on average take
longer to install.
There is therefore a pre-eminence of monopile foundations in the
OWF installed or being installed, resulting in a larger dataset. In ad-
dition, there is a trend for monopiles to cover increasingly deeper wa-
ters and larger turbines. Thus, it is appropriate to focus the remaining
analysis of foundations and turbine-foundation sets on monopile-based
installation.
4.2. Does installation time depend on water depth and/or distance from the
coast?
Fig. 6 shows that the number of existing OWFs really far from the
coast or in waters 30m or more is small: 4 and 9 respectively, out of 59.
The graphs show that most deep-water monopile installations to date
took place not far from the coast, up to 45 km.
In theory at least, both deeper waters and distances farther from
shore should cause longer installation times. This is because deeper
waters would make installation more complex and monopiles are larger
and need to be hammered deeper into the subsea; further distances
involve longer navigation time for the installation vessels.
However, the data in Fig. 6 tell a very different story: installation
time is in general independent from average water depth whereas it
only shows a minor positive correlation with distance to shore in the
case of the larger turbines. Regarding water depth, it is perhaps sig-
nificant that the dispersion of installation days with water depth is very
high below 25m but it is much lower beyond this depth. Regarding
distance, the two farthest-away data points of the 3–4MW turbine
series shown in Fig. 6 (right) correspond to wind farms with low in-
stallation time, 2.7 and 1.43 vessel-days per monopile respectively. The
reason is perhaps that both wind farms (Sandbank and Gemini) started
installation very recently (2015), when technological advances and
organisational learning caused important reductions in installation
time.
Conversely, Fig. 6 shows that wind farms with equal or very similar
depth/distance have taken very different installation time. For example,
OWFs Meerwind and Borkum Riffgrund 1, at 24 and 26m depth, lo-
cated 53 and 54 km from shore and with similar distances to the in-
stallation ports (92 and 80 km), took 6.4 and 2.5 vessel-days, respec-
tively, to install. Interestingly, they both installed the same turbine
model and had similar total capacity, and thus these factors cannot be
accounted for the differences. The main difference is likely to relate to
vessels and installation methods. In addition, the former started in-
stallation in 2012 whereas the latter in 2014.
Fig. 4. Breakdown of offshore wind capacity per foundation type, for European
OWF, both operational by the end of 2017 and under construction, or in de-
velopment at the end of 2017 with expected commissioning by 2024. Source:
own data. Remarks: 55% of the 22 GW in development have decided the
foundation type; for the other 45% it was assumed that monopiles will be used
for average depths below 36m, jackets above 36m and a few projects will use
floating or gravity base foundations.
Fig. 5. Overall picture of the time taken to install one foundation (without the
turbine) for each OWF that has finished foundations installation. Source: own
data.
6 Table 3 does neither consider floating wind farm Hywind Scotland nor experimental
projects Alpha Ventus, Gunfleet Sands III, Belwind Haliade, Nissum Bredning, Blyth De-
monstration, and Beatrice pilot.
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4.3. Economies of scale: relation to wind farm and turbine size
This subsection explores how monopile installation time is related
to the wind farm and turbine sizes.
In Fig. 7 the number of turbines is a proxy for wind farm size. The
figure shows that there are large wind farms above and below the
3–4MW trend line. The size of the bubbles (i.e. number of turbines per
OWF) does not suggest the existence of economies of scale, as larger
wind farms do not take generally less time to install per foundation.
The series of installations with turbines rated 6MW or above sug-
gest a slightly different situation. Part (b) of Fig. 7 shows that in this
group of installations the two largest wind farms (Gode Wind I & II,
Race Bank) are, by different margins, more efficient than the weighted
average of 2.28 days/monopile. Note that given the higher number of
data points, the message conveyed by the 3–4MW group should be
considered more robust.
Given the apparent contradiction, more insight was sought by
plotting installation time against the same indicator, the number of
turbines, without taking into account the evolution factor (year in-
stallation started), for all monopile installations together (Fig. 8).
The data shows that the number of vessel-days reduces only slightly
as the wind farm increases in size. In addition, the R-square factor of
0.0279 shows a level of dispersion such that the results cannot be
considered conclusive. Similar analysis but taking the wind farm ca-
pacity (in MW) as the proxy for size only improves R-square slightly to
0.0891. This aspect is therefore still not conclusive and by taking both
Table 3
Average installation time in vessel-days of the periods 2009–2013 and 2014–2016. Data include outliers. Source: own calculations.
Non-weighted average installation time of foundations (Vessel-days) /foundation (Vessel-days) /MW
Foundations started construction between 2009 and 2013 (all foundations) 5.22 1.39
Foundations started construction between 2014 and 2017 (all foundations) 2.56 0.54
Foundations started construction between 2009 and 2013 (monopiles) 4.24 1.32
Foundations started construction between 2014 and 2017 (monopiles) 2.39 0.50
Fig. 6. Relationship between installation time and average water depth and distance to shore. Source: own data, 4COffshore.
Fig. 7. (a) Evolution of foundation installation days related to wind farm size; (b) enhanced view of the 6+MW set.
Fig. 8. Relationship between monopile installation time and wind farm size as
reflected by the number of foundations.
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approaches into account we can conclude that there is only a low level
of economies of scale with wind farm size.
4.4. Reduction in foundation installation time per megawatt-equivalent
The picture changes significantly if the focus of the analysis is the
megawatt-equivalent of monopile installation, as shown in Fig. 9. This
unit is better placed to connect with the eventual reduction in the cost
of energy.
In effect, the fact that turbine technology has improved and larger
turbines are being installed in each foundation is claimed to have had
the biggest impact in the reduction of installation days per megawatt.
From 1991 up to 2004 essentially only turbines below 2.5MW were
installed on monopiles, whereas after 2006 only turbines in the 3–4MW
range were installed (Fig. 9), with two exceptions. In 2016 for the first
time, most wind farms that started installation were designed for tur-
bines larger than 4MW – in fact as much as 8MW.
Improvements in foundation installation times per megawatt has
thus clearly outpaced improvements per foundation. The reduction in
installation time per monopiles from 2000 to 2017 was 58%, as taken
from two samples: the non-weighted average of the seven wind farms
built between 2000 and 2003 (5.22 days per foundation), and the
corresponding one for four wind farms that started to install in 2017
and already finished (2.19 days). Data show that the corresponding
figures per MW of the turbine installed were 2.47 days in 2000–2003
and 0.30 days in 2017, an 87% reduction. One wind farm, Belgian
Rentel project, even managed to install monopiles at 0.18 days/MW.
Fig. 9 very vividly proves the large impact that the newer, large
turbines have had in reducing installation time per megawatt. Com-
paring the trend lines for the groups of turbines shows the significant
reduction first from the 1.5–2.3MW to 3–4MW and recently to the
6+MW technologies.
4.5. Discussion
Monopile technology dominates the market for offshore wind
foundations fixed to the sea floor. Monopiles take, on average, less time
to install than any other type of foundation, and more so when mea-
sured in terms of days per MW equivalent.
There is no correlation of installation days with water depth nor
with distance to shore, but there is a clear trend towards shorter in-
stallation time overall. Other variables have a stronger influence, the
most important of which could probably be the capabilities of the
vessels used and the distance to the construction port instead of the
direct distance to the shore.
On average, significant time reductions began to happen after 2013,
with monopiles being installed in only 38% of the time (per MW
equivalent) as in the period 2009–2013. This was coincidental with
entry into service of new, large vessels (140– 160m long) Pacific Orca,
Pacific Osprey, Vidar, Aeolus, Scylla…
There is a certain correlation between wind farm size and installa-
tion time but this correlation has not evolved with technology or pro-
cess learning.
The reduction in the time of installation per MW between two
samples (2000–2003 and 2017) reached 87%, from 2.47 down to 0.30
days/MW.
5. Turbine installation: results and discussion
Turbine installation is generally independent of the kind of foun-
dation used, and thus this analysis of turbine installation includes tur-
bines on all kinds of foundations.
Has the installation of turbines obtained the same efficiency gains as
in the case of the monopile foundations?
Fig. 10 shows that the data have a high level of dispersion, and
suggests that turbine installation is nowadays only marginally more
efficient per turbine. This graph shows the turbine installation rate for
European OWFs7 from 2000. The trend line shows only a very slight
sign of a reduction in installation time. Therefore, when considered
from the point of view of installing only the turbine, the improvement is
marginal. Still, it should be noted that turbines have been increasing in
size, and this increase makes installation time longer because:
(a) Methods and procedures to install that were learnt and already well
managed are not necessarily valid with the larger turbines, and
(b) Larger cranes are needed which may render old vessels unusable.
The size of the bubbles, which represents the size of the wind tur-
bines, hints a more positive view: the installation time per megawatt
has been reduced radically, as shown in the following paragraphs and
figures.
Fig. 11 plots the time needed to install turbines in megawatts terms
for the whole set of turbines and only for turbines installed on mono-
piles. The vertical axis has been trimmed in order to better show the
important points. This leaves out of the picture three wind farms in-
stalled in 2000, 2003 and 2006, plus BARD.
The weighted average turbine installation rate increased from 2.92
days/turbine in the 9 wind farm built in the period 2000–2003 to 3.39
days for the 12 projects started in 2016–2017 and already finished.
However, the installation rate per megawatt of the same set of wind
Fig. 9. Monopile installation days per MW terms.
Fig. 10. Evolution of the turbine-only installation days and turbine size for
monopile-based installations with turbines between 1.5 and 2.3MW (blue)
between 3 and 4MW (red), and larger than 6MW (green), as well as non-
monopile-based installations of any turbine rating (purple). Source: own data-
base. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.).
7 One OWF is actually not shown in the graph, BARD Offshore 1, at 26.6 days/turbine.
It started installing in 2010 and finished three years later with up to four vessels installing
turbines. The developer went bankrupt.
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farms decreased from 1.38 to 0.62 days/MW, a 55% reduction.
There are interesting differences between both graphs in Fig. 11. For
example, there are no large turbines installed on monopiles prior to
2014; also, the reduction in installation time is steepest in the case of
monopile-mounted turbines. However, those two points are more con-
nected that a first look might suggest: because the data shown corre-
spond installation time per MW, the new installation of large turbines
(up to 8MW) on monopiles from 2014 onwards makes the reduction
trend per MW steeper for monopiles.
Note that prior to 2014 only two turbines larger than 3.6 MW had
been installed on monopiles, at the Gunfleet Sands Demonstration
project, and this project is not included in our analysis because of its
experimental character.
Both graphs also suggest that from 2013 the dispersion of turbine
installation times has been greatly reduced.
In summary, turbine installation times have increased per unit and
have significantly decreased per megawatt.
As in the case of monopiles, the availability of larger vessels able to
carry more turbines has helped improving installation times per
megawatt: the highest number of megawatts carried by a vessel was 9.2
in the period 2000–2003 (4 turbines rated 2.3 MW each) whereas Scylla
carried six 6-MW turbines during the installation of Veja Mate OWF.
6. Whole set installation: results and discussion
6.1. Installation rate (vessel-days/set), monopile-based
The graphs show the evolution of the installation time for the whole
set turbine plus foundation. Fig. 12 shows that the trend towards a
reduction in the installation time of OWF using the smaller turbines
(1.5–2.3MW rated capacities) was broken by the eventful Teesside in-
stallation (started in 2012 and needing 14 vessel-days/set). However,
the decreasing trend shown by mid-size turbines (3–4MW rated capa-
cities) is clear and it is based on enough data points to consider it a
robust trend. The largest turbine set shows a similar decreasing trend
but note that data are less robust because of the lower number of data
points.
Interestingly, this reduction in installation times occurs despite the
increase in distances to shore.
Focusing on the medium-range turbine group (3–4MW), whereas
Fig. 7 shows that the installation of monopiles has indeed seen a time
improvement, Fig. 10 shows that the installation time of turbines on
monopiles has not progressed at the same pace.
When observed over the trend line in Fig. 12, the installation of the
whole set is reduced from 9 days in 2003 to 6.25 days in 2015 for
medium machines (3–4MW) on monopiles.
6.2. Installation time per megawatt of installed capacity
The picture is very different and the rate of reduction more clear in
the case of installation times per MW of turbine (or wind farm) capa-
city.
Fig. 13 shows that the installation time of OWFs based on monopiles
has improved on a per megawatt basis, both for the smaller and for the
larger turbines.
The results shown there strongly support the hypothesis that wind
farm installation per megawatt is becoming less time-demanding. This
conclusion is further reinforced when analysing all wind farms based on
monopiles put together, irrespective of turbine rating (Fig. 14).
This figure shows how installation times have decreased per MW for
all commercial wind farms using monopiles. The weighted average of
the seven wind farms built between 2000 and 2003 was 3.67 days per
MW, whereas the average of the nine wind farms that started to install
in 2016 and 2017 and have already finished turbine installation was
Fig. 11. Turbine-only installation days per MW under two scenarios: all turbines (left) and only turbines on monopiles (right). The installation year corresponds to
the start of installation.
Fig. 12. Monopile-based, full-set installation times and distances to shore.
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1.06 days, a 71% reduction. The wind farm that achieved the lowest
installation time, the Walney 3 project, managed to install each set at an
average 0.60 days/MW.
The whole impact of larger turbines can only be seen by comparing
figures per set and per megawatt (see Table 4).
In conclusion, the installation time of the foundation and the tur-
bine of an offshore wind farm on monopiles has reduced by 22% on a
per-turbine basis but a much more impressive 71% on a per-megawatt
basis. The latter is a very significant drop that is responsible for an
important part of the reduction in the cost of energy from these offshore
wind farms.
7. Conclusions
This research presents for the first time the quantification in tem-
poral terms of the learning-by-doing and technological improvements
in installation of turbines and foundations of offshore wind farms.
This study shows that turbine plus foundation installation time has
decreased from 7.6 days in 2000–2003 to 5.9 days in 2016–2017 for
monopile-based projects. Interestingly, this reduction in installation
times occurs despite the increase in distances to shore.
The reduction in installation times is stronger when the effect of
larger turbines is taken into account. Installation times for all wind
farms with monopile foundations were reduced from just below 4 days
per MW in 2000–2003 to 1.06 days per MW in 2016–2017, a 71% re-
duction.
This reduction is mostly caused by improvements in the installation
of the foundations. Foundation installation times per megawatt has
improved by 87%, significantly more than turbine installation per MW
(55%). However, the biggest effect was achieved by the increase in the
size of individual turbines (to 8.25MW at Walney 3) and the corre-
sponding increase in foundations size and reduction in the number of
foundations and turbines for the same given wind farm capacity.
This research found that the effect of economies of scale, measured
based on wind farm size, was not significant in reducing the installation
time for either foundations or turbines.
A limitation of this study is that the effect of waiting-on-weather
days has not been discounted, as discussed in subsection 3.3, and we
strongly recommend follow-up work that discounts this effect if pos-
sible. A second limitation is that some of the dates corresponding to the
oldest wind farms lack the accuracy of data available for the newest
projects.
We suggest that this research could be a starting point for thorough
quantification of key technological and non-technological elements
behind the impressive offshore wind cost reductions of late. These in-
clude, e.g. other installation elements, mainly cable installation, or the
impact of evolving financing rates and financing structures. The re-
sulting research could be put together to fully understand how a tech-
nology that is subject to the strong force of nature has been able to
manage and dominate it.
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Appendix A
See Table A1.
Fig. 13. Evolution installation rates per MW of installed capacity in wind farms
with monopile foundations.
Fig. 14. Evolution of the installation rate for turbines mounted on monopiles,
all turbine ratings in a single data series.
Table 4
Average figures for the beginning and the end of the period under study, set
foundation plus turbine, and corresponding reduction.
Simple average Weighted average
Per turbine Per MW Per turbine Per MW
Sets in 7 MP-based wind farms
starting construction
2000–2003
9.52 4.59 7.58 3.67
Sets in 9 MP-based wind farms
starting construction
2016–2017
6.44 1.17 5.93 1.06
Reduction 32% 75% 22% 71%
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Table A1
Main wind farm features and installation days.
No Wind farm project No. of WT WT power (MW) WF capacity (MW) Type of foundation Year start installation Days/ foundation Days/ turbine Days/ set
1 Utgrunden 7 1.5 10.5 Monopile 2000 4.29 6.57 10.86
2 Middelgrunden 20 2 40 Gravity base 2000 3.00 3.00 6.00
3 Yttre Stengrund 5 2 10 Monopile 2001 11.00 3.60 14.60
4 Horns Rev 1 80 2 160 Monopile 2002 3.18 2.68 5.85
5 Rodsand 1 72 2.3 165.6 Gravity base 2002 5.42 1.10 6.52
6 Samso 10 2.3 23 Monopile 2002 3.67 3.00 6.67
7 North Hoyle 30 2 60 Monopile 2003 5.23 7.33 12.57
8 Arklow Bank I 7 3.6 25.2 Monopile 2003 6.57 4.86 11.43
9 Scroby Sands 30 2 60 Monopile 2003 2.60 2.07 4.67
10 Kentish Flats 30 3 90 Monopile 2004 1.97 3.80 5.77
11 Barrow 30 3 90 Monopile 2005 5.97 5.00 10.97
12 Lillgrund 48 2.3 110.4 Gravity base 2006 8.56 1.54 10.10
13 OWEZ 36 3 108 Monopile 2006 3.25 2.39 5.64
14 Burbo Bank 25 3.6 90 Monopile 2006 2.24 1.60 3.84
15 Beatrice pilot 2 5 10 Jacket 2006 8.50 30.00 38.50
16 Prinses Amalia 60 2 120 Monopile 2006 3.03 6.13 9.17
17 Lynn & Inner Dowsing 54 3.6 194.4 Monopile 2007 4.33 2.26 6.59
18 Robin Rigg 60 3 180 Monopile 2007 4.18 5.00 9.18
19 Thornton Bank I 6 5 30 Gravity base 2008 7.00 11.00 18.00
20 Rhyl Flats 25 3.6 90 Monopile 2008 3.96 7.60 11.56
21 Horns Rev 2 91 2.3 209.3 Monopile 2008 1.61 2.71 4.32
22 Gunfleet Sands I & II 48 3.6 172.8 Monopile 2008 2.39 4.58 6.97
23 Thanet 100 3 300 Monopile 2009 5.47 1.97 7.44
24 Rodsand II 90 2.3 207 Gravity base 2009 3.37 5.36 8.73
25 Alpha Ventus (T) 6 5 30 Tripod 2009 7.50 17.67 25.17
26 Alpha Ventus (J) 6 5 30 Jacket 2009 14.83 8.67 23.50
27 Sprogo 7 3 21 Gravity base 2009 2.00 2.86 4.86
28 Belwind 55 3 165 Monopile 2009 5.38 3.22 8.59
29 Greater Gabbard 140 3.6 504 Monopile 2009 3.69 2.78 6.47
30 Walney I 51 3.6 183.6 Monopile 2010 2.69 4.76 7.45
31 BARD Offshore I 80 5 400 Tripile 2010 14.09 26.63 40.71
32 EnBW Baltic 1 21 2.3 48.3 Monopile 2010 3.00 1.76 4.76
33 Sheringham Shoal 88 3.6 316.8 Monopile 2010 3.18 6.89 10.06
34 Ormonde 30 5.075 152.25 Jacket 2010 4.61 4.57 9.18
35 London Array 175 3.6 630 Monopile 2011 4.31 3.26 7.57
36 Lincs 75 3.6 270 Monopile 2011 5.93 3.61 9.55
37 Thornton Bank II 30 6.15 184.5 Jacket 2011 7.36 8.80 16.16
38 Walney II 51 3.6 183.6 Monopile 2011 3.94 4.25 8.20
39 Trianel Borkum 1 40 5 200 Tripod 2011 8.23 7.80 16.03
40 Anholt 111 3.6 399.6 Monopile 2011 2.81 4.37 7.18
41 Teesside 27 2.3 62.1 Monopile 2012 8.96 5.52 14.48
42 Thornton Bank III 18 6.15 110.7 Jacket 2012 6.52 12.78 19.30
43 Borkum Riffgat 30 3.775 113.25 Monopile 2012 2.97 2.83 5.80
44 Gwynt y Mor 160 3.6 576 Monopile 2012 5.02 5.02 10.04
45 Karehamn 16 3 48 Gravity base 2012 4.00 5.31 9.31
46 Meerwind 80 3.6 288 Monopile 2012 6.36 6.49 12.85
47 Global Tech I 80 5 400 Tripod 2012 6.14 9.30 15.44
48 Gunfleet Sands III 2 6 12 Monopile 2012 6.00 6.50 12.50
49 Nordsee Ost 48 6.15 295.2 Jacket 2012 9.24 7.69 16.93
50 Belwind Haliade prot. 1 6 6 Jacket 2013 0.00 44.00 44.00
51 Dan Tysk 80 3.6 288 Monopile 2013 3.86 1.90 5.76
52 Northwind 72 3 216 Monopile 2013 2.07 3.29 5.36
53 West of Duddon Sands 108 3.6 388.8 Monopile 2013 2.16 2.32 4.48
54 EnBW Baltic II (J) 41 3.6 147.6 Jacket (3 legs) 2013 10.00 3.81 13.81
55 Humber Gateway 73 3 219 Monopile 2013 3.45 3.79 7.25
56 EnBW Baltic II (MP) 39 3.6 140.4 Monopile 2013 5.26 3.81 9.07
57 Amrumbank West 80 3.775 302 Monopile 2014 4.58 2.69 7.26
58 Borkum Riffgrund 1 78 4 312 Monopile 2014 2.48 2.68 5.16
59 Westermost Rough 35 6 210 Monopile 2014 2.66 6.66 9.31
60 Butendiek 80 3.6 288 Monopile 2014 2.79 3.41 6.20
61 Luchterduinen 43 3 129 Monopile 2014 1.84 1.51 3.35
62 Westermeerwind 48 3 144 Monopile 2015 1.44 3.69 5.13
63 Gode Wind I & II 97 6 582 Monopile 2015 1.63 2.97 4.60
64 Kentish Flats Extension 15 3.3 49.5 Monopile 2015 1.47 3.80 5.27
65 Gemini 150 4 600 Monopile 2015 1.43 2.52 3.95
66 Sandbank 72 4 288 Monopile 2015 2.64 2.50 5.14
67 Nordsee One 54 6.15 332.1 Monopile 2015 2.33 3.76 6.09
68 Rampion 116 3.45 400.2 Monopile 2016 2.86 2.55 5.41
69 Veja Mate 67 6 402 Monopile 2016 3.91 3.34 7.25
70 Dudgeon 67 6 402 Monopile 2016 1.84 3.63 5.46
71 Wikinger 70 5 350 Jacket 2016 7.04 3.99 11.03
72 Nordergrunde 18 6.15 110.7 Monopile 2016 4.39 7.28 11.67
73 Nobelwind 50 3.3 165 Monopile 2016 2.49 3.20 5.69
74 Burbo Bank Extension 32 8 256 Monopile 2016 1.66 3.96 5.62
(continued on next page)





No Wind farm project No. of WT WT power (MW) WF capacity (MW) Type of foundation Year start installation Days/ foundation Days/ turbine Days/ set
75 Race Bank 91 6.3 573.3 MP 2016 2.23 2.55 4.78
76 Galloper 56 6.3 352.8 MP 2016 1.64 5.41 7.05
77 Walney 3 40 8.25 330 MP 2017 2.51 2.48 4.98
78 Walney 4 47 7 329 MP 2017 2.51
79 Ajos 8 3.3 26.4 Gravity 2017 2.70 1.50 4.20
80 Tahkoluoto 10 4.2 42 Gravity 2017 2.40 1.50 3.90
81 Blyth Demonstration 5 8.3 41.5 Gravity 2017 8.00 3.00 11.00
82 Hywind Scotland 5 6 30 Spar floater 2017 1.87 1.87
83 Rentel 42 7.35 308.7 MP 2017 1.33
84 Arkona 60 6.417 385 MP 2017 2.40
85 Nissum Bredning 4 7 28 Gravity 2017 14.75 13.25 28.00
86 Aberdeen (EOWDC) 11 8.4 93.2 SBJ 2018
Notes:
– Experimental wind farms or prototype installations are coloured red and underlined.
– Wind farms installed as part of a single project (Gunfleet Sands I&II, Lynn & Inner Dowsing, and Gode Wind I&II) are counted as a single project. Wind farms
installing more than one type of foundation (Alpha Ventus and EnBW Baltic II) are treated as two different projects.
– The table does not reflect which wind farms used tugs for floating the monopiles to site (with the consequent time savings) or barges to move other elements
(e.g. jackets) to site.
Table B1
Wind farm installation dates and vessels.
No. Name Foundation installation Turbine installation
Start End Vessels Start End Vessels
1 Utgrunden I 01.09.00 30.09.00 Wind 16.09.00 31.10.00 Wind
2 Middelgrunden 01.10.00 30.11.00 Eide Barge 5 01.11.00 31.12.00 MEB-JB1
3 Yttre Stengrund 01.05.01 25.06.01 Excalibur 15.06.01 15.07.01 MEB-JB1
4 Horns Rev 1 30.03.02 03.08.02 Buzzard, Wind 07.05.02 21.08.02 Sea Energy, Sea Power
5 Rodsand 1 01.06.02 01.07.03 Eide Barge 5 09.05.03 27.07.03 Sea Energy
6 Samso 04.10.02 05.11.02 Vagant 10.12.02 03.01.03 Vagant
7 North Hoyle 07.04.03 15.08.03 Excalibur, The Wind 03.08.03 15.03.04 MEB-JB1, Excalibur, Resolution
8 Arklow Bank I 16.07.03 31.08.03 Sea Jack 01.09.03 05.10.03 Sea Jack
9 Scroby Sands 20.10.03 06.01.04 Sea Jack 25.03.04 01.06.04 Sea Energy, Excalibur
10 Kentish Flats 22.08.04 19.10.04 Resolution 01.05.05 22.08.05 Sea Energy
11 Barrow 15.05.05 15.11.05 Resolution 01.12.05 30.04.06 Resolution
12 Lillgrund 11.01.06 26.02.07 Eide Barge 5 03.08.07 16.10.07 Sea Power
13 OWEZ 03.04.06 28.07.06 Svanen 02.06.06 26.08.06 Sea Energy
14 Burbo Bank 05.06.06 30.07.06 Sea Jack 20.05.07 29.06.07 Sea Jack
15 Beatrice Pilot 15.07.06 31.07.06 Rambiz 01.07.07 31.07.07 Rambiz
16 Prinses Amalia / Q7 22.09.06 26.03.07 Sea Jack 16.05.07 16.11.07 Sea Jack, Sea Energy
17 Lynn & Inner Dowsing 15.04.07 05.12.07 Resolution 15.03.08 15.07.08 Resolution
18 Robin Rigg 15.09.07 09.01.09 Resolution 04.11.08 31.08.09 Sea Worker, Sea Energy
19 Thornton Bank I 26.04.08 06.06.08 Rambiz 16.07.08 20.09.08 Buzzard
20 Rhyl Flats 29.04.08 05.08.08 Svanen 03.04.09 10.10.09 Lisa A
21 Horns Rev 2 13.05.08 07.10.08 Sea Jack 15.03.09 14.11.09 Sea Power
22 Gunfleet Sands I & II 14.10.08 31.12.08 Svanen, Excalibur 24.03.09 31.01.10 Sea Worker, KS Titan
23 Thanet 15.03.09 31.03.10 Sea Jacks, Resolution 09.12.09 24.06.10 Resolution
24 Rodsand II 01.04.09 01.02.10 Eide Barge 5 20.03.09 15.07.10 Sea Power
25 Alpha Ventus 17.04.09 01.06.09 Odin, JB114 02.06.09 16.09.09 Taklift 4,
26 Alpha Ventus 01.09.09 07.09.09 Buzzard, JB115, Thialf 25.09.09 16.11.09 Thialf, Buzzad
27 Sprogo 01.09.09 15.09.09 16.10.09 05.11.09 Sea Energy
28 Belwind 02.09.09 16.02.10 Svanen, JB114 26.03.10 16.09.10 JB114, JB115
29 Greater Gabbard 08.10.09 08.09.10 Stanislav Yudin, Javelin, Leviathan, 09.05.10 21.03.12 Leviathan, Sea Jack, Kraken,
30 Walney 1 02.04.10 17.08.10 Goliath, Vagant 10.07.10 24.01.11 Kraken, Sea Worker
31 BARD Offshore I 07.04.10 08.05.13 Wind Lift I, 02.12.10 01.08.13 Brave Tern; Thor; JB115; JB117
32 EnBW Baltic 1 05.05.10 10.07.10 Sea Worker 27.07.10 02.09.10 Sea Power
33 Sheringham Shoal 25.06.10 21.08.11 Svanen, Oleg Strashnov 08.06.11 10.07.12 Endeavour; Leviathan
34 Ormonde 22.07.10 24.10.10 Buzzard, Rambiz 17.03.11 01.08.11 Sea Jack
35 London Array 01.03.11 19.10.12 Sea Worker, Adventure, Svanen, Sea
Jack
27.01.12 29.12.12 Discovery, Sea Worker, Sea Jack
36 Lincs 29.03.11 15.06.12 Resolution, JB114 04.07.12 31.03.13 Resolution
37 Thornton Bank II 06.04.11 28.09.11 Buzzard, Rambiz 18.03.12 27.07.12 Neptune, Vagant
38 Walney 2 07.04.11 06.08.11 Svanen, Goliath 15.05.11 26.09.11 Leviathan, Kraken
39 Trianel Windpark Borkum 1 (40) 01.09.11 24.04.13 Goliath, Oleg Strashnov, Stanislav
Yudin
24.07.13 01.06.14 Adventure
(continued on next page)
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This research investigates, analyses, and quantifies the technological effects of wind
turbine repowering (ie, where old turbines are removed and new turbines are installed
at the same or a very close location, including the enhanced performance in energy
production). In these cases, it is assumed that both old and new turbines are subject
to the same wind regime, other than because of technological elements, such as hub
height, and thus it is possible to isolate the effects of new technology from the effect
of changing local wind conditions. This research is based on the analysis of empirical
data on repowering turbines in Denmark and Germany, and on historical production
data available for the Danish component of the data set. Technological innovations
are expected to enable new wind turbines to capture more energy at the repowering
site, mostly through larger rotors and higher hub heights, and this is what this study
has analysed. The results show that new turbines in repowering projects are twice
as high, have three times the rotor diameter, nine times the swept area, six times
the nominal power, and nine times as much electricity as the old turbines. However,
the most significant improvement is probably the increase of capacity factor of 7.1%
on a per‐turbine basis, or 9.7% on a per‐production basis.
KEYWORDS
dismantling, innovation, repowering, technological progress, wind energy1 | INTRODUCTION
Wind energy facilities, as other power generation technologies, are subject to ageing, inducing reduction of efficiency, output, and availability.1 In
the case of wind turbines, it has been suggested that they lose up to 1.6% of their output per each year.2 There are many reasons for reductions in
production, including fouling of blades and decreased efficiency of the gearbox, bearings, or generator. In addition, downtime increases as the
turbines get older and need more maintenance. Even the lack of spare parts may become an issue at a certain age.3 In parallel, operational costs
increase over time.4
When the asset approaches the end of its operational life, project owners have a number of options: decommissioning, refurbishment (or par-
tial repowering), repowering, life extension, or run to fail. Given that an excellent description of the former three options can be found in Topham
et al,5 we will not expand on this here. Run to fail involves leaving all turbines working, with minimum maintenance, until maintenance costs are
higher than revenues.6- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 661Repowering a wind farm implies dismantling the existing wind turbines and installing new turbines of a larger size with new technology7 at or
near the positions of the old turbines. Although repowering can apply (but has not been done so to date) to offshore wind farms, in this research,
we focus on the experience of repowering onshore wind facilities.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the background to repowering wind turbines. Section 1 presents the method-
ology, model, and main data issues; Section 2 represents the results of our research, the technology effects of repowering in Germany and Den-
mark on the most significant technical characteristics of the turbines, and the impact of repowering on energy production for Danish wind
turbines. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 3.
Throughout the paper, the following definitions will apply:
• Repowering: the process of replacing existing wind turbines with new turbines, which either have a larger nameplate capacity or more efficiency,
resulting in a net increase of power generation (according to del Rio et al8).
• Dismantled: refers to any turbine that has been decommissioned; removed refers to turbines that were decommissioned and dismantled in the
context of a repowering project; and new refers to the replacing of turbines.
• Repowering year: the year the new turbine was commissioned.2 | BACKGROUND—REPOWERING WIND TURBINES
Repowering wind turbines (or wind farms) brings a number of benefits. First, and most important, repowering will increase performance and elec-
tricity production of wind projects, as demonstrated under different circumstances by previous studies.1,4,8-11 This increase in performance is
partly because the sites with the best wind conditions were often used in the 1980s or 1990s.12 Compared with a greenfield project, financing
conditions tend to be better for repowering projects because the wind resource is known already and planning costs will be lower.6,13,14 In some
cases, parts of existing infrastructure might be usable,15 eg, the wind farm substation and some of the electrical connections. Repowering will have
a positive effect in reaching climate change commitments at a national level, as modelled by Jung et al in the German case, Serri et al in the Italian
case, and by Ramírez et al in the Spanish case.11,16,17
A theoretical case study for a wind farm in India has shown that energy yield could increase by a factor of four.18 Other studies have reported
an increase in capacity factor by 10 percentage points.14 Interestingly, research based on actual wind farm repowering cases found that while
maintaining the same rated power, electricity production was doubled.19FIGURE 1 Age distribution of wind fleet in selected countries. Sources: Global Wind Statistics,29 Wind in Power 2017,30 and JRC Wind Energy
Database31 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
662 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.Repowering of wind turbines also offers advantages for the whole electricity system8 and the society at large. In general, repowering will lead
to a reduction of reactive power consumption and voltage variations.18 Turbines have evolved to better support the grid by adding increasingly
complex features, such as low‐voltage ride‐through. Further, new turbines have lower rotational speeds with reduced noise emissions.20 Bigger
rotors and slower rotational speeds provide a less visually intrusive and more pleasant view than fast‐rotating turbines.21
In terms of environmental effects, wind farm repowering has a number of benefits. Fatalities for raptors and other birds are reduced, as shown
by a research in California, which found that repowering resulted in a reduction of fatalities by 83% for raptors and 87% for all birds for the same
amount of energy generated.22 In Mediterranean mountain ecosystems, repowering was found to reduce the relative mortality of skylark males as
compared with new turbine installation.23 Repowering impact on global warming has also been investigated, and researchers found that the
impact of removing the old and installing the new turbines (and other works) is “clearly offset by the benefits of increasing the generation of elec-
trical power from renewable sources.”24 The visual effect was investigated based on a real case, and it was found that the repowering wind farm
project achieved a 37% power increase with no additional visual effects.25 Last but not least, local acceptance is also usually higher for repowering
projects compared with greenfield developments.26,27
A significant portion of the installed European Union (EU) wind fleet will come to the end of its lifetime between 2020 and 2030.28 Approx-
imately, 3.3 GW of the wind turbines installed in the EU by the end of 2017 were 20 years and older. This group, along with the approximately 18
GW of turbines between 15 and 19 years old are the obvious candidates for repowering (Figure 1). Notwithstanding this, there are cases where
younger turbines can be suited for repowering, and this would include some of the 33 GW of turbines between 10 and 14 years old. The largest
markets for repowering in the EU are Germany, Denmark, Spain, and Italy. The repowering market is also large in the United States and India, with
about 1.1 and 0.3 GW of wind turbines being 20 years and older.
Two countries that have been frontrunners in wind energy have accumulated significant experience with repowering so far: Denmark and
Germany.32 Since 2001, Denmark has supported repowering through various incentive programmes, which led to the repowering of a significant
amount of the oldest wind turbines. Fifty‐six percent of turbines installed before 2000 and 84% of turbines installed before 1994 had already been
removed by the end of 2017. More than 3200 turbines were dismantled in Denmark before 2018.
In Germany, about 5470 MW (approximately 2040 turbines) of wind power capacity has been installed before 2018 in repowering projects.
Those turbines replaced about 2900 old turbines (2280 MW).33 Table 1 shows the annual evolution of repowering in Germany.
So far, the technological effects, efficiency gains, and performance improvements of actual repowering projects have not been researched in a
detailed manner. Some evidence is available from theoretical studies.1,10,34 Some case studies have been performed on an individual wind farm
basis (see, eg, Castro‐Santos et al34 and Villena‐Ruiz et al20 for actual repowering wind farms in Spain), then the focus has been economic or
techno‐economic, rather than technological. Also, at a national level, the focus of the assessment or modelling of repowering has been from an
economic (eg, de Simón‐Martín et al,27) or techno‐economic (eg, Serri et al.,17) perspective.
The objective of this research is therefore to fill this gap by analysing the technological and performance (in terms of energy production)
changes due to wind turbine repowering independent from locational changes in wind resource. In addition, unlike previous research, this research
focuses on a large number of cases in which different analytical tools have been applied.3 | METHODOLOGY AND DATA USED3.1 | Methodology
There are two main methodological elements in this research. First, technology trends were uncovered through graphical representation. Second,
regression analysis was performed to show how variations in performance are linked to the key technology trends.TABLE 1 Historical account of repowering in Germany
Wind Turbines <2006 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Removed turbines 147 79 108 26 76 140 170 252 416 544 253 336 387 2934
New turbines 107 55 45 18 55 90 95 161 269 413 176 238 315 2037
Removed MW 155 26 41 10 37 56 123 179 258 364 195 366 467 2277
New MW 190 136 103 24 136 183 238 432 766 1148 484 679 952 5472
Note. Source: Annual and half‐year reports “Status of wind energy development in Germany” by Deutsche WindGuard on behalf of the German Wind
Energy Association,33 for 2017 and previous years. Remarks: the source acknowledges that not all repowering activity has been captured in these statistics;
figures prior to 2006 are obtained through subtracting from the latest cumulative figures.
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 663The data sample consists of sets of two wind turbines, one removed and a second one newly installed in the vicinity (see the next paragraphs)
around the same period. Data include the technical characteristics of both turbines and the corresponding energy produced during a reasonably
long period of time.
Microsoft Excel and Visual Basic for Applications were used as the main modelling tools before applying regression analysis to the results. A
Visual Basic for Applications macro selected pairs of removed/newly installed turbines under the following conditions:
• maximum distance between them was 1500 m;
• new installation occurred between 30 days before and 500 days after dismantling the old turbine.
The maximum distance of 1500 m was decided after Monforti and González‐Aparicio found that “uncertainty in the wind farm locations of the
order of a few kilometres is not expected to visibly decrease the quality of the wind power assessment at national level.”35 Figure 7 in that article shows
that a separation of 1500 m hardly affects the simulated wind conditions.
The period of 30 days before and 500 days after dismantling the old turbine was chosen to follow the reasonable project management process
while not letting excessive time impact the available technology at the time of repowering. A much longer time period might involve completely
disconnecting the old and new turbines (thus not a repowering project).3.2 | Data sources and data availability
For Denmark, the publicly available Danish master data register for wind turbines (Stamdataregister for vindkraftanlæg) provided by the Danish
Energy Agency was used.36 The register contains data on geographical coordinates, turbine model, rated power, hub size, rotor diameter, date
of commissioning and decommissioning, and annual energy production for most wind turbines. However, some wind farms do report global pro-
duction data; in such cases, the register presents the average production per turbine. On the negative side, this database lacks wind farm names;
therefore, it is not possible to unequivocally associate old and new wind farms and even turbines.
In Germany, a publicly available register of all notifications (eg, commissioning and decommissioning) of renewable energy installations since
August 2014 is available from the Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway.37 For wind energy, the
register contains the geographical coordinates, turbine model, rated power, hub size, rotor diameter, and date of commissioning and
decommissioning per wind turbine. The register also specifies that if a new wind turbine was commissioned as part of a repowering project. Wind
turbines that have been commissioned before August 2014 are not included in the sample. Also, operators are not obliged to report dismantling of
old turbines, thus we cannot assume that the set of decommissioned turbines is complete. Energy production data were provided by the Federal
Network Agency to the JRC under a confidentiality agreement and cover the years 2012 to 2016 only. Unfortunately, given the limited period,
these data did not enable energy production analysis as in the Danish case.
For Denmark, data about repowering projects from as early as 2000 were available, whereas for Germany, the sample only includes repowering
projects from the last 4 years. The data available varies according to the specific parameter analysed because of the different levels ofFIGURE 2 Evolution of the age of Danish
removed turbines in this analysis. Size of
bubble indicates number of wind turbines
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
664 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.completeness in the data fields. However, there are two broad categories of parameters: technological or structural elements relate to the turbine
characteristics (eg, hub height, rotor diameter, and specific power) and energy production resulting from the interaction of structural elements with
the wind; in other words, turbine data vs production data.
Any data point containing valid data in structural fields was used for the respective analysis. However, the analysis related to energy
production was restricted to those cases where at least three full years of data were available in order to accommodate the variability of the
wind resource.
For Denmark, the data sample that could be used for the subsequent analyses included 232 pairs of turbines for the technical parameters,
which is just 6% of all dismantled turbines. Data on energy production was available for 200 pairs (5.5% of all dismantled turbines). The data sam-
ple for Germany with complete information about the technical parameters contained 442 pairs of turbines and data on energy production was
not used. The appendices contain detailed information about data issues and the data improvements performed.4 | RESULTS
In Denmark, three “waves” of repowering can be identified from the data: 2000 to 2003 (123 data points), 2008 to 2011 (48 data points), and
2013 to 2016 (51 data points). The first wave is broadly consistent with the first incentive programme for repowering—April 2001 to December
2003.38 The second wave comes roughly at the end and after the second incentive programme (2005‐2009). The third wave does not correspond
to any incentive programme. The overall pattern of dismantled turbines is consistent with these waves, with a total of 1569, 727 and 467 turbines
were dismantled during those periods. In particular, the number of data points is low in 2005, 2007, and 2012, whereas no repowering project was
captured by the model in 2004 and 2005.
The age of the turbines in Denmark when removed varies over time. The first wave average was just below 15 years, the second wave was 18
years, and the third wave was 17 years (Figure 2). German turbines in the sample are 15.9 years old, on average.
For Germany, data about repowering projects and production data were only available for 2014 onward. Thus, in the remaining of this section
we will focus mainly on results for Denmark and will compare them with German data (whenever data were available).4.1 | Technological changes
4.1.1 | Power rating
The average power rating of removed turbines increases slightly during all waves in Denmark (Figure 3). This average rating was 133 kW during
the first wave, 284 kW during the second wave, and 712 kW during the third wave for removed turbines. The corresponding figures for the new
turbines were 1131, 2299, and 3116 kW, respectively. The figure shows the widening gap between removed and new turbines, from approxi-
mately 1000 kW during the first wave, 2000 kW during the second wave, and 2400 kW during the third wave. The sharp increase after 2006
to 2007 has to be highlighted.FIGURE 3 Evolution of the average power
rating of new and removed turbines [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
FIGURE 4 Power rating increase (times)
between new and removed turbines in
Denmark [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 665In Germany, the average power rating of removed wind turbines was between 900 and 1300 kW, while the new turbines showed more similar
ratings to Denmark (for 2014 onwards), which was a capacity of between 2500 and 3050 kW on average.
The average (or mean) of power rating increases in Denmark was 11.6 times throughout the period, but the median was 8.8 times. This sug-
gests a high number of cases where the power rating increases (times) were low, as was the case during the second part of the period, from 2008
(Figure 4). For the average power rating of new turbines (1833 kW) versus the average of old turbines (302 kW), the increase is sixfold.
New turbines in Denmark were significantly more powerful than removed turbines during the first repowering wave, when they averaged 11
to 12 times the rated power of removed turbines. Later waves saw reduced differences and in the latest wave new turbines were only 5 to 6 times
as powerful as decommissioned turbines. This trend from larger to smaller differences between new and old turbines has been observed as well in
Germany, where the average increase was 3.7‐fold in 2014 and 3.0‐fold in 2017.
Statistical analysis suggests that in 2000 to 2002, projects were more homogeneous in Denmark, with 50% of the projects increasing power by
between 600 and 1300 kW each year. In 2002, the year when most cases were found (101), there were more radical outliers, with a 300‐ to 2651‐
kW difference between the new and the old turbines.
It is interesting to note that German and Danish removed turbines have very significant differences in all three key technological elements:
power rating, rotor diameter, and hub height. Figures 3, 5, and 6 show that from 2014 to 2017, these elements in German and Danish removed
cases start to diverge: whereas power rating, rotor diameter, and hub height of Danish turbines decreases or remains constant, in the case of
German machines those parameters always increase: turbines with larger power, taller towers, and larger rotors are increasingly being removed.FIGURE 5 Evolution of the average rotor
diameter of new and removed turbines
[Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
666 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.4.1.2 | Rotor diameter
The rotor is perhaps the element of the turbine that has a more direct relationship (through its swept area) to the energy produced. In Denmark,
the rotor diameter of turbines, both for the decommissioned and new sets, was on average more homogeneous than in the case of turbine power
rating. Old turbines had an average 21‐m diameter during the early period (wave 1), 29 m during wave 2, and 45 m during wave 3; the correspond-
ing figures for the turbine that replaced them are 56, 88, and 106 m, respectively (Figure 5). In Germany, average rotor diameter of removed wind
turbines was between 51 and 62 m between 2014 and 2017 (slightly higher compared with Denmark), whereas the new turbines showed a rotor
diameter between 87 and 113 m (on average).
Thus, on average, rotor diameters increased by around 30 m in 2000 and by 70 m in 2017 in Denmark. The most extreme case was where a
Vestas model (V164‐8 MW) was installed 470 m from where a 26‐year‐old Vestas V25‐200 was dismantled 2 months earlier, causing a 139 m
rotor increase and an increase of 43 times the swept area.
The relative increase of rotor diameter has been, on average, very stable: new turbines had a rotor three times as large as old turbines (in
metres), equivalent to a 9‐time increase in swept area. Given the direct relationship of swept area to energy produced, it could be concluded that
the increase in rotor diameter is the single most important structural element impacting an increase in energy production.4.1.3 | Hub height
The hub height is the last structural element analysed here that is strongly affected by repowering, and there are two reasons for this: first, larger
rotors naturally require larger towers; second, at higher altitudes, winds are stronger and steadier, conditions that warrant more energy extracted
and lower structural loads than turbulent winds.
The average annual hub height of turbines, both decommissioned and new, continued to increase through the periods (Figure 6). Old turbines
in Denmark had an average of 26 m hub height during wave 1, 32 m during wave 2, and 45 m during wave 3; the corresponding figures for new
turbines are 52, 76, and 86 m, respectively. A comparison with rotor diameter shows that hub heights for new turbines have not increased as sig-
nificantly as rotor diameters.
The average annual hub heights of removed turbines in Germany were between 60 and 70 m, notably taller than the corresponding Danish
data for the same years, 2014 to 2017, whereas the new turbines had hub heights between 97 and 120 m.
The average hub height increase was about 22 m in 2000 to 2003 and about 40 to 60 m in 2015 to 2017. Relative increase in hub height has
been, on average, very stable at two times the old turbine hub height.
4.1.4 | Specific power
Perhaps the most interesting result from repowering is the evolution of specific power, the ratio of power rating to swept area. This is because the
profile value, which measures how valuable a wind turbine generation profile is to the electricity system, increases in line with a reduction in spe-
cific power.39 All other elements being equal, a reduction in specific power results in higher capacity factor.FIGURE 6 Evolution of the average hub
height of new and removed turbines [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
FIGURE 7 Evolution of the average specific
power of new and removed turbines [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 667At the beginning and throughout the first wave, new turbines had significantly higher specific power than the old turbines they replaced; 434
vs 344 W/m2 in Denmark (Figure 7). This increase can be considered counterintuitive as it would reduce profile value. The reason can be traced
back to the support mechanism in Denmark, which, by making remuneration based on a total amount of full load hours (22 000),40 indirectly
promoted turbines with high specific power compared, eg, with a support mechanism based on a number of years of production. Reinforcing this
Danish feature, another database of 3606 wind turbines or wind farms commissioned in Europe during the period from 2001 to 2006, which is
based mostly on the database provided by GlobalData,41 shows that Danish turbines had an average specific factor of 420 W/m2 compared with
396 W/m2 in Germany and 378 W/m2 in Spain, the two big markets of the time.
A support mechanism based on the number of years of production promotes that turbines produce as much energy as possible during
these years, whereas support based on a number of full‐load hours promotes that turbines produce less energy per year in order for support
to last longer.
During the second wave, both new and old turbines had similar specific power, albeit the former already below the latter: 373 vs 392 W/m2.
During the third wave, the situation reversed, with new turbines having significantly lower specific power: 354 vs 411 W/m2. This reversal can be
linked both to technological evolution—the average specific power of a wind turbine has been decreasing with time,42 and because of changes in
2014 to the Danish support scheme, which incentivised lower specific power turbines.43
Interestingly, in Germany, average specific power was between 411 and 422 W/m2 for removed turbines and 461 and 316 W/m2 for new
turbines in 2014 to 2017, revealing a clear downward trend that increased the profile value of new turbines.
It is important to note that the lowest specific power of new turbines in Denmark steadily happens in the 2014 to 2017 time period. This is
consistent with the support scheme change in 2014, as mentioned earlier, to reduce the incentive for high specific power turbines. As Lena Kitzing
stated, “The change (to the support scheme) in 2014 has also eliminated much of this incentive by using swept area instead (at least for 70% of the
support duration calculation).”44
Looking forward, we see elements that could differentiate repowering project turbines from greenfield ones that are related to the location of
old turbines. In the past, turbines were placed considerably closer to human settlements than new wind farms. Therefore, repowering the old site
is unlikely to get planning consent in a number of cases. Even in the cases when planning consent is obtained, it could come with restrictions in
hub height or rotor diameter that can be similar to those placed on new projects in much of the United Kingdom (eg, Kelmarsh or Dunmaglass
wind farms) or Ireland (eg, Meenadreen Extension), where 2+ MW machines have hub heights limited to 70 m.4.2 | Electricity production
In this work, a number of wind turbine pairs did not contain reliable production data. Some others did not contain three full years of data. As a
result, only 200 pairs make up the energy‐production‐related analysis. The average number of production years of old turbines was 16 and 12
for new turbines until the end 2018, the end of the data sample.
The German data were not used for studying the effect of repowering on production because they were not available for a time period long
enough to obtain reliable results.
668 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.4.2.1 | Absolute annual energy production and increase
The annual energy production was calculated as the weighted average of the individual turbines for the years of production, which were consid-







where the absolute annual energy production for the whole set (AAEP) of turbines commissioned in each of the years between 2001 and 2015
(except 2004, 2006, and 2012 for which there are no valid data) is the sum, for each commissioning year, of the average annual turbine production
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where the average annual turbine production (AATP) of a removed turbine is the sum of its annual energy production from year a (the year fol-
lowing commissioning) to year b (the year before decommissioning). In the case of new turbines, b is the last year of data (2018).
The increase in absolute annual energy production for each (t) repowering turbine is the result of subtracting AATP for the removed turbine (td)
from AATP of the removed turbine (tr):
ΔAEPt ¼ AATPtr − AATPtd: (3)
As expected, the new turbines have increased annual energy production (Figure 8). On average, production increased by 1800 to 2700
MWh between 2001 and 2003; by 5000 to 8200 MWh between 2008 and 2011, and by 6500 to 10 300 MWh between 2013 and 2015.
Respective weighted average annual production increases were 2294, 6730, and 7734 MWh. According to annual averages per repowering
year, annual electricity production has remained relatively stable for removed turbines from 2001 to 2010 (between 250 and 550 MWh), then
picking up to 1400 MWh in 2013 to 2015. New turbines have seen a sharp increase from about 2500 MWh in 2001 to 2003 to almost 10
000 MWh in 2013 to 2015.
The relative increases of annual energy production are more random and range between 8 and 25 during 2001 to 2015, with a nonweighted
average of 12.7.
4.2.2 | Specific annual electricity production
Specific annual energy production shows the amount of electricity that a turbine generates irrespective of rotor size, ie, per square metre of swept
area. This indicator therefore collects technology improvements mostly due to turbine efficiency, power rating, and hub height.
Results consistently show that new turbines have increased specific energy production: 99% of the cases (197 pairs) show an increase after
repowering (Figure 9). The trend in both old and new turbines is towards higher specific electricity production in 2014, but 2015 shows a change.FIGURE 8 Evolution of the average annual
electricity production of new and removed
turbines [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 9 Evolution of the average annual
specific electricity production of new and
removed turbines [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 669With no data after 2015, it is not possible to define whether the 2015 effect is short or long term. On average, specific electricity production
increased by 320 kWh/m2/yr—a 45% increase—from 702 to 1021 kWh/m2/yr.4.2.3 | Capacity factor
The capacity factor (CF) is the percentage of actual production to theoretical production should the turbine have been producing continuously at
the rated power. It is expressed either as a percentage or as the equivalent number of hours, on annual average.
The net effect of repowering on CF is clearly positive. Figure 10 shows the annual average capacity factor for all the turbines removed or
installed based on the year the new turbine was installed. The graph shows the improvements since 2008, whereas previous projects did not
achieve significant improvements. The lower CF of the new turbines in the first years under study is the result of the higher specific power of
these turbines. One of the reasons behind this could be, as discussed in Section 2.1.4 and elsewhere, the impact of the then Danish support
scheme favouring turbines with high specific power. This point is strongly supported by the much lower specific power and much higher CF of
the turbines installed in 2014 and 2015 (after the reform of the Danish subsidy system in 2014) which, as shown in Figure 10, is the highest ever
(41.1% annual average in 2014).
In Figure 11, the CF of the old turbine is shown on the horizontal axis and the CF of the new turbine on the vertical axis. The black line divides
pairs according to whether the new (top left) or old (bottom right) turbine has a higher CF.FIGURE 10 Capacity factors of old and new
turbines [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 11 Capacity factors of new and removed turbines (colour indicates year of repowering) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
670 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.In the large majority of cases, the new turbine has a higher capacity factor. In 14% of the cases, the new turbine had a lower CF than the
replaced turbine. Some cases could be explained by data issues (eg, errors in reporting of electricity production). Most often, those cases related
to early repowering projects when turbine technology was more similar between the removed and new turbine (Section 2.1).
The results show that the old turbines had a capacity factor of 22.4% on average, whereas the new turbines reached 29.5%. This is a significant
7.1% increase in capacity factor on a per turbine basis.
However, the improvement is even higher if the effect of increasingly larger rotors is taken into account. Calculations based on the whole‐fleet
annual production identify this effect. The set of old turbines for which energy data are available, where the sum of power rating is 56.5865 MW,
produced an average of 109 895.9 MWh annually, which gives an average capacity factor of 22.2%. Similarly, the sum of power ratings of the set
of new turbines is 354.16 MW, which means they produce an annual average of 988 146.3 MWh, providing an average capacity factor of 31.85%;
an increase of 9.7% on a per production basis.TABLE 2 Results of the regression analysis
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Adj SS Adj MS F value P value
Regression 2 1776735939 888367969 1380.38 0.000
ΔTR (kW) 1 961780834 961780834 1494.45 0.000
ΔSP (W/m2) 1 111166111 111166111 172.73 0.000
Model Summary
S R2 R2 (adj) R2 (pred)
802.227 93.37% 93.30% 93.12%
Coefficients
Term Coef SE Coef T value P value VIF
Constant −55 149 −0.37 0.715
ΔTR (kW) 3.2249 0.0834 38.66 0.000 1.29
ΔSP (W/m2) −8.262 0.629 −13.14 0.000 1.29
Regression Equation
ΔAEP (MWh) = −55 + 3.2249 ΔTR – 8.262 ΔSP
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 6714.2.4 | Regression analysis
In order to relate the variation in energy performance to the technological elements that caused them, and to identify the most important ones, we
decided to use regression analysis.
Regression analysis has been applied in the energy field, eg, by Lee and Yang,45 Fumo and Rafe Biswas,46 and Ma et al.47 In the wind energy
field, Arias‐Rosales and Osorio‐Gómez48 have applied regression analysis to wind turbines based on estimates of the cost of energy.
Among the statistical models commonly used, linear regression analysis has shown promising results because of the reasonable accuracy and
relatively simple implementation when compared with other methods.46 Under the multiple linear regression approach, the selection of the
explanatory variables is a key issue because irrelevant variables have negative effects on the process.49 To ensure that the multiple linear regres-
sion approach is the appropriate methodology, it has been tested so that the input variables selected are linear (ie, all of them follow a normal
distribution) and independent from each other.
The correlation between the technological changes brought about by repowering was explored (ie, the increases with time in hub height, rotor
diameter, and power rating) between the repowered and new turbines, and the increases in annual energy production (AEP) in each case. The
regression analysis took AEP increase (ΔAEP) as the dependent variable and all other variables as independent variables. The reason for defining
AEP as the dependent variable is that the final objective of repowering is increased production, which is also the natural result of the changes
in technological variables.
The regression analysis used Minitab statistical software. Initially, the following predictor variables were considered:
ΔTR = Change in turbine rating (MW)
ΔHH = Change in hub height (m)
ΔSP = Change in specific power (W/m2)
YR = Repowering year.
The first analysis trials quickly showed that two variables were not statistically significant (ΔHH, YR), as the P value was above.05 for these
predictor variables.
The two remaining independent variables (ΔTR and ΔSP) were found to be of statistical significance for the regression model.
The coefficient of multiple determination, R2, takes an acceptable value of 93.37%, and adjusted R2 is 93.30%. A small Mallows' Cp value of 3.0
was obtained, indicating that the model is sufficiently precise. It was concluded that the model fits the data well.
Other assumptions that are required for multiple regression analysis to give a valid result were checked as well. They are shown inTable 2 and
summarised here:
• the independent variables are significant, as P value is below.05 for both variables.
• The variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.29 for the two independent variables of the regression model, indicating that the predictor variables are
not correlated.
• The residuals show an approximate constant variance.
• The residuals are normally and randomly distributed.FIGURE 12 Probability plot: predicted change in electricity production and residuals of the regression [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
672 LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL.Note that the ratio between turbine rating and swept area is very important: it is used by turbine manufacturers to design products better
suited for local wind conditions. For example, Siemens Gamesa currently offers two different rotor diameters (155 and 170 m) for their 5.8‐
MW wind turbine, and two different rated powers (3.4 and 4.5 MW) for their 132‐m rotor diameter turbine.50 Because of this reason, we
carried out further analyses: the swept area (SA, m2) was tried instead of specific power (W/m2) in the regression analysis. Somehow, although
R2 reached 95%, the results showed a VIF value of 7.83 for both statistically significant variables ΔTR and SA, indicating a possible problem of
multicollinearity.
Another analysis was based on the previous regression model result that change in hub height (ΔHH)was not significantly related to the increase
in energy production. To explore this further, the data set was split into two subsets: from 2000 to 2005 and 2007 to 2015, to examine possible
partial time correlation. However, the results of the analysis showed again that ΔHH remained a nonsignificant variable for the regression model.
The results of the regression analysis are shown in Table 2, whereas Figure 12 shows the adjusted probability plot and the residuals of the
regression analysis.
Time‐organised, plotted results in Figure 12 confirm what has been observed earlier: because of faster technological progress, repowering
effects in the past few years had greater impact on turbine efficiency than early repowering projects. On the other hand, from the regression
analysis, variations in increased electricity production can be mainly attributed to variations in two explanatory variables: turbine rating, ΔTR,
and specific power, ΔSP.
The coefficients can be explained as follows:
• for each increase of turbine rating by 1 kW, annual electricity production increases by 3.22 MWh.
• For each decrease in specific power by 1 W/m2, annual electricity production increases by 8.62 MWh.
The lack of a direct relation between the increase in energy production and the increase in hub height, or with time, came as a little surprise
to the authors. This is because the technology has improved over time (YR), and because an increase in hub height is directly related to an
increase in energy production. See, for example, a recent statement by Vestas, the market leader, “With hub heights of 152 m, the (…)
customised tower solution increases the project's annual energy production by unlocking new wind resources at higher and more consistent
wind speeds.”51 We think that the reason is that the impact of the increase in turbine rating and specific power is much more significant than
the impact of having higher hubs.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This study has, for the first time, assessed the technological effects caused by a large set of real repowering projects and their impacts on energy
production on a turbine‐by‐turbine level. The average repowering occurred has brought nearly a three‐time increase in rotor diameter, or a nine‐
time increase in swept area, and a doubling of hub height. New turbines were between 6 and 11.6 times as powerful as decommissioned turbines,
depending on how the average was taken.
The results show that repowering has resulted in an increased capacity factor of 7.1% on per turbine basis, or 9.7% on a per production basis.
Interestingly, during the first years of repowering, new turbines had significantly higher specific power than the turbines they replaced, and this
trend reversed in the 2014 to 2017 period. This was linked to changes to the financial support instrument being used at the time in Denmark,
which from 2014 promoted turbines with low specific power.
New turbines have a higher annual energy production compared with the removed turbines. On a weighted average, production as a result of
repowering increased by 2300 MWh between 2001 and 2003; by 6700 MWh between 2008 and 2011; and by 7700 MWh between 2013 and
2015. Because the annual electricity production remained relatively stable for the removed turbines, the increase in additional energy production
is because of the sharp increase of the performance of new turbines. The average annual energy production achieved by new turbines was about
4941 MWh, or 9.0 times the production of the removed turbines.
Also, the study shows that specific energy production (per m2 swept area) has increased in 99% of the cases. On average, specific electricity
production increased by 320 kWh/m2/yr.
A regression analysis was performed to assess the impact of the underlying changes in technology on energy output. It showed that the
increase in energy production was directly related to the increase in turbine rating and the decrease in specific power of the new turbines. On
average, every additional kilowatt of rated power added 3.22 MWh to the annual energy production, and each W/m2 of lower specific power
increased annual electricity production by 8.62 MWh.
Further, this study analysed the effects of repowering on a turbine‐by‐turbine level. This was done to mitigate the influence of local variations
in the wind resource. Of course, it is highly unlikely that in a given wind farm would substitute each turbine with a newer, larger one when
repowering in practice. Repowering projects most often concern whole wind farms where both turbine and power grid upgrades are performed
and wind farm configuration is optimised for energy production and levelled cost of energy, often by reducing turbine counts but approximately
maintaining power density. A follow‐up to this study has been proposed to analyse with empirical data repowering of wind farms in order to char-
acterise the actual change in turbine density and energy production resulting from deployment of new modern turbines in place of older facilities
LACAL‐ARÁNTEGUI ET AL. 673at the end of their life. A further research question would also be to analyse the financial aspects of repowering, for example, was the repowering
performed at the optimal time from a cost perspective?
From a societal view point, and considering the growing market for repowering in the coming years, it is important to understand if market‐
driven repowering projects will also deliver the socioeconomic benefits to society. In particular, will the wind resource be utilised optimally? What
are indirect economic impacts (eg, on the value of land) of repowering? These questions need answers in order to determine if repowering could
be more efficient or steered by policy instruments to bring the additional value for the economy and society.
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This paper explores the globalization of the wind energy industry with a focus on the contribution by
European companies and their economic impact in the global wind energy sector.
The global wind energy industry is nowadays a tale of two worlds, China and the rest of the world. In
the last five years, China installed between 37 and 48% of the annual world market, and it is all but closed
to foreign companies. Consequently, Chinese manufacturers captured between 38 and 47% of the world
market whereas European reached between 41 and 50%. European manufacturers led in the rest of the
world, serving between 73 and 82% of that market. They localise production and supply chain in the main
markets (e.g. India, Brazil, US) or in countries where producing for export is cost-efficient (e.g. China,
Mexico). Turbine manufacturers enter new markets through joint ventures, technology licensing,
establishing wind farm developing subsidiaries, facilitating access to finance, or by acquiring a local
company.
Manufacturers help improve the capability of their suppliers and take them to serve newmarkets. Still,
European turbine manufacturers maintain important manufacturing, sales and R&D centres in Europe,
where they keep major procurement, supply chain and employment thus significantly contributing to its
economy.
European developers also expanded into other markets, sometimes by acquiring and strengthening a
local developer (this was generally the case in the US), sometimes by starting a subsidiary from scratch.
They have been particularly active in the US and Latin America.
The European wind industry is a success story of worldwide reach that attracts jobs and growth for
Europe. In order to support that this will continue to be so in the mid- or long-term future, the industry
needs the support of European and national policy makers with consented, well-targeted actions.
© 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Globalization1 has involved huge benefits for humankind, from
health improvements to culture diffusion and economic growth [1].
In the latter aspect, globalization is to a large extent responsible for
the economic growth of entire countries, e.g. Singapore or China
[2,3]. However, where local companies could not compete with
foreign companies on a level playing field, globalization has caused
loss of jobs and a certain impoverishment locally [4].
The most important economic effect of globalization, other thana.eu, roberto.lacalarantegui@
to “international”, and refers
ountries.
Ltd. This is an open access articlereducing the prices for goods and taking people out of poverty, is
probably the increase in trade. For example, between 1970 and
2002 imports as a ratio to world gross domestic product (GDP)
increased from around 12% to above 24% [5]. Other economic ef-
fects include foreign direct investment (FDI), e.g. where foreign
companies either acquire local companies or set up local branches
or production facilities, and the financing of local investment with
foreign funds as seen e.g. in offshore wind farms in the North Sea
[6]. On the other side, a number of negative effects have affected
how people see globalization, from changes in land use resulting in
the destruction of forests to make room for cash crops [7] to the
delocalisation of manufacturing to countries with lower labour
costs and less-strict environmental regulations [8].
One interesting aspect of globalization, one that directly affects
the object of this research, is the interdependence between inno-
vation and trade. Innovation is a competitive instrument, withunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ucts and processes [9]. Innovation, referred to improvements in
processes and products, is also a driver behind better quality and
lower cost, the two key competitive elements in any established
industry.
The scope of this paper is more limited though: because it is
focused on an industrial sector, wind energy, this research is cen-
tred on globalization of this industry and within it on the contri-
bution by European companies manufacturing turbines and
developing wind farms. As part of the research, some of the eco-
nomic impacts of these companies at home and abroad are
analyzed.
Previous research has explored globalization connected to
different industrial sectors. Gourevitch et al. explored the effects on
the hard disk drive (HDD) industry [10]. This industry had, at the
time, worldwide revenues of $30 billion, which is of similar order of
magnitude as the turbine manufacture industry at around $53
billion.2 Although firms from the US dominated the industry in its
beginnings, locally manufacturing around 80% of the world's HDD,
and thus proved to be themost innovative firms, productionmoved
to Asia by 1995. That year, while “over 80% of the world's hard disks
were made by US firms, less than 5% of drives were actually assembled
in the US”. In terms of employment in 1995 “only 20% of the world's
employees in the HDD industry worked in the United States, yet over
60% of the wage bill paid by US firms were earned in the United States.”
The globalization of the pultrusion technology industry suggests
that already some time ago low labour costs stopped being the
most significant element behind delocalisation of production to
emerging economies. In this case, vicinity to significant markets e
as the case of China e was a major reason [11]. Incidentally, the
pultrusion industry is indirectly linked to wind energy in that they
both use fibreglass, the main material in rotor blades [12]. The
globalization of the mechanical industry in Italian industrial clus-
ters shed some additional light on the relationships client company
e local suppliers that can help understanding how to promote a
local supply chain [13], something that will be reviewed later in this
paper.
The analysis of globalization of the energy field can be focused
on trade of energy resources and fuels or on means of exploring,
transforming and exploiting energy e the latter perhaps linked
more to industrial policy that to energy policy. The globalization of
conventional energy resources (coal, natural gas, nuclear fuel, and
oil and oil products) was explored by Overland (2016) who found
that it is growing and accelerating [14]. Renewable energy re-
sources are globally available per nature: solar, wind, water and
biomass are present everywhere although to a different extent.
Energy products from renewable energy sources (e.g. pellets from
biomass) are traded [15] and thus subject to globalization. The
energy industrial sector is significantly globalized with multina-
tional corporations operating worldwide. Further, there is evidence
of the positive impact of policies in the development of the wind
industry [16]. As Kuik et al. found, the competitive advantage of the
Europeanwind industry is based on the pioneering character of the
related regulation [16], and it is long lasting [17].
This research paper first presents global wind deployment while
more weight is put in exploring the key markets. Electricity pro-
duction fromwind turbines is explored in relation to both installed
capacity and technical characteristics. Then in Section 3 the glob-
alization of turbine manufacturers is analysed with a focus on key
European players, and within it the key enabling factors of home
market, financial health, international expansion and the strategies2 Based on 54 GW installed of which 23 GW in China [18], at an average global
turbine cost of 1,13M$/MW [68] with a 30% discount in China.used for it (licensing, joint ventures, taking the role of developer
and facilitating access to finance). Mergers and acquisitions are a
specific form of globalization with impact on technology transfer
between countries, and for this reason it was analysed separately
(Section 3.6). Section 4 assesses the impact of globalization in the
key aspects of procurement, supply chain, employment, and reve-
nues, based on raw data from a turbine manufacturer and links to
more diffuse information from other manufacturers. Section 5 an-
alyses the market for the other key role, the developers of wind
farms, and how they have globalized. Finally, Section 6 draws some
conclusions.2. Current situation of the wind energy sector
2.1. World new wind energy capacity installed in 2017 and
cumulative
The annual market in 2017 reached 52.6 GW [17], a slight
reduction from the 54 GWof 2016 [18]. China installed 37% of global
new capacity in 2017 (2016: 43%), followed by the EU with 30%
(2016: 23%), the US with 13% (2016: 15%) and India with 8% (2016:
6%) [17,18] (see Fig. 1).
The global annual market reached a record in 2015 with 63 GW
installed [19], a highlight in a period (since 2009) when it has
remaining at a very high level of around or above 40 GW. In 2017 it
dropped to 52.6 GW which is still a very significant figure.Fig. 1. World wind energy deployment (or market) in gigawatts (GW) of installed
capacity, both new installations in 2017 and cumulative at the end of that year [17].
Fig. 2. Global annual installed wind energy generation capacity, and EU share of the annual installations.
Source: GWEC [17], adjusted with Member State data
3 Capacity factor considered over grid-connected capacity only. If CF was calcu-
lated on the (larger) installed capacity the figure for China would be significantly
lower.
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The European Union, and within it Germany, Spain and
Denmark, was the main annual market until 2008 and then it
passed on this lead to China (Fig. 2). However, the EU has remained
a significant force at 20e30% of annual installations.
In terms of cumulative installed capacity, in 2016 China overtook
the EU, 169 GW vs. 154 GW. However, 12% of Chinese installations
(20 GW) were not connected to the grid at the end of the year [20].
One year later, China reached 188 GW, the EU had 169 GW and the
US was placed third with 89 GW (Fig.1). They were followed at long
distance by India with 33 GW [17,18].
It is perhaps interesting to mention that the three dips in annual
growth, in 2013, 2016 and 2017, were due to significant contrac-
tions in a key market: the US in 2013 and China in 2016 and 2017.
This shows that the sector is heavily dependent on major markets.
Fig. 2 shows the evolution of the main markets in the global
market. It shows that China became the major market in 2009 and
since then it has remained as such: it has consistently installed
between 40 and 50% of global capacity since [18]. The other large
market, the US, until 2017 was subject to much instability due to
the situation of its support framework in the midst of political
battles. This instability seems now over with legislation that
disposed an orderly and gradual (20% per year) phase out of the
main support measure, the Production Tax Credit (PTC) [21].
Due to strong support policies, China will continue leading the
world market for the foreseeable future. The EU will probably in-
crease installations towards 12e14 GW per year thanks to the
offshore sector. The US could install between 8 and 12 GW per year
up to 2022.
China is therefore the main player. However, it is important to
explore how would the market look like without China. Fig. 3 is
based on Fig. 2 but removes the effect of Chinese installations,
showing what a less concentrated market could be.
The figure shows a smaller global market where the effect of the
US instable support scheme is more profound e.g. in 2013 only 62%
of the 2012 installation took place, a reduction of 38% year-on-year.
Without China, the world wind power deployment clearly depends
on two pillars, the US and the EU.
A key factor determining future trends is the level at which the
cost of generating wind energy will continue to fall [22]. However,the analysis of this factor is beyond the scope of this research.
With that limitation in mind, prospects are that, in the medium
term, China, the US and India will accelerate deployment. In the
first two countries a main driver is the forthcoming radical changes
to their support systems, feed-in tariffs (FiT) and production tax
credits (PTC) respectively, which will reduce the revenue for future
wind farms and thus trigger a flux of new projects trying to get the
current levels of remuneration. In the case of India, the main driver
is government push towards carbon-free, indigenous electricity
generation, coupled with lowest-ever costs achieved through auc-
tions. Both China and India have set ambitious wind deployment
targets: China's Strategic Energy Action Plan 2014e2020 set a
target of 200 GW by 2020, although recent reports point out to-
wards an increase to 210e250 GW [23], and India's 60 GW by 2022
[24].
In the EU, offshore wind is currently receiving a significant push
(see Fig. 8 in Ref. [25]), but the long-term perspectives are less clear,
as a new low-cost paradigm makes governments re-consider how
to fit new projects and to absorb large amounts of offshore wind
electricity in the respective electricity systems.2.3. Wind electricity generation in 2017 vs. installed capacity
Wind electricity production in 2017 was in the EU (346 TWh),
higher than in China (306 TWh [26]) or the US (254 TWh [27]), see
Fig. 4. However, it is in the US where the average turbine produced
more electricity: US capacity factors in 2017 reached 33.9%
compared to 22.3% in China,3 and 24.5% in the EU.4
Main reasons for these differences include wind resources and
electricity system limitations. The wind resource in the US is
significantly higher than in Europe, in particular in their mid-West
states which is where most wind deployment has taken place: in
2016 64% of newcapacity was installed in 10 states, according to the4 Calculations based on the respective country and industry sources, see Fig. 4.
Fig. 3. Global excluding China annual installed wind energy generation capacity, and EU share of the installations.
Source: GWEC [17], adjusted with EU Member State data
Fig. 4. Electricity generated in the three main markets in 2017 compared to their respective installed capacity at the end of 2017.
Sources: US Energy Information Administration [27], ENTSO-E [69], GWEC [17], China National Energy Administration [26], CWEA [70].
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Sea area (including both onshore and offshore) reaches high
averagewind speeds. Rather than to its wind resource, the problem
causing very low capacity factors in China relates to limitations in
its electricity grid which obliges to curtail production: wind
resource-rich areas, in the north of the country, are heavily affected
by grid constraints to export electricity to the demand areas in the
south and the east.
Wind electricity production naturally increases with increased
deployment. Interestingly, on a turbine-by-turbine basis, electricity
production from new wind turbines is increasing as well because
new technologies (essentially larger rotors and taller towers) boost
production and capacity factors, all other factors remaining equal.
Specific power is the ratio of the size of the electricity generator
of the turbine (in Watts) to the size of its rotor (in m2). Specific
power downwards evolution (Fig. 5) involves that rotors are getting
larger related to the electricity generator of the turbine. In addition,
the swept area of larger rotors is larger, and thus more energy is
extracted by a single turbine.5 In the states of ND, MN, WY, SD, IA, CO, KS, NM, OK and TX a total 52.54 GW
were installed at the end of 2016, over 82.18 GW in total. Source: AWEA's US Wind
Industry Fourth Quarter 2016 Market Report.3. The global turbine manufacture market
3.1. Wind turbine manufacture market in 2017
The group of the top ten wind turbine manufacturers in 2017
includes the presence of five European companies: Vestas, SGRE,6
Enercon, Nordex-Acciona and Senvion [29,30]. Based on FTI , the
share of European OEMs in this top ten has increased from 50% in
2015 to 61% in 2017. This was partly due to their increased in-
stallations (from 22 to 25GW) but mostly due to the reduction in
home market for Chinese manufacturers (down from 30 to 20 GW)
which naturally resulted in a higher relative share of the rest of the
world market.
Three of the other top ten manufacturers per installed capacity
(MW) are Chinese. GE of the US and Suzlon of India complete the
top ten. The former company could partly be considered European
after it acquired in 2015 FR/ES manufacturer Alstom Wind.
In addition to showing this ranking, Fig. 6 shows that concen-
tration in the turbine manufacture market was significantly higher
in 2017 than in 2015: in 2015 the top 10 gathered 70% of global
installations ("others" was the remaining 30%) whereas in 20176 Note that the merger Siemens e Gamesa was finalised in early 2017.
Fig. 5. Evolution of the specific power factor in 215 prototype wind turbine models introduced between 2010 and 2018. Note: not all turbines were eventually commercialised.
Source: own database.
Fig. 6. Turbine manufacturers market share in 2015 and 2017, per country or region. Note: For comparison purposes, Nordex includes its acquisition Acciona in both 2015 and 2017,
even when in 2015 Acciona was not yet part of Nordex. European companies in blue and Chinese in red.
Source: Global Wind Market Update 2016 & 2017 [29,30], adjusted with own data. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the
Web version of this article.)
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In the medium term it is possible that Suzlon (IN) and Goldwind
(CN) take market share from EU manufacturers. Suzlon has a past
international footprint and it has stated a strategy to recover in
those markets. Goldwind's turbines are reaching bankability
outside China, a difficult task [31]. This is less likely to happen with
other Chinese manufacturers as they are only starting to expand
outside China e this is the case of Envision, Ming Yang and United
Power.
In the long term Envision and perhaps SEwind from Chinamight
also take a significant international market share.3.2. Evolution of the global market and role of European companies
There are two figures whose comparison is probably the
simplest way to measure how successful European turbine manu-
facturers actually are. As shown in Fig. 7 these two figures corre-
spond to: Share of installations in the EU within global installations (EU
share of deployment)
 Market share of EU manufacturers (OEM) within the annual
global market.
In the last five years (2013-2017) European manufacturers
consistently held between 41 and 50% (average 45.2%) of the world
market, whereas the EU market was only between 20 and 32%
(average 25.5%) of the world market. Therefore European turbine
manufacturers capture an average 19.7% world market share above
the EU market.
If installations in China are discounted (“ex-China”), European
manufacturers enjoy an even greater success, as they have held
between 73% and 82% of ex-China world installations since 2013.
They have the enormous merit of having withstood the threat of
low-cost Chinese turbines exporting to world markets, something
not achieved by other related industrial sectors such as photovol-
taic solar panels.
Fig. 7. Whereas the share of EU deployment is relatively low, the share of European turbine manufacturers (OEM) in the global market is much higher. Notes: Percentages vary
slightly depending on the exact milestone (installation, commissioning …) and source (GWEC, FTI, own data) used.
Fig. 8. Profit of turbine manufacturers, as reflected by EBITDA figures, 2016. European
companies in blueish. The numbers between brackets correspond to the company
market ranking in 2016 installed capacity. Sources: [32,33,55,56,62,70e74]. Note:
Enercon EBITDA corresponds to 2015.
Fig. 9. 2016 EBITDA margin as percentage of revenue, selected turbine manufacturers.
Sources: [32,33,55,56,62,71e74]. Note: Enercon figure corresponds to 2015.
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In general wind turbine manufacturers presented a very healthy
financial situation in 2016.
Fig. 8 shows the financial health of a group of wind turbine
manufacturers including six European companies. Companies part
of the top ten that aremissing here include General Electric because
it is a big industrial conglomerate that does not present a break-
down per business areas; and Chinese companies Envision and
Ming Yang because of lack of data. Enercon (DE) is privately owned
and thus it does not present annual results in public, still Enercon
made public some figures in interviews with sector magazines
[32,33].
Vestas, the market leader, presented the highest EBITDA. Euro-
pean manufacturers Gamesa, Siemens (in 2016 they still were
separate companies) and Enercon present significant EBITDAs,
along with Goldwind of China. A third group could include Nordex
and Senvion (DE) and Suzlon (IN), with lower margins.
However, if we look at another financial indicator (Fig. 9), the
profit margin (EBITDA margin) or margin of EBITDA on total reve-
nues, Asian companies showed higher figures at 19.7% (Goldwind)
and 17.9% (Suzlon). This suggests that those Asian competitorswould be in a stronger position to face price competition, i.e. they
can reduce prices eand still make a profit- further than European
companies.
Profits have greatly improved across the board since the 2012/3
crisis.3.4. Manufacturers going global
In a sector undergoing global expansion such as wind energy is,
most players have expanded to new markets. Fig. 10 shows this
global trend: in general all manufacturers (represented by coloured
bubbles) between 2008 and 2016 have increased the number of
markets where they have made annual sales totalling more than
50MW of turbines.
European companies Vestas, Enercon, Siemens, Gamesa and
Nordex have increased the number of markets served, as so has
General Electric. The data shows as well that Suzlon retreated into
its home market in 2013 (even when it had some exports in 2014/
2015). Chinese companies show very limited expansion to other
markets, with only Goldwind showing a certain presence abroad.
Several reasons lie behind this situation. First, EU markets are
generally small and sometimes subject to political negative policy
changes (e.g. Spain, Italy), thus European manufacturers have to
Fig. 10. Number of countries served by turbine manufacturers 2008e2016. Notes: The vertical axis represents the number of countries for which each turbine manufacturer
installed, in the given year, at least 50MW of wind turbines. The area of the bubble represents total installed capacity by the given manufacturer in those countries. Source:
Bloomberg New Energy Finance database of wind farms.
Fig. 11. Length of O&M contracts included as part of turbine purchase agreements (TPA). The thickness of the bubbles represents the country volume in MW. Source: [35].
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the first-mover advantage [34] and recognised technological
quality which are enablers for this expansion.
Chinese companies' difficulties to expand abroad could be
caused by a certain lack of trust in the long-time performance of
Chinese-made turbines. This view is probably supported by anec-
dotal evidence: Chinese wind turbine contracts traditionally do not
include any maintenance beyond the two years of customary
guarantee (see Fig. 11 borrowed from reference [35]), which sug-
gests that maintenance after the second year of operation is not
carried out by the turbine manufacturer, who is (in theory at least)
well placed to do proper maintenance.7 Until here data from our own database.3.5. Strategies for entering new markets
As in any other industrial sector, wind turbine manufacturers
have expanded abroad by following different strategies. These
include licensing, joint ventures, acquisitions, developing wind
farms, or contributing to financing the wind farm projects.3.5.1. Licensing
Licensing turbine designs is an approach followed by engi-
neering, non-manufacturing companies focusing on a “design and
license” business model as well as by wind turbine manufacturers.
Among the former the most successful are Aerodyn (DE) who
licensed to BARD (DE), Ming Yang (CN), SEwind (CN), United Power
(CN), Hyosung (KR) and HEAG (CN)7 and Dongfang [36]; MECAL NV
(NL) who licensed to HEAG and CSIC Haizhuang (CN) and in
particularWindtec (AT) which, under its parent company American
Superconductors (AMSC) licensed to more than 10 manufacturers
worldwide.
A few turbine manufacturers have resourced to licensing as a
way to enter new market and increase the profitability of their
intellectual property investment. The following could be
highlighted:
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Regen (IN), IMPSA (AR), GenesYs (DE) and Eozen (ES). The last
three are no longer in business, whereas Vensys continues to
develop and sell turbines.
- Senvion (DE) licensed (as REpower, its name to 2013) to Gold-
wind, Windey and DEC, all Chinese.
- Lagerwey (NL) licensed to CASC (CN) and EWT (NL).
- Fuhrl€ander (DE) licensed to A-Power, Huide and Sinovel (all
Chinese).
A variation of licensing is an activity that is called “joint devel-
opment”, or “joint R&D” in China. This activity is an extension of
licensing where the technology company is a turbine design com-
pany (e.g. Aerodyn, MECAL, AMSC). The activity was analysed by
Zhou et al. [36] who concluded that “joint R&D has improved Chinese
companies' technical capacity, human resources and financial growth.
However, the effect on Chinese companies' innovation capacity is still
limited because of unequal technical capacities of the two sides in
collaboration, as well as their preference for augmenting profits rather
than technical capacity. Current joint R&D mode is only the extension
of licensing mode in wind-turbine manufacturing industry.”3.5.2. Joint ventures
Joint ventures have used to enter new markets as different as
Spain and China e but they have not proven successful in the long
time, they have been rather problematic. One key difference with
licences is that licences commonly give licensees more control but
it is thought that “the most accessible technology is usually somewhat
outdated”. Cooperative development as joint ventures, by contrast,
“grants domestic turbine manufacturers access to newer designs and
the right to manufacture turbines locally, albeit with greater foreign
involvement” [37].
In joint ventures (JV) foreign corporations contribute technology
and knowhow, sometimes capital andmarketing, whereas the local
partner contributes manufacturing capacity, relationships with the
national government and/or understanding of the local context.
Gamesa Corporacion Tecnologica (“Gamesa”) wind turbine
manufacturer, now part of Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, was
created as “Gamesa Eolica” in 1994. Gamesa Eolica was a joint
venture between Gamesa's local owners (51%) and Vestas (40%)
with a focus on manufacturing and selling turbines in Spain, Latin
America and Northern Africa [38]. In 2001 Vestas sold its share to
its partner and Gamesa became free to enter othermarkets in direct
competition with Vestas [39]. Part of the agreement included
technology transfer for turbines G52, G58, G66 and G80.
Joint ventures have been a key strategy for the expansion of
European manufacturers to enter the Indian and Chinese markets,
although with very different results. In India, Vestas joined RBB
Consultants and Engineers Private Ltd in 1987 to form Vestas RBB
India on a 49/51% share, where Vestas contributed the V27-225 kW,
V39-500 kW and V47 technologies. The JV was dissolved in 2006,
changed named (now RRB Energy Ltd) and claims to continue
manufacturing V27, V39 and two new models (600 and 1800 kW).
Since then Vestas did not enjoy any significant success in the
country judging by their own orders announcements: only 99MW
in 2009, 129MW in 2010, 78MW in 2011, 51.8MW in 2013, and
86MW in 2015.
In 1995 Enercon joined the Mehra family of Mumbai in a 56/44%
JV called Enercon India Ltd, with negative results as it finished in a
series of court cases. In effect, after a dispute arose in 2008 on the
terms and royalty payments due after the linked technology licence
agreement [40], Enercon became unable to sell in the Indianmarket
while the court case lasted. It was only in 2017 that the casefinished and Enercon could enter the Indian market again [41].
In China nine joint ventures started in the 2000s and all of them
have been dissolved [42]. For example, Harakosan of Japan and
state-owned XEMC (CN) formed Hara XEMC Windpower in 2006
and by the end of 2008 Harakosan had sold all shares to XEMC [43].
It is perhaps interesting to see some the arguments given by Har-
akosan when in 2007 it sold to XEMC 23% of its initial 50% in their
joint venture: “1) Since most wind-power generation projects in
China are for electric utilities, the operation of these businesses is
closely associated with policies of the Chinese government. Conse-
quently, using a majority-owned Chinese company results in a more
advantageous position for negotiations of all types” [44]. This is
consistent with the situation for Chinese state-owned enterprises
(SOE) as described in the analysis of the developers market in
section 5.3.
The following lists all wind turbine manufacturers joint ven-
tures in China:
- Yituo-MADE (Luoyang) Wind Turbine Co. Formed by China
YiTuo Group and MADE (ES) [37].
- Xi'an Nordex Wind Turbine Co. Ltd. Formed by Xi'an Aero-
Engine Group and Nordex (DE)
- Nordex (Yinchuan) Wind Power Equipment Manufacturing Co.
Ltd. Formed by two Chinese partners (Ningxia Electric Power
Group and the Ningxia Tianjing Electric Energy Development
Group) and Nordex [37].
- Hara XEMC Windpower: XEMC, Harakosan (JP)
- Nantong CASC Wanyuan Acciona Wind Turbine Manufacture
Co., Ltd.: CASC and Acciona (ES)
- REpower North. Formed by North Heavy Industry Corp. and two
Western partners, developer Honiton Energy Ltd. (UK) and
REpower (DE)
- Harbin Hafei-Winwind Wind Power Equipment Co. Ltd. (also
called Hafei in Harbin) Formed by Harbin Power Equipment
Group and WinWinD (FI)
- Guangxi Yinhe Avantis Wind Power Co., Ltd., Formed by Yinhe
group and Avantis Group (DE)
- Shandong Swiss Electric Co., Formed by Weifang Zhongyun
Machinery Co., Ltd. And unidentified Swiss and German
partners.
Licensing and joint ventures sometimes occur successively. In
2011 Siemens constituted two JVs with Shanghai Electric to build
blades and assemble nacelles in China [45]. Later these JVs were
terminated and then Siemens licensed to Shanghai Electric the
construction of all models of blades, and the entire rotor-nacelle
assembly of the 4MW offshore machines in China. The licensing
agreement was later extended to the 6MW direct-drive machine
[46]. With that, all the business of Siemens Wind Power (SWP) in
Chinawas reduced to the licensing of its technology (previously the
licensing agreement was focused only in the smaller onshore G2,
and D3 turbines whereas blades were supplied directly by SWP,
who had set blade manufacturing facilities in the country).3.5.3. Manufacturers taking the role of developers
Several turbine manufacturers including Vestas and Gamesa
resourced to developing wind farms as a way to sell their turbines
abroad as well as at home (section 5.3 includes some details on how
OEMs inroads into the developer market). Suzlon since the 2000s,
and several Chinese companies more recently, have adopted this
strategy with which they are supporting their foreign expansion.
Envision and Goldwind in particular have pursued the strategy
of developing wind farms. Goldwind has been particularly active in
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Given that the competitive advantage of Chinese manufacturers
is the lower cost of manufacture in China, they have enjoyed most
success in markets where a local content is not required. On the
contrary, in countries like India and Brazil8, Chinese manufacturers
have hardly had any deployment. One exception, from the period
before local content rules existed in Brazil, is Sinovel's 34.5MW
Barra dos Coqueiros wind farm (2012).
3.5.4. Facilitating access to finance
Under certain conditions access to finance is a limiting factor in
the development of new wind farm projects. One example is when
the country risk9 is high or very high whereas in other cases it is the
specificities of the project that create the risk. Under these condi-
tions, turbine manufacturers that can facilitate access to finance as
part of a turbine supply package are better positioned to get the
contract and thus to expand internationally. This is a strategy used
generally in countries like Pakistan, but lately exploited widely by
Chinese turbine manufacturers and GE.
The Sapphire wind farm in Pakistan is an example. Mr Nadeem
Abdullah, owner of the wind farm, declared “we chose GE wind
turbines because (…). GE has been instrumental in supporting Sap-
phire to achieve financial closure with OPIC.” “OPIC is the U.S. Gov-
ernment's Development Finance Institution, which mobilizes to
provide capital to global development in order to assist U.S. foreign
policy efforts, including helping develop renewable energy as a mutual
American-Pakistani goal. OPIC's funding will help assist in the devel-
opment of the wind farm” [47].
Chinese manufacturers are backed by significant financial pos-
sibilities stemming from the internationalisation policies of their
government. China's Belt and Road initiative [48], or OBOR (One
Belt One Road), supports financing of infrastructure projects
including wind farms, and this has had an impact already e.g. in
Pakistan, as shown in Table 1.
Irrespectively of whether the funding is coming from the state,
multi-lateral or private banks, well-funded turbine manufacturers
can offer the developer some kind of financial package: as St.
James puts it “his is perhaps why we see them more successful in
markets with difficult access to capital” [49].
The strategy of partial financing or facilitating access to finance
is not limited to countries with a high risk profile. For example in
the US, GE Energy Financial Services (the financing business unit of
GE) invests in wind farms partly because the synergy to do the
financing and the equipment allows the turbine manufacturer “to
sit with project developers at an earlier stage than we otherwise
might” [50].
3.6. Merger and acquisition processes10
One of themost typical andmore critical aspects of globalization
is that it normally comes with merger and acquisition (M&A) of
companies. This has severe consequences for the industry and the
economy of countries that lose ownership of decision-making in
their companies when they are acquired by foreign ones.8 Brazil, like Russia and previously China, has local content rules which forces the
establishing of local manufacture plant and/or the purchase of local components,
both sourcing strategies not favoured by Chinese OEMs.
9 Country risk is “the risk of investing or lending in a country, arising from
possible changes in the business environment that may adversely affect operating
profits or the value of assets in the country. For example, financial factors such as
currency controls, devaluation or regulatory changes, or stability factors”. Source:
Wikipedia.
10 The author would like to warmly thank Mr Daniel Roman Barriopedro for his
significant contribution to this subchapter.In the wind sector, very often foreign companies have bought
European companies with the objective of absorbing their tech-
nology. In most of those cases small European companies are
incorporated into a big industrial conglomerate.
Table 2 shows some examples ofM&Aefocusing in those having
the most important industrial or technology impact-since 2000,
highlighting in bold the cases in which foreign companies have
acquired European technology.
There were 42 large transactions completed in the wind in-
dustry between 2001 and 2017.
The table shows that M&A activity of significant market players
has accelerated, with annual transactions peaking at 12 in 2016.
Seventeen among those transactions have been between European
companies. This could be due to the large European history in wind
industry, the financial crisis and the subsequent consolidation
happening among a broad number of agents in Europe.
Seventeen is also the number of operations in which European
technology was acquired by foreign companies, in most cases
American (7 cases) or Chinese (411) but also from Japan (3), South
Korea (2) and India (1). The consolidation of the wind industry is
taking place, and companies of the largest world economies are
acquiring European technology in order to accelerate, improve and
expand their business.
It is significant that no acquisition of American or Asian tech-
nology companies by a European company was identified.
Fig. 12 shows that there has been a recent increase in M&A ac-
tivity, concretely since 2014. This activity has affected the sector
with higher impact that it has targeted European technology.
M&A activity has demonstrated that consolidation can help
turbine OEMs achieve greater economies of scale, for example
through geographic expansion and the exploitation of a larger
resource capacity to create synergies and diversify product offering.
Moreover, it also offers the opportunity for large industry con-
glomerates to enter the wind industry (e.g. Daewoo, General
Electric) or to set up joint ventures reaching global leadership as
demonstrated by those in the offshore wind industry (e.g. Vestas
and Mitsubishi). This might contribute to increasing the competi-
tiveness of the entire wind sector against other renewable or con-
ventional energy industries.
This consolidation of the wind industry very often comes
naturally accompanied by restructuration plans that benefit from
all synergies of merging two companies, or of acquisition of a small
company by a large industrial conglomerate. In the case of foreign
companies acquiring European technology companies, the result is
that the EU risks to lose (a) highly-paid industrial jobs, (b) the
corresponding industrial fabric (c) long-term investment in the
projects that supported these companies, and (d) intellectual
property rights of innovations. Another concern is that the capital
or R&D investment lost to foreign owners was in part or in all
publicly funded -through universities, EU or national public
research programmes and/or company R&D tax relief.
With the wind turbine technology sector becoming more
mature, European turbine manufacturers are facing increased
pressure mostly from GE and Chinese turbine manufacturers. In
addition, competition from solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is
becoming increasingly intense [51] due to the faster cost-reduction
pace of solar PV.
In order to gain a strong or dominant position in the markets
which are seeing fast growth while being competitive in cost of11 Two more Chinese acquisitions focused on developers, not considered tech-
nology companies here, even when it is acknowledged that the acquisition gave
foreign companies access to the technology in the European turbines installed in
their wind farms.
Table 2
Mergers, joint ventures and acquisitions in the XXI century. Notes: bold highlight denotes that European technology is acquired by foreign companies; Enron Wind’s (US)
technology was European after its acquisition of German Tacke in 1997, and Harakosan of Japan is considered to have European technology when it was acquired by STX in
2009; OEM denotes wind turbine manufacturer.
Buyer Buyer sector Target company; merge with; JV name Target sector Announced
Gamesa (ES) OEM Gamesa JV (ES) (buy 40% Vestas share) OEM 2001
GE (US) Industrial conglomerate Enrond Wind (US) OEM 2002
Gamesa (ES) OEM MADE (ES) OEM 2003
Vestas (DK) OEM NEG Micon (merge) (DK) OEM 2004
Siemens (DE) Industrial conglomerate Bonus (DK) OEM 2004
Harakosan Co Ltd (JP) Building developer Zephyros (NL) OEM 2005
Suzlon (IN) OEM 86,5% REpower (DE) OEM 2007
Alstom (FR) Industrial conglomerate Ecotecnia (ES) OEM 2007
Goldwind (CN) OEM Vensys (DE), 70% OEM 2008
XEMC (CN) OEM Darwind (NL) OEM 2009
GE Wind (US) OEM ScanWind (SE) OEM 2009
STX Heavy Industry (KR) Industrial conglomerate Harakosan (JP) OEM 2009
Daewoo (KR) OEM DeWind (DE) OEM 2009
AREVA (FR) Industrial conglomerate Multibrid (DE) OEM 2010
TOSHIBA (JP) OEM Unison (KR) 40% OEM 2011
GE Power Conversion (US) Industrial conglomerate Converteam (UK) Generator & converter manufacturer 2011
Hitachi (JP) OEM Fuji HI Wind (JP) OEM 2012
MingYang (CN) OEM GWPL (IN) OEM 2012
Titan Wind Power (CN) Tower manufacturer Vestas' tower business (except US) Tower manufacturer 2012
MHI (JP) & Vestas (DK) OEM JV Offshore (DK) OEM 2013
Gamesa & Areva OEM JV in Offshore OEM 2014
Yaskawa (JP) Industrial conglomerate The Switch (FI) Generator manufacturer 2014
GE Renewable Energy (US) OEM Alstom Wind (FR) OEM 2015
GE Renewable Energy (US) OEM Blade Dynamics (UK) Blade Manufacturer 2015
Cheung Kong Infrastructure (CN) Developer/Operator Iberwind (PT) Developer/Operator 2015
CSR (CN) Industrial conglomerate Soil Machine Dynamics (SMD, UK) Subsea vehicles 2015
Centerbridge (US) Investment house Senvion (DE) OEM 2015
GE Renewable Energy (US) OEM LM Wind Power (DK) Blade manufacturer 2016
Three Gorges (CN) Developer/Operator WindMW (DE) Developer 2016
Envision Energy (CN) OEM Portfolio of 600MW of projects by Vive Energia (MX) Developer 2016
Siemens & DONG OEM/developer A2Sea (DK) Offshore installation 2016
Nordex (DE) OEM Acciona (ES) OEM 2016
Vestas (DK) OEM Upwind (US) Independent Service Provider 2016
Vestas (DK) OEM Availon (DE) Independent Service Provider 2016
Nordex (DE) OEM SSP (DK) Blade manufacturer 2016
Senvion (DE) OEM Euros (DE) Blade manufacturer 2016
Senvion (DE) OEM Kenersys (IN/DE) OEM 2016
State Grid (CN) Developer/Operator CPFL Energia (BR) Developer 2017
Gamesa (ES) OEM Adwen, 50% Areva stake OEM 2016
Siemens (DE) OEM Gamesa (Merge) OEM 2016
Nidec (JP) Generator manufacturer Leroy-Somer (FR) Generator manufacturer 2017
DEME (BE) Offshore installation A2Sea (DK) Offshore installation 2017
Table 1
Projects financed by the Chinese OBOR initiative in Pakistan, financial information. Note: RoE means return on equity. Sources: [75e81]; own database; financial information
from Reynolds et al. [82].
Project Capacity (MW) Cost (M$) Debt/Equity RoE (%) Developer Equipment manufacturer Status
Hydrochina Dawood 50 125 e e HydroChina (CN) Ming Yang (CN) Operational (2016)
United Energy Pakistan 99 250 e 30.14 UEP (PK) Goldwind (CN) Operational (2017)
Sachal 49.5 134 80/20 18 Arif Habib (PK) Goldwind (CN) Operational (2017)
Three Gorges 2 & 3 99 260 75/25 28.85 Three Gorges (CN) Goldwind (CN) Operational (2018)
Cacho 50 24.6 Announced
Western Energy 50 Announced
R. Lacal-Arantegui / Renewable Energy 134 (2019) 612e628 621energy terms, in the past three years European turbine manufac-
turers streamlined production and significantly reduced costs. In
this context, those M&A deals have had a significant impact on
turbine OEMs' competitive landscape both in the short and in the
medium term. The main impact that M&A activity is introducing to
the competitive landscape of EU OEMs are, in the short term:
1. GE-Alstom, Nordex-Acciona and Siemens-Gamesa are three
major operations that have a significant impact on the
competitive landscape of the turbine manufacturing sector. Forexample, although the acquisition of Alstom's power business
did not boost GE's global wind market share dramatically, it
brought GE back to the offshore wind sector with nearly 2 GW
offshore wind pipelines in the European waters. The other two
cases had an impact mostly in providing de acquiror access to
additional markets.
2. Nordex returned to the top 10 OEMs after its acquisition of
Acciona's turbine business, approved by the European Com-
mission in 2016.
Fig. 12. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in the wind sector, no of operations per year and cumulative since 2000.
Source: Daniel Roman Barriopedro, own data, press releases and news.
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global leader in the wind market. According to FTI Consulting
[29], the combined entity accounted for more than 13% of global
wind turbine installation in 2016 and 16.6% in 2017 [52], making
it the second largest OEM in the world.
In conclusion, the global market will favour larger players in the
medium term, especially in onshore wind. Offshore, the limited
number of markets will play a role but it is unlikely to support
consolidation in the OEM market. As a consequence during this
process of consolidation Europe is losing some of its core technol-
ogy industrial fabric, and with it a relevant piece of its economic
activity.12 Gamesa's figures show that procurement from the average Asian supplier
reaches significantly higher unit value tan procurement from the average European
supplier. In a loose average, the ratio would be 3.3 to 1. Source: own calculations
based on [54].4. Impact of globalization of turbine manufacturers
From a policy point of view probably the most important eco-
nomic impacts of globalization are related to “where”: where
companies create employment, both direct and indirect in their
supply chain, and where they pay taxes. It is perhaps worth noting
in this respect that in its recent Reflection paper on harnessing
globalization [53], the EC suggested that every billion euro of ex-
ports supports 14 000 jobs.
Information on where OEMs pay taxes is essentially non avail-
able for this research, perhaps it is not publicly available at all. In-
formation onwhere companies create employment is available in a
patchy way as some manufacturers are more transparent than
others.
Gamesa's corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports detail
elements that can be used to answer the first question above. Other
manufacturers give less details, but the information they give is key
to confirm -and at times modulate- the trends shown in [54].
Therefore, the approach followed in this part of the research is to
use Gamesa's data to define a trend and then to contrast that trend
with the available data and information by other turbine
manufacturers.
European turbinemanufacturers have access to a limitedmarket
at home (see section 3.1), and thus in general most of their revenues
come from third countries. Fig. 13 shows that this OEM obtained
only 16% of its global income in the EU in 2016, but it spent 34% of
its procurement there [54]. EU countries specifically accounted for
by Gamesa are Germany (2.61% of total procurement), France
(0.82%), Spain (25.14%), Italy (1.04%), the UK (1.14%) and Denmark
(0.59%).Another European manufacturer, Vestas, installed 37% of its
turbines in the EU [55], Nordex 53% in the EU [56] and Enercon 48%
in Germany [57]. They all show higher dependency on the EU (or
any of their Member States) as home market.
The weight of EU purchases in total procurement can be
considered a partial proxy for competitiveness of European sub-
suppliers (or supply chain). Fig. 14 shows that in the particular
case of this OEM the weight of the EU in procurement has eroded
during the last few years, while theweight of China and Indiaeand,
to a lesser extent, Brazil-has increased. The increases in the case of
India and Brazil can be understood as a need to localise production
in these large markets.
Whereas the latter localisation argument also applies to China,
however, in the Chinese case procurement share (17% in 2016)
largely exceeds revenue (4% in 2016). It can be concluded that a
significant part of the goods procured in China are actually used in
other markets.
Vestas expresses as well the need for localisation in target
markets Brazil, China and India: “local presence and local sourcing
is of great importance in these countries, be it for reasons of
proximity to customers, cost-effectiveness, or fulfilling local con-
tent requirements in manufacturing” [55].
Furthermore, Vestas has a strategy to have closer ties with large
suppliers because “involving these in the development of products
and processes, as the suppliers often possess many years of knowledge
and experience that can be utilised to the benefit of both parties” [55].
This kind of strategies could be a threat for Vestas' European sup-
pliers even when it offers them an opportunity to expand abroad
because of the required supplier size: some foreign suppliers, most
commonly Chinese ones,12 do have the required size, and thanks to
this strategy theymay conquer part of themarket share currently in
the hands of European suppliers.
The decision of where to set up componentsmanufacture comes
therefore hand-by-handwith supply chain decisions, and they both
are partly the result of the size of the focus market.
Data on number and location of suppliers corresponding to both
tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers are shown in Fig. 15. Gamesa kept in the
EU the largest share of world suppliers (48%) despite having only
16% of revenue from EU markets. A comparison with Fig. 13, which
Fig. 13. Revenue vs. procurement split, Gamesa. Note: 4.43% of procurement in the original data set is unassigned. Following a principle of proportionality, here these have been
allocated to the EU and RoW on a 50/50 basis.
Source: [54].
Fig. 14. Evolution of procurement per region, Gamesa. Note: Between 4.5% and 9% of
procurement is not allocated to a country in the original. Here it has been added to the
EU and to the rest of the world (RoW) on a 50/50 basis.
Source: [54].
Fig. 15. Location of suppliers vs. origin of revenue. Most suppliers are EU-based,
whereas most revenue is created abroad. Remarks: comparison is only loose because
suppliers statistics show “EMEA” figures (vs. “EU” in revenue statistics), and “LATAM”
(vs. “RoW”).
Source: [54].
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a lower number of Chinese suppliers obtain a higher share of
procurement, thus reaching higher average individual share of
procurement. Similarly to Chinese suppliers, US, Indian and RoW
suppliers are larger than EU or Brazilian ones.
Some EU OEMs follow a strategy to “develop” foreign suppliers
in an effort to localise the supply chain [58]. In these cases, OEMs
assign their own materials and quality development engineers to
suppliers' facilities in order to ensure their technological develop-
ment and competitiveness. During this process foreign firms learn
and improve, thus increasing the quality of their products while
maintaining the price-based competitive advantage of lower-cost
countries and social systems. When a third-country supplier
proves to be of outstanding quality and price, the OEM uses its
products beyond the host country, actually integrating the supplier
as a new member of its global supply chain. Whereas this process
helps the OEM become more competitive globally and reduce the
cost of energy, there are two drawbacks for the EU economy: first,
European jobs are lost as they are transferred to the third country;second, there is a risk that the supplier offers its newly-acquired
knowhow to competitors of the OEM who would eventually bet-
ter compete with the European OEM, thus eroding the latter's
competitive advantage.
Therefore, one strategy to create additional added value in
Europe would be to implement programmes that promote OEMs to
develop their European supply chain in the same way as they
develop suppliers elsewhere. Initial exploration of this option
suggests that a crucial enabler of this process is the attitude of the
local workforce, as perhaps measured by productivity ratios.
Indeed, the relationship between productivity and competitiveness
is strong: competitiveness has been defined as “the set of in-
stitutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of pro-
ductivity of a country” [59].
Emerging (Latin America, South Africa) and open (Australia, US)
markets are first in the list of non-localisation-required markets:
“entry barriers are lower, local financing is hard to obtain, and,
perhaps more importantly, manufacturers can compete on price”
[60].
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tionalise without creating a local supply chain. This is the example
of Senvion (DE) who, with this approach, is entering Australia,
Chile, Argentina, Japan and the US among others. The advantages
that are claimed for this strategy include: no expenditure in
building up local facilities (unless economically feasible); faster
product time to market; and benefits of scale in manufacturing via
consolidation of existing factories [61].
Finally we will explore figures comparing the creation or
maintaining of employment at home towhere revenue is earned, as
the amount of jobs being kept in Europe is the key benefit of Eu-
ropean wind energy companies' success in globalization.
Vestas, with more than 22 000 employees in over 34 countries,
had at the end of 2016 54.3% of them based in the EMEA region
(Europe, Middle East and Africa), an area where it earns just 45% of
its revenues [55]. However, despite maintaining the majority of
employment in Europe, Vestas also shows that European com-
panies are subject to the pressures of globalization: in 2016 the
blade factory in Lem (DK) had to reduce 300 staff due to “its high
manufacturing costs compared to the market level as well as the need
to strengthen Vestas' overall manufacturing and supply chainFig. 16. Location of jobs in full-time equivalent (FTE) vs. origin of revenue. Most of the
employment is maintained in the EU, whereas most of the revenue is raised abroad.
Source: [54].
Fig. 17. Comparison of where revenue is earned, where procurement takes place and
where employment is maintained, 2016competitiveness in response to evolving market conditions”.
Fig. 16 shows data for Gamesa which could be the extreme case
save, perhaps, Enercon, whose data are not public. The former
concentrates in the EU 49% of their workforce whereas only 16% of
its global revenue originates in the EU. Further, Fig. 17 compares the
percentages of revenue (V), employment (no. of jobs) and pro-
curement from suppliers (first and second tier) for the company,
and reinforces the conclusion that this company maintains a very
significant base at home even when most of its revenue (84%)
originates outside the EU.
With regards other European OEMs in the top-15 ranking of
manufacturers in 2016, data for Enercon and Siemens were not
available. Nordex-Accionamaintained in Europe, at the end of 2016,
83% of its employees, whereas 61% of orders came from Europe
[56]. Senvion, whose 2016 revenue in the EU was 80% of total
revenue (the remaining being Canada and the US) [62], does not
provide a breakdown of its workforce per country/area in its annual
report.
5. Global wind farm developer market
The role of the developer is crucial for the success of a project,
and it has certain characteristics that are interesting to highlight in
the context of this research.
Wind energy projects normally consists of two major elements:
the turbines, which are generally supplied from towers to blades by
the turbine OEM, and the balance-of-plant (BoP) which includes
civil works, electrical connections among turbines and to the grid,
and an electricity substation if necessary. Transport and installation
of the turbines could be part of either element. In China, a dual
system of contracts makes that it is not the turbine OEM that
supplies the tower nor the turbine transformer, but the BoP
contractor.
BoP is provided by very varied companies including legal con-
sultants, builders, cable manufacturers, etc. Therefore, the devel-
oper has to have deep knowledge of the local market, legal,
economic and social context. This knowledge is naturally held by
local companies and thus the developer market is highly localised.
5.1. Methodology
This part of the research is based on data from Bloomberg New
Energy Finance (BNEF) wind farm database received in May 2017.
This database contained both onshore and offshore projects
commissioned between 2007 and 2016 or that were under con-
struction by the end of 2016. Projects below 5MWwere removed as
theywere considered local projects. This resulted in a total capacity
in the database was 401662MW.
5.2. Details of the developers market
Based in the need to be local, the developers market is much
more diversified than the turbine manufacturer market. The 20
largest developers only sum 35% of wind energy commissioned in
the years 2007e2016 (see Figure 18), which can be compared with
97% of the wind turbine market held by the 20 largest manufac-
turers, according to the same database.
Most large developers are business units of either Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) including Guodian/Longyuan, Huaneng,
Datang, Huadian, China General Nuclear (CGN), or of traditional
European utilities such as Iberdrola, EDP, EDF, E. ON, Enel, Dong, SSE
Renewables. Two American developers, owned by utilities, are
among the leading developers by volume installed: NextEra and
Invenergy.
The five largest Chinese developers are active essentially only in
Fig. 18. Developers market per installed capacity, last 10 years. Based on 402 GW of onshore and offshore projects deployed between 2007 and 2016 or under construction at the
end of that year. Source: BNEF database of wind farms adapted with own market knowledge.
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(4%), Datang (3.7%), Huadian (2.8%) and CGN (2.3%). Next is US
company NextEra (2.3%, 95% of which in US and the rest in Canada),
followed by Spanish developer Iberdrola (1.9%). Chinese Guohua
follows and EDP Renovaveis and EDF Energies Nouvelles from the
EU complete the top ten in this database.Purchases of EU assets by non-EU firms.
Recently, a consortium of three Japanese entities (invest-
ment trading company Sojitz Corporation, Mitsubishi UFJ
Lease & Finance and utility company Kansai Electric Power)
bought 60% of a portfolio of five Irish wind farms (four of
which already in operation and one under development),
with a total 223MW capacity, for 300MV [83]. This involves
a valuation of the assets of 2242V/kW, significantly higher
than the estimated CapEx of 1200e1400V/kW.
Within the EU, Irish assets have been particularly attractive
for non-EU investors, with China General Nuclear Power
Group buying 230MW of wind farm assets from Gaelectric
in December 2016.5.3. Globalization of developers
European developers, although overall not the largest in size,
have expanded operations through several markets whereas Chi-
nese and US ones only marginally or moderately expanded abroad.
For example, US developers have expanded, e.g. to 1e3 countries in
the case of NextEra and Invenergy, whereas Chinese developers
have only recently started to expand into Canada, Pakistan,
Australia, South Africa, the US and other countries.
At first sight it feels surprising that Chinese developers, with
plenty of financial muscle, have not expanded abroad significantly.
Cui and Jiang [63] argue that state ownership is a problem for those
developers to invest abroad as it “creates the political affiliation of a
firm with its home-country government, which increases the firm's
resource dependence on home-country institutions, while at the same
time influencing its image as perceived by host-country institutional
constituents.” This point is reinforced by Huang et al. [64] who,
based on resource dependence theory, suggest that SOE's depen-
dence from state resources “may also reduce these firms' willingness
to expand internationally”.
Part of developers' international expansion took place through
acquisitions, in particular into the US market. Iberdrola acquired
local developers MREC Partners and Midwest Renewable Energy
Projects and utility Energy East. EDP and EDF acquired Horizon
Wind Energy and enXco respectively. In other cases, developers
expanded with organic growth, setting up country subsidiaries.
This was most common in markets with closer cultural ties, e.g.
Gestamp from Spain into Brazil.
Another form of expansion to new markets is the acquisition of
projects. For example, Acciona (ES) in 2016 acquired the San Roman
wind farm (93MW) in Texas, US, from American developer Pioneer
Wind Energy [65].
European developers lead in terms of number of countries
present. This ranking is led by Spanish Gamesa Development andAcciona Energía who are present in 14 countries each. They are
followed by Iberdrola (ES) and ENEL (IT), who are present in 13
countries, EDF (FR) in 11, E. ON (DE) in 10, Engie (FR) in 9, and EDP
(PT) in 8 countries. Present in 7 countries are RES (UK), Vestas (DK),
and four more European companies follow with presence in 6
countries: Innogy, ABO and Nordex from Germany and Gestamp
from Spain.
It's only in position 16 of this ranking of countries present that
the first non-EU developer present in 5 countries is found, AES from
the US. AES is accompanied by yetmore European developers: juwi,
WKN and BayWa (DE), Vattenfall (SE) and Global Wind Power A/S
(DK), all of which are present in 5 countries.The analysis of the global number of installations (in MW) per
year shows the companies that have become more active or suc-
cessful than others. Chinese developers, focused only on their do-
mestic market, have been subjected to the ups and downs of that
market, and generally show peaks in 2010 and 2015 and drops in
2011e2014 and 2016.
Large developers from the European Union have reduced their
investment and thus show a negative trend in the period studied:
Iberdrola, E. ON, Gamesa Development, Acciona, and BP. EDP and
EDF, although generally having less new installations recently than
at the beginning of the period, have picked up slightly in 2016.
Table 3
Wind farm development activity of European wind turbine manufacturers outside
Europe. Source: BNEF database of wind farms.


















US X X X
Venezuela X
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Invenergy, as have European Enel, Renewable Energy Systems and
wpd.
The description, based on BNEF data, shows how selected Eu-
ropean developers internationalised.
- Iberdrola. Based on its home country (ES) and on the home
country of its acquisitions (see above, mostly UK and US), Iber-
drola expanded into other EU countries (to FR, DE, PL) at the
beginning of the period but new onshore EU projects became
rarer, and something similar occurred in the US. In 2015 Iber-
drola entered the Asian market (TR). Overall, Iberdrola has
reduced investment in wind farm deployment over the years.
- EDP (Energias de Portugal) Renovaveis has expanded mostly in
the US, significantly more than in ES, RO, PT, PL, and FR. Origi-
nally EDP was present in the US, Spain and France, and over the
10 years under study it diversified to a total 8 countries.
- EDF (Electricite de France) Nouvelles Energies had diversified
prior to 2007 with presence in FR, IT, PT, GR, US. After 2007 EDF
further diversified to CA, MX, PL and the UK. Significant markets
for EDF are the US, PT, IT, FR and CA.
- E. ON (DE) somehow surprisingly did not start developing wind
farms in its home country but in the US, and it still has a very low
basis in Germany. E. ON expanded to DK, PL, PT, ES and SE,
although the bulk of its assets during this period (68%) are in the
US.
Chinese developers have as well made attempts to go global,
with mixed results. For example, China Longyuan Power Group
Corporation Limited, a minority stock market-listed subsidiary of
Chinese state-owned utility China Guodian Corporationwith 58% of
capital, has as main business the development and operation of
wind farms. By mid-2017, Longyuan had a consolidated wind ca-
pacity of 17.4 GW [66].
In 2011 Longyuan and Gamesa signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding (MoU) for Gamesa to support Longyuan's inter-
nationalisation [67]. Shortly afterwards Longyuan acquired its first
operational foreign project, the 99MW Dufferin wind farm in
Canada, which was developed … with GE turbines. The other
Longyuan overseas project, the 245MW Mulilo De Aar in South
Africa, is being built with Guodian wind turbines.
The MoU was therefore never put in operation.Internationalisation of the development activity of turbine
manufacturers
European turbine manufacturers have traditionally included a
wind farm development business unit or activity focused on the
onshore subsector that developed as well projects outside the EU.
These projects often took place in partnership with local com-
panies, e.g. offering turnkey installations.
Table 3 shows the countries where the wind farm development
businesses of European turbine manufacturers are or have been
active. It is perhaps interesting to mention some details:
- Gamesa was originally present in some EU countries (ES, PT, IT,
DE) and expandedwithin the EU, then the US, China andMexico.
However, similarly to Iberdrola, towards 2013 it reduced very
significantly its developing business.
- Acciona Energía concentrated most activity in its home market
(ES) but already at the beginning of the period it had some ac-
tivity in other EU countries and beyond. After the crisis in the
Spanish renewable energy sector, Acciona expanded to other
American markets although its development activity was
significantly less.6. Conclusions
Globalization goes hand-by-hand with localisation. In order to
compete in large markets (India, China, US, Brazil), EU companies
have had to grow local manufacture and a supply chain. The US is
somehow the exception and this could be due to its openness as a
market. Smaller markets are supplied from the main production
centres (whether the EU or factories in China) and do not require
localisation.
Vestas, Gamesa, and other European companies to a lesser
extent have been successful at localisation whereas Suzlon and
Chinese companies are generally less able to localise supplies,
perhaps due to the low-cost production achieved in their home
countries.
OEMs in the EU contribute to the economy significantly thanks
to their exports, but China is emerging as a manufacturing hub for
them. Eventually, this could result in Chinese suppliers offering
products of higher quality which risks increasing competition from
Chinese OEMs using this modality of technology transfer.
Whereas seven acquisitions of EU technology firms by US
companies, and four acquisitions by Chinese companies were
identified, no European company acquired a US or Chinese tech-
nology firm. This can be the result of the longer history of EU
companies in the business, of the quality of their technology, of the
successive crisis affecting the sector in Europe, of the availability of
funding on the side of the American and Chinese, or a combination
of these. Significantly as well, General Electric of the US has been
the acquirer of all but one European technology companies bought
by US firms.
The European wind industry is a success story of worldwide
reach that attracts jobs and growth for Europe. In order to ensure
that this will continue to be so in the mid- or long-term future, the
industrymay need the help of European and national policymakers
with consented, well-targeted actions. Support programmes could
help maintaining technological leadership through research,
development and innovation programmes feeding on cross-
industry knowledge and knowhow. They could support industrial
leadership also in the manufacture of components. Instruments to
financially and politically back the expansion of the industry to new
and existing foreign markets may also be required.
Further reflection of policy makers with developers, turbine
manufacturers and other key players may be needed so as to
R. Lacal-Arantegui / Renewable Energy 134 (2019) 612e628 627increase the impact of the sometimes already existing programmes
(e.g. Horizon 2020) and make their implementation more
comprehensive.
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List of abbreviations and definitions
BNEF: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, a Bloomberg company
BoP: Balance of plant of a wind farm
HDD: Hard disk drive
FTE: Full-time equivalent (jobs)
LATAM: Latin America
M&A: Merger and acquisition
O&M: Operations and maintenance
OEM: Original equipment manufacturer, in this report OEM refers to the turbine
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SOE: state-owned enterprise
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Wind energy has grown from less than 20 gigawatts (GW) in 2000 to 590 GW by the end of 2018 and
already provides 6% of the electricity consumed in the world. During this period, the wind energy
technology industry has evolved from a local to a global business. To illustrate the globalization of this
sector, this research assesses the effectiveness of the firms’ international strategies based on empirical
indicators. The intensity, the speed of internationalization, the geographic extensity and diversification
are calculated and analyzed. The results indicate that the most successful firms are the market leaders
Vestas and Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, and they are characterized by leading in both the depth
(sales abroad/total sales) and width (number of countries) of internationalization as well as in geographic
diversification. These companies are closely followed by four European and American firms: Enercon,
Nordex, General Electric and Senvion. To date, Chinese firms, leaders in the largest market (China), are in
general unable to internationalize as effectively as firms from other constituencies. Our results reveal
that strong rivalry pressure in the domestic market is not a guarantee for the international competi-
tiveness of its best-performing firms in the case of the wind energy industry e unless there are special
characteristics in that domestic market.
© 2020 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Introduction
Many theories about the process of firm internationalization can
be found in the literature. Among the best known is the Uppsala
model, which presents growth in the international activities of a
company as a gradual process of expansion into new markets [1,2].
This expansion occurs through a series of successive stages that
result in an increasing degree of international operations. A second
approach explains internationalization as a process of learning or
the development of company capabilities to recognize opportu-
nities in international markets [3]. Researchers have focused on the
importance of establishing relationships [2,4]; firm growth is seen
as a dynamic process, strongly dependent not only on a competitive
product or service but also on the opening and strengthening of
relations with players in other markets. Research has also focused
on technical know-how, location [5] and international entrepre-
neurship [6], in which both emerging and consolidated companies
can create value based on the use of their entrepreneurial skills in
their internationalization processes., roberto.lacal-arantegui@ec.Time is a key factor of competitive advantage, as the first com-
pany entering a new country positions itself better in this market.
Management of time in terms of the order, timing and speed of the
process is an essential aspect of a firm’s international expansion [7].
The speed of internationalization is therefore a matter of interest in
the study of business globalization, and most studies analyze the
process only until the moment the company starts to internation-
alize [8,9]. However, someworks have argued that it is necessary to
consider not only the time a company takes to establish its business
in the first foreign market but also the time that elapses until it
consolidates its international activity [10,11]. Furthermore, some
studies have suggested that speed does not always positively in-
fluence performance [12]. Finally, firm size, firm age and other
factors influence the success, measured in terms of profitability, of
the international activity of a firm [13].
In the case of the wind industry, there are hardly any references
that address how the international expansion processes of the
companies occurred [14]. In this sector, there have been asym-
metric developments in different regions, mainly depending on
specific political support and the economic and industrial back-
ground. On the one hand, Europe has led technological develop-
ment for 40 years, using first the local market for wind energy
deployment and later expanding to other regions based on the
J.M. Yusta, R. Lacal-Arantegui / Renewable Energy 157 (2020) 593e604594experience gained. Innovation has been, and still is, a key factor in
the growth of companies beyond their national borders. On the
other hand, China has become an important player in recent years,
capturing almost half of the new capacity installed annually, which
has allowed the technological and business growth of local
companies.
Thewind industry is relatively young, since it has only reached a
significant size during the last 20 years; in terms of its main indi-
cator, cumulative installed capacity in gigawatts (GW), it has grown
from less than 20 GW in 2000 to 590 GWby the end of 2018 [15]. By
considering this deployment as well as the unit costs from, for
example, IEA Wind [16,17], Bloomberg New Energy Finance [18]
and Joint Research Centre [19], we estimate that the approximate
equivalent cumulative investment reached $50 billion by 2000 and
$1370 billion by 2018.
Some research papers have confirmed that the creation of a
domestic market in renewable energies has been decisive for the
competitiveness and internationalization of companies [20e23].
This impact of the local market is particularly true in the case of
companies in Europe and the USA, whereas the large Chinese
market has not been decisive for its companies to actively partici-
pate in the global industry, at least until now [14].
Indicators for measuring the degree of internationalization of
firms include the transnationality index [24], the network spread
index [25], the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and other indices.
Those indicators have been used to measure the degree of inter-
nationalization intensity, geographic extensity or geographic con-
centration of the firm’s international activity, respectively [26]
(cited by Ref. [27]).
However, there is little research on the internationalization of
the wind energy industry in general and of wind turbine manu-
facture in particular, and none of this research used international-
ization indices. Yet, quantitative assessment is necessary to enable
robust, unbiased research to identify the international strategies of
wind companies and to increase the understanding of the historical
evolution and current trends.
The objective of this paper is to select the appropriate indices for
assessing the globalization of themainwind turbinemanufacturers
worldwide. In this way, we address the internationalization effec-
tiveness of these companies that eventually result in the global
deployment of wind energy.
The novel contributions of this paper are (a) the proposal of a set
of indicators to measure the degree of internationalization of wind
turbine manufacturers, which combine structural indicators with
indices for measuring the speed of internationalization, and (b)
their application to data of the installed capacity by the 15 major
manufacturers in 112 countries and territories over the past 40
years.
Section 2 presents and discusses the methodology used. In-
dicators such as the intensity and speed of internationalization,
geographic extensity and diversification are described, and the
results of modeling of these indicators are presented in Section 3. A
discussion follows in Section 4 along with the ranking of the firms.
Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Methodology
The indicators to assess the internationalization of enterprises
that have been proposed in the scientific literature can be classified
as structural, performance-based and attitudinal [27]. Composite
indices have been created with the individual indicators [25]. Of
these types, structural indicators are the most widely used. Per-
formance indicators represent the economic results and market
success of the company brought about by its international expan-
sion. The indicators of attitude refer to the management styles andthe decision-making processes leading to the globalization of the
company.
Structural indicators are the preferredmeasures of the degree of
internationalization, perhaps because they rely on numerical values
to provide an empirical view, and for this reason, they are used in
this research. As there is not an individual indicator that satisfac-
torily measures the overall degree of the internationalization of a
firm [27], we propose the use of several structural indices that help
with assessment, lead to a useful analysis and together present a
meaningful picture of the process.
One of the most popular indicators is the transnationality index
(TNI), which was introduced by a United Nations report (World
Investment Report 1995. Transnational Corporations and Compet-
itiveness) at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment in 1995 [24]. The TNI is a composite indicator calculated as
the average of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign
sales to total sales and foreign employment to total employment.
This index belongs to the group of measures of internationalization
intensity, focusing on the intensity of foreign activities in relation to
the quantity of domestic activities.
However, other interesting dimensions can be provided for the
assessment [28]. Geographic extensity indices consider the number
of countries and operations to calculate the spread of a firm, while
geographic diversification indices estimate the degree of concen-
tration or diversification of a firm’s business among different
countries. As a third dimension, measuring the speed of interna-
tionalization could help to explain not only the success but also the
different nature of firms’ strategies [29e32].
The data about the installed capacity, in megawatts (MW), from
each of the 15 primarywind turbinemanufacturers in 112 countries
and territories worldwide from 1978 to 2017 was used for the
purpose of this study [33]. The database is nearly complete, as it
includes a total of 517.7 GW of wind turbines installed or
commissioned during this period, including old turbines that have
already been decommissioned. This figure is 96% of the most ac-
curate estimate of the worldwide installed capacity, 539.6 GW, by
the GlobalWind Energy Council [34]. Themain gaps in the database
correspond with Chinese installations; for example, a total of 32.6
GW of installations were assigned to Goldwind of China, whereas
its actual installations were 42.7 GW in China [35] plus 1.3 GW
abroad. The installed capacity by the top 15 turbine manufacturers,
also called original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), in the
database was 458.5 GW, or about 85% of the worldwide installed
capacity by the end of 2018.
The consideration of what constitutes the “home country”
required a methodological decision. The history of the wind energy
sector includesmanymergers and acquisitions between OEMs, and,
in some cases, the result is an OEM with a large installed base in
several countries, such as the merge of Siemens Wind Power and
Gamesa into Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy (SGRE) in 2016.
Siemens Wind Power was, in turn, the acquisition of the Danish
company Bonus by German Siemens in 2004. Assuming that SGRE
(now a Spanish company with Siemens as a majority German
stakeholder) has Spain as a single home country is incorrect; it is
more accurate to assume that SGRE has three home countries (DK,
ES and DE).
In the same way, General Electric (GE) is mostly the result of the
acquisition of the U.S. companies Zond and Kenetech and the
German company Tacke (see Fig. 1), and thus it was assigned two
home countries (DE and US). Although GE acquired the Swedish
company ScanWind, the contribution of this firm was not signifi-
cant, and Sweden was thus not considered a home country for GE.
Following this criterion, Nordex was assigned Spain and Germany
as home countries, but Goldwind was not assigned Germany
(following the acquisition of 70% of Vensys) as a home country.
Fig. 1. The most significant mergers and acquisitions among wind turbine manufacturers.
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wind turbine manufacturers.
After having worked with wind installation databases from five
different industrial intelligence suppliers since 2009, we found that
the MAKE database is the most complete in terms of the number of
installations (in MW) that are allocated to each turbine manufac-
turer. However, the database still retained some elements that had
to be refined. This refining work consisted of screening the initial
installations in the database against the company’s history on
either its website or wind energy-related books of the 1990s [36,37]
and against some of the other databases from industrial intelli-
gence suppliers [38e41].
The data therefore allows the assessment of certain structural
measures of the internationalization of these wind firms. The in-
dicators aid in understanding the evolution of market dynamics,
firm expansion and the influence of the domestic renewable policy
on boosting a firm’s global activity. Hence, we selected and applied
the following structural indices to the analysis of wind turbine
manufacturer internationalization.2.1. Internationalization intensity
For a measure of the intensity of internationalization, we
focused on the ratio of the installed wind turbine capacity abroad
(“exports”) to the company’s total installed capacity (“total sales”).
This index is one of the three that constitute the TNI [24], and it is
one for which the available data allows full research. This index can
effectively measure the depth of the foreign expansion for each
firm.
First, we calculated this index for each year in the sample, from
1978 to 2017. Then, the intensity index Ifirm was obtained for the
total amount of the installed capacity by each firm in all 112
countries and territories. In addition, a second indicator Ifirm was
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Pfirm; co; yr is the total installed capacity by each wind turbine
firm, in each country co, in each year yr, including the domestic and
foreign capacity.2.2. Geographic extensity
The number of foreign countries and territories in which each
company has installed wind turbines is the relative spread of each
firm worldwide [25]. This spread is directly related to what can be
called the width of internationalization of a company, which is
measured by the network spread index (NSI), a ratio for each firm of
the absolute number of foreign countries where the firm ever
deployed wind turbines to the similar figure for the firm that








Where Ncountriesfirm is the absolute number of different foreign
countries that a firm has ever done business with.2.3. Geographic diversification
A firmwhose foreign activity is diversified does business in each
market in a balancedway. This balance protects the firm against the
ups and downs of individual markets. This protection is unlike a
firmwhose business mostly depends on a few of its export markets.
We propose the use of a geographic diversification index GDfirm to
measure how the activity is split among those countries.
First, for every firm and year, we calculated the ratio of the
installed capacity in each country ðPfirm; co; yrÞ to its total installed
capacity. Second, we used the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman
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firm activity for each year GDfirm; yr. Finally, we computed the mean
of the annual HHI values to obtain an average value of the
geographic diversification index of each company in the whole
period GDfirm. This average index can also be calculated for a





















The index varies between 0 and 10,000, where 10,000 indicates
that the company concentrates its sales in a single country, while
values closer to zero indicate greater international diversification.Fig. 2. Wind turbine market share in 2017 of the 15 leading OEMs in this study. In-
stallations by other OEMs have been disregarded. Source: MAKE database [33].2.4. Speed of internationalization
Internationalization studies using structural indicators do not
usually include a measure of speed. However, this speed is an
important issue and a key aspect of a firm’s international strategy
[7,10]. Hence, we discuss here a set of indicators based on proposals
in the literature that quantify the average speed at which the
company has expanded internationally.
Hilmersson et al. [19,20] have suggested several possible indices
to measure the speed of internationalization: the mean number of
markets exported per year since inception, the ratio of exports to
total sales and the share of the firm’s assets abroad. Concerning the
first index, Mohr [21] has proposed a variation as the average
number of foreign markets divided by the number of years since
the firm’s first international expansion. Using the date of the first
international expansion fits better with the wind industry than the
date of inception since sales abroad started after a long period of
technology development.
The ratio of exports to total sales is the internationalization in-
tensity defined in Section 2.1. How this element evolved over time
can be a useful indicator for the assessment of the internationali-
zation dynamics of a firm. In the case of wind turbine manufac-
turers, the indicator is defined as the percentage of the foreign
against the total rated capacity (in MW) of the turbines installed.
Speed could also refer to the length of time until a certain
milestone is achieved. The literature suggests using between 10%
and 20% of the total number of countries and territories exported to
for this indicator [32,44,45]. After analyzing the historical data se-
ries from the database, we propose this milestone to be 20%, as this
figure reflects a significant number of exports for most companies
in the sample.
Therefore, the selected indicators to measure the speed of the
internationalization of wind turbine firms are the following:
 The average number of new markets entered per year since the
firm’s first international expansion
 The number of years between the first year of the internation-
alization of the firm to the year when it reached themilestone of
20% of its final number of foreignmarkets; thus, for example, if a
firm had exported to a total of 30 countries by the end of 2017,
the figure in this indicator would be the years until it reached six
foreign markets.
 Internationalization intensity over time3. Results
The results indicate that some of the companies in the sector
have had an international focus almost since their inception, while
others have based their growth onmeeting the needs of their home
country. Fig. 2 depicts the 2017 market shares of the world’s 15
leadingwind turbinemanufacturers, inwhich European companies
continue to retain a significant quota: Vestas, SGRE, Enercon, Nor-
dex and Senvion accounted for 56% of the 2017 market share of the
15 largest companies. Chinese companies reached a 30% share of
the top 15, due to the strong momentum of wind power in their
home country and the nature of a state-managed economy that
favors national champions and state-owned companies [46]. In
total, those 15 leading companies installed 45.5 GW in 2017, with a
minimum contribution from Sinovel and XEMC.
3.1. Internationalization intensity
Table 1 summarizes the results of some indicators of the degree
of internationalization as discussed in Section 2. First, it should be
highlighted that the international activity of wind turbine com-
panies has accounted for as much as 51% of the total installed ca-
pacity worldwide until 2017: 235,800 MW of 458,500 MW.
Moreover, the first four companies reach 63% of the total installed
capacity and 85% of the foreign installed capacity.
The Ifirm indicator relates the installed capacity abroad to the
total capacity installed by the firm, according to the formula of
Equation (1). The indicator reveals that European companies have
carried out most of their business in the international field
throughout the history of the wind sector. Furthermore, Fig. 3
graphically illustrates these results: two companies, Vestas and
SGRE, have captured most of the international wind energy busi-
ness. However, Fig. 4 shows that Vestas and SGRE reached that
position in very different way: Vestas was very international from
the beginning whereas SGRE reached Vestas in 2011 and between
this year and 2017 both accounted for roughly equal share of in-
ternational sales, 47 GW Vestas vs. 45 GW SGRE. Table 1 indicates
that these two companies have accounted for an overall 64% of the
installed capacity abroad.
The results of the index Ifirm offer a historical perspective of the
international activity of the companies, since the average of the
annual index Ifirm was calculated. Vestas appears to be the only
Table 1
Results of the indicators of intensity of the degree of internationalization.
Company Total installed capacity Foreign installed capacity Intensity




Vestas 91,168 19.9% 87,521 37.1% 96% 70%
SGRE 82,922 18.1% 62,460 26.5% 75% 42%
GE 63,180 13.8% 22,189 9.4% 35% 18%
Enercon 49,038 10.7% 27,170 11.5% 55% 35%
Goldwind 32,643 7.1% 1,310 0.6% 4% 2%
Nordex 23,896 5.2% 17,112 7.3% 72% 33%
United Power 18,082 3.9% 254 0.1% 1% 0%
Suzlon 17,634 3.8% 5,907 2.5% 33% 9%
Senvion 17,108 3.7% 11,120 4.7% 65% 32%
Sinovel 16,739 3.7% 350 0.1% 2% 3%
Envision 11,940 2.6% 30 0.0% 0% 0%
Ming Yang 11,501 2.5% 180 0.1% 2% 1%
SEwind 9,937 2.2% 0 0.0% 0% 0%
XEMC 6,616 1.4% 4 0.0% 0% 0%
Haizhuan 6,132 1.3% 32 0.0% 1% 1%
458,536 100% 235,637 100%
Table 2
Results of the indicators of geographic extensity.
Geographic extensity
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of the European companies reached desirable rates of foreign
business of between 32% and 42% over time. The American com-
pany GE presents a lower Ifirm of 18%, whereas Chinese companies
have hardly developed an international business.
Fig. 4 represents the installed capacity in foreign countries by
each company and helps with understanding their historical evo-
lution. In addition, a dashed line in the figure indicates the sum of
the domestic installations up to 2008, which puts the foreign
business into perspective.
Vestas, SGRE, GE and Nordex display continuous growth, while
Enercon’s international business has been in decline since 2012. It is
also interesting to note that Vestas first started a significant inter-
national expansion around 1995, while other companies did not
start until the 21st century. However, during recent years and after
the merge of Siemens and Gamesa, SGRE has caught up with Vestas
in the international arena.
The figure reveals an interesting feature in 2012e2013: a gen-
eral drop in foreign installations that is pronounced in the case of
Siemens and Gamesa (SGRE). This drop is due to the fall of the U.S.istinction of the capacity installed at home and abroad. Source: MAKE database [33].
Fig. 4. The annual evolution of installed capacity abroad by firm and the total aggregate domestic installed capacity by all firms from 1978 to 2017. Source: MAKE database [33].
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1,084 MW in 2013 [47]. The data indicates that Siemens and
Gamesa, two separate companies at that time, installed 3,875 MW
in the US in 2012 and only 87 MW in 2013. Other companies suf-
fered from the U.S. drop as well, primarily GE. However, the case of
GE is not depicted in Fig. 4 because the US is GE’s domestic market.
The figure illustrates the lack of contribution from Chinese OEMs to
internationalization as well as the retreat from foreign markets of
Suzlon in 2012e2017.3.2. Geographic extensity
The geographic scope, or extensity, of the wind turbine manu-
facturers is here assessed by means of the number of countries
where they have expanded their businesses, depicted in Table 2 and
Fig. 5. This information is accompanied by the calculation of the
NSI, which allows a relative classification. Fig. 6 provides additional
information on the historical evolution of the number of foreign
markets per firm.Fig. 5. Graphical represWhen comparing the trends displayed in Figs. 4 and 6, it is
interesting to note how theworld leaders, Vestas and SGRE, are also
the manufacturers that have been present in many countries.
However, their evolution was different: Vestas was consistently
leading in both the number of countries and the installed capacity
abroad, while SGRE lagged behind in both indicators until it
reached Vestas around 2011. Since that year, Vestas installed in an
average 33 countries per year and SGRE in 27.
Table 2 lists the high number of countries where Enercon, GE
and Nordex have been present (47, 40 and 41, respectively). How-
ever, the share of those companies in the total foreign installed
capacity (see Table 1: 12%, 9% and 7%) has not achieved a similar
high level. In this regard, GE’s and Nordex’s NSI values are
0.55e0.56, lower than Enercon’s 0.64. Senvion, Suzlon and Gold-
wind have been present in 26, 16 and 13 countries, respectively, but
the volume of their activity abroad (Table 1) is different at 4.7%, 2.5%
and 0.6% of the total foreign installed capacity.
Equally interesting a finding, the figures for Goldwind and other
Chinese companies do not support the theory proposed by Porter inentation of Table 2.
Fig. 6. Annual evolution of number of exported countries from 1978 to 2017 by firm (excluding Chinese companies). Source: MAKE database [33].
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competitive advantage for internationalization [48]. We think that
this strong pressure is more theoretical than real in the Chinese
case. With China as the leading country (189 GW installed by the
end of 2017), the most international of the Chinese OEMs, Gold-
wind, has only installed between 3% and 4% of its business abroad,
even though Goldwind has surpassed every other leading Chinese
OEM in this respect.3.3. Geographic diversification of companies
It was discussed previously that internationalization is different
when it is balanced among countries rather thanwhen one country
(or a small handful of them) weighs heavily in the business port-
folio of the company. In other words, the international diversifi-
cation of each company is to be measured in relation to the size of
its presence in each country, not only according to the number of
countries where it is present. This indicator can be obtained by
relating it to diversification indices based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman market concentration index.
Section 3.1 clarified that internationalization in the wind in-
dustry started, in practice, by 2000. For this reason, this indicator
was applied to the period from 2000. Table 3 presents the average
value GDfirm of the annual GDfirm index between 2000 and 2017.
This indicator reveals once more that Vestas has the mostTable 3
Results of the indicator of geographic diversification GDfirm.
Geographic diversification








Suzlon 7,234diversified international activity with a GDfirm value of 1,334. On the
other hand, the GDfirm index of Chinese companies takes a value
close to 10,000 in all cases, thus indicating that they have virtually
not expanded their activity outside their country. Fig. 7 depicts the
annual values of the GDfirm for companies in the wind sector,
excluding Chinese companies.
The comparison between the results of two companies illus-
trates the contribution of this index to assessing the different
character of internationalization from a country diversification
point of view. Firms can be present in a similar number of countries
yet have different structures of diversification. Both GE and Nordex
are present in a similar number of foreign countries (40 and 41,
respectively; see Table 2). However, the GDfirm index reveals that
Nordex (GDfirm ¼ 2,156) has more geographically diverse business,
while GE (GDfirm ¼ 4,123) concentrates its business more in some
countries, led by its home market, the US.
The GDfirm figures include the respective acquisitions of Acciona
by Nordex and Alstom by GE in 2016. Interestingly, these acquisi-
tions were presented as complementary in terms of country
diversification by both acquiring OEMs. For example, in the case of
Nordex-Acciona, the press release noted that “the twowind turbine
manufacturers have complementary technologies and market
footprints, with Nordex’s strong presence in Europe a good match








Fig. 7. Geographic diversification index GDfirm from 2000 to 2017 by firm excluding Chinese companies.
Table 4
Wind turbine installations of Acciona and Nordex for the period up to 2015, main
markets.
Country Nordex Acciona Country Nordex Acciona
Australia 1 239 Italy 626 65
Belgium 39 Japan 70
Brazil 303 Lithuania 70
Canada 26 177 Mexico 607
Chile 105 Netherlands 252
China 724 Norway 148
Colombia 20 Pakistan 150
Costa Rica 50 Poland 271 183
Croatia 30 Portugal 411
Czech Republic 13 Romania 100
Denmark 135 South Africa 182 138
Egypt 63 South Korea 65
Estonia 18 Spain 203 1,730
Finland 247 Sweden 435
France 1,402 39 Turkey 1,122 59
Germany 3,204 United Kingdom 1,122 36
Greece 111 6 United States 902 1,373
India 54 Uruguay 167
Ireland 391 Total 12,696 5,202
Table 5
Onshore wind installations, in MW, which boomed in Germany between 2010 and
2017 and contributions by Enercon. Global installations by Enercon. Sources:
German Wind Energy Association, MAKE database [33]. Note that Enercon does not
make offshore wind turbines, thus only onshore figures are relevant here.
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Germany (DE) 1,453 2,012 2,217 2,786 4,571 3,731 5,002 5,334
Enercon DE 926 1,213 1,304 1,496 2,043 1,329 1,782 1,915
Enercon global 3,197 3,920 4,310 3,636 4,107 3,023 3,343 3,264
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This statement matches data in the MAKE database, as pre-
sented in Table 4. Only in the US, Poland and South Africawere both
companies about equally active in the number of installations,
whereas in 28 of the 37 countries, only one of themwas present or
both were present but one had only a symbolic presence of less
than 10 MW.
Fig. 7 reveals that the overall trend of the index GDfirm between
2000 and 2017 is slightly decreasing, which indicates greater
diversification of the sector international activity. The trend can
possibly be split into two clearer periods: from 2000 to 2011, all
companies experienced an increase in diversification, whereas the
period 2012e2017 introduced a slight reversing trend that was
more severe in the cases of Suzlon and Enercon. Suzlon has expe-
rienced a deep crisis since 2011 that caused it to retreat to its home
market of India after about seven years of significant international
expansion. Enercon’s evolution since 2012 was likely influenced by
the boom of its homemarket, Germany, where it is the leading OEM
(see figures in Table 5).
An even finer focus on the two more diversified companies,
Vestas and SGRE for recent years (2014e2017) shows that SGREbecame the most diversified company during that period, with an
average GDfirm for the period of 1,068 vs. 1,407 Vestas. Even, during
this period, Nordex with a GDfirm of 1,254 performed better than
Vestas.3.4. Speed of internationalization
Three indicators were used in this research to study the pace at
which companies have expanded their operations abroad: the
mean number of new markets entered per year since internation-
alization, the years passed from the first year of internationalization
until reaching 20% of the total number of countries exported and
the relationship between the exports and total sales over time.
Table 6 presents key figures used for the calculation and the
results obtained for the first two indicators. In general, companies
had an early internationalization led by Vestas and SGRE in the
1980s, and they were soon followed by the European companies
Nordex, Enercon and Senvion and GE of the US. Chinese companies
have not been included here because they have barely developed
international activity.
The average number of new markets per year since the firm’s
first international foray is also presented in Table 6. This indicator
reveals how the speed of internationalization of SGRE and Vestas
has been faster than the rest of the companies, whereas Suzlon and
Senvion have significantly lower ratios that make them lag behind
the others.
As mentioned in Section 2 and according to the literature, it is
worth calculating the number of years between the start of inter-
nationalization until the year when a firm achieved 20% of the final
number of foreign countries exported. The companies that have the
best ratios here are Suzlon, GE, Enercon, Senvion and Nordex.
Conversely, SGRE and Vestas did not reach 20% of sales abroad until
Table 6













Mean no. new markets entered per year
since internationalization
No. years until 20%
countries exp.
Vestas 1978 1981 1993 39 36 73 1.97 12
SGRE 1978 1984 1996 39 33 70 2.12 12
Enercon 1984 1992 1997 33 25 40 1.77 5
GE 1983 1993 1997 34 24 47 1.64 4
Nordex 1987 1991 1998 30 26 41 1.59 7
Suzlon 1996 2003 2006 21 14 16 1.07 3
Senvion 1988 1993 1999 29 24 26 1.00 6
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Thus, Vestas and SGRE took longer to reach the 20% milestone,
but they were also the first companies both founded and initiating
exports; they were the pioneers and their work facilitated faster
development of the global market. The data indicates that late
entrants such as Suzlon were faster to reach the milestone, which
was due to the greater maturity of the markets.
The third indicator selected to measure the speed of interna-
tionalization was the relationship between the exports and total
sales over time. Fig. 8 represents the percentage of foreign versus
total installed capacity by selected companies from 2000 to 2017
for clearer visualization of the historical data. The difference be-
tween some companies that began their international development
early (Vestas and SGRE in 1981e1984) compared to others that
have accelerated in recent years is relevant. Suzlon has not been
considered in this figure because the effect of its deep crisis would
introduce noise into the analysis.4. Discussion
The indicators proposed in this research to assess the interna-
tionalization of the wind industry reveal the different levels of
success of the firms’ foreign expansion as well as the evolution that
allows the understanding of the current market situation. Thus, by
comparing the results of the top 15 companies in Figs. 2 and 3, it is
observed that Vestas and SGRE have led the market during the past
40 years and still maintain their leading positions.
These two companies also present the best results for interna-
tionalization. Table 7 lists the summary of the internationalization
indicators obtained in this research, in which it is observed that
Vestas and SGRE achieved the highest values both in the intensity
of internationalization and in the geographic spread of theirFig. 8. The relationship between foreign and total installed capacity froactivity. When the Ifirm index is considered, which presents the
average value of the evolution of the international activity of the
companies, a ranking similar to that of the Ifirm index is observed for
all companies except for Suzlon, which drastically drops from
Ifirm ¼ 33% to Ifirm ¼ 9%. This reduction means that Suzlon’s inter-
national activity has been prominent but also concentrated in a few
years. These results justify deepening the study of the historical
evolution of the overseas expansion of the companies and of the
speed of that process.
Significant internationalization of the wind industry did not
start until the beginning of the 21st century, except in the case of
Vestas, which began its noteworthy activity abroad around 1993
(see Fig. 4 and Table 3). Among the companies that started to
expand their business abroad later, SGRE has stood out in recent
years, even at times surpassing the annual volume of Vestas’s in-
ternational activity.
Other than Vestas, the information in Fig. 4 allows companies to
be classified into three groups:
- Enercon, SGRE and GE began to gain significant foreign sales
volume in 2004, after the three companies had already reached
an international presence in at least 20% of the countries
exported to around 1997 (Table 6).
- Another group of companies (Nordex, Senvion and Suzlon) have
accelerated their international activity since 2007, but these
companies have subsequently experienced a different evolution.
Nordex has consolidated its internationalization more than
Senvion, whereas Suzlon has seen its internationalization
shrank to nearly zero.
- Chinese companies have barely developed activity abroad, as
can also be seen in the results summarized in Table 7. Amongm 2000 to 2017 by firm, excluding Chinese companies and Suzlon.
Table 7





Intensity Geographic extensity Geographic concentration
MW % MW % Ifirm(MW foreign/MW total) Ifirm Annual average No. countries NSIfirm GDfirm
(>yr 2000)
Vestas 91,168 19.9% 87,521 37.1% 96% 70% 73 1.00 1,334
SGRE 82,922 18.1% 62,460 26.5% 75% 42% 70 0.96 2,420
GE 63,180 13.8% 22,189 9.4% 35% 18% 40 0.55 4,123
Enercon 49,038 10.7% 27,170 11.5% 55% 35% 47 0.64 3,021
Goldwind 32,643 7.1% 1,310 0.6% 4% 2% 13 0.18 9,276
Nordex 23,896 5.2% 17,112 7.3% 72% 33% 41 0.56 2,156
United Power 18,082 3.9% 254 0.1% 1% 0% 2 0.03 9,745
Suzlon 17,634 3.8% 5,907 2.5% 33% 9% 16 0.22 7,234
Senvion 17,108 3.7% 11,120 4.7% 65% 32% 26 0.36 4,042
Sinovel 16,739 3.7% 350 0.1% 2% 3% 8 0.11 9,556
Envision 11,940 2.6% 30 0.0% 0% 0% 2 0.03 9,955
Ming Yang 11,501 2.5% 180 0.1% 2% 1% 3 0.04 9,630
SEwind 9,937 2.2% 0 0.0% 0% 0% 0 0.00 10,000
XEMC 6,616 1.4% 4 0.0% 0% 0% 1 0.01 9,991
Haizhuan 6,132 1.3% 32 0.0% 1% 1% 1 0.01 9,520
458,536 100% 235,637 100%
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foreign markets, respectively.
The indicators represent the relationship between the number
of countries where companies have expanded their activity and the
volume of their international business. By jointly analyzing the
results of the indicators Ifirm and GDfirm in Table 7, it is confirmed
that Vestas is the company that has historically extended its in-
ternational activity more, demonstrating the highest intensity
values of the degree of internationalization, Ifirm ¼ 96% and
Ifirm ¼ 70%. In addition, Vestas is the company that has the most
balanced international business between countries, with the lowest
value of GDfirm ¼ 1,334; all the other companies present a higher
concentration of their foreign business in a smaller number of
markets.
Considering the historical evolution in Figs. 6 and 7, since 2009,
the global wind energy market has increased remarkably, and
companies are diversifying, except for GE, which has been signifi-
cantly focused on meeting the high demand in its home country.
Two companies, Enercon and Senvion, have reduced their diversi-
fication since 2013 (see Fig. 7), although Senvion maintains a
presence in a relatively high number of countries but concentrates
its activity in a few of them. Finally, it is interesting to observe how
most companies evolved in 2017, decreasing their presence in some
countries (Fig. 6) and concentrating their business more (Fig. 7), aTable 8
Internationalization ranking of wind turbine manufacturers.
Ranking/indicator Intensity Geographic diversification G
Vestas 1 1 1
SGRE 2 3 2
Enercon 3 4 3
Nordex 4 2 4
GE 6 6 5
Senvion 5 5 6
Suzlon 7 7 7
Goldwind 9 8 8
Sinovel 8 10 9
Ming Yang 11 11 1
United Power 12 12 1
Haizhuan 10 9 1
Envision 13 13 1
XEMC 14 14 1
SEwind 15 15 1situation that reveals the maturity of some markets and pressures
companies toward higher market diversification.
One of the main results of this research is the inclusion of some
measures of the speed of internationalization in the assessment of
company effectiveness. When analyzing the indicator of the
average number of new markets exported per year since the firm’s
first international expansion (Table 7), it is possible to group the
companies into three different sets:
- Vestas and SGRE present the highest value, near or above 2
- Enercon, GE and Nordex present values between 1.59 and 1.77
- Suzlon and Senvion present values at or just above 1.
These numerical values reflect the different paces of expansion
of the international activity of these companies, highlighting Vestas
and SGRE as more global companies, followed by GE, Enercon and
Nordex.
The result of the individual indicators offers the opportunity to
rank companies’ internationalization, and this ranking is listed in
Table 8. Overall, Vestas is leading in nearly all indicators, while
SGRE follows, then a group of fourWestern companies ahead of the
Asian companies, which are headed by Suzlon.5. Conclusions
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very limited number of key players: the top 15 manufacturers
accounted formore than 85% of worldwide installed capacity by the
end of 2018. This level of concentration enabled the researchers to
perform a very thorough assessment of the different business
internationalization models.
For the first time, this research has applied business interna-
tionalization indicators to analyze the internationalization effec-
tiveness of the wind energy technology industry. Moreover, with
the novelty of including an indicator of speed, this research com-
bined four indicators in a way to shed additional light on the
process.
An intensity indicator provided evidence of how much the
different companies have internationalized related to their total
activity and the evolution of each firm’s international business
relative to each other’s and to the global domestic business. The
geographic extensity indicator revealed the range of countries that
the companies expanded to and how apparently similar firms (in
terms of depth of internationalization) focus the range of their in-
ternational business differently. The geographic diversification in-
dex exposed the quality of internationalization and demonstrated
that some firms narrowly focus their business on a limited number
of countries, whereas the market leaders have a more balanced
portfolio of sales per country. Finally, the speed indicator proved
that first movers were slow in internationalizing, but they paved
the way for other companies to internationalize at a much faster
pace.
One company, Vestas, has led the internationalization of this
industry since the beginning, both in terms of depth (96% of sales
abroad, as measured by the intensity indicator Ifirm) and width (73
countries entered). Vestas has also led in the quality of interna-
tionalization, as it is the company with the lowest dependency on a
small number of markets, as presented by the geographic diversi-
fication indexwith a GDfirm value of 1,334. Close to Vestas, SGRE, the
company resulting from the merge of Siemens Wind Power and
Gamesa, currently presents similar figures in all these indicators
(75% intensity, 70 countries and GDfirm ¼ 2,420) after trailing
behind duringmost of the growth period of the industry. Moreover,
since 2011, SGRE has reached Vestas in the depth of internation-
alization (sales of 45 GW vs. 47 GW respectively) but not in the
annual number of countries, with 27 and 33 countries respectively.
Since 2014, SGRE has presented best-in-industry quality of inter-
nationalization with an average GDfirm ¼ 1,068, closely followed by
Nordex (1,254) and Vestas (1,407).
Chinese companies, relative newcomers, are yet to enter foreign
markets, although they are starting to do this and are led by
Goldwind (GDfirm 7,334 in the 2014e2017 period). These companies
demonstrate that, in thewind energy sector at least, a strong rivalry
pressure in the domestic market is not a guarantee for the inter-
national competitiveness of its highest performing firms. The
findings suggest that other elements different from competitive
forces highly influence the Chinese domestic market.
The openness of the wind energy sector, in terms of interna-
tional reach, suggests that one of the important questions for future
research is whether the arrival of foreign companies in a country
with incumbents increases competition and how it occurs.Disclaimer
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4. Methodology, discussion and conclusions 
This section presents and discussed the methodologies used in the different areas of research, 
discusses the four pieces of research and their respective results as well as the final conclusions of 
the PhD work. 
4.1. Methodology 
The nature of this research required methodologies to be adapted to the data available in each 
of the four main pieces of research. Data originated from very different sources as well as 
different models were used. Data sources have been described in the introduction, whereas 
models used ranged from purpose-built Visual-Basic for Applications (VBA) to popular 
regression analysis software. 
All methodologies started by defining the system boundary and the objective under study. 
These were: assessing offshore wind farm installation time and its evolution [5]; technological 
and performance (in terms of energy production) changes due to wind turbine repowering 
independent from locational changes in wind resource [6]; elements of the globalisation of the 
wind industry and within it a focus on the contribution by European companies manufacturing 
turbines and developing wind farms, including some of the economic impacts of these 
companies at home and abroad [7]; and selecting and applying indices appropriate to the 
assessment of the globalisation of the main wind turbine manufacturers worldwide, their 
internationalisation effectiveness of these companies which is that eventually resulted in the 
global deployment of wind energy [8]. 
In general, all four pieces of research in this thesis required careful analysis of definitions used 
in scientific, official, and commercial literature. Some of the concepts were found not to have a 
universally-accepted definition, not even when sources are limited to scientific literature. In 
other cases, the subject was so new that there was not a definition, as for example the 
indicator (“vessel-day”) used in the analysis of offshore wind installations (see section 3.1 in 
[5]). In another example from the same piece of research, the data were populated with a wide 
range of elements (vessels), sometimes with very different characteristics, and this led to 
questioning where to set the system boundary of vessel characteristics (op. cit.). But without 
doubt the need to establish definitions was more pressing when the methodology demanded 
the definition of indicators as in [8]. 
Another common element of the diverse methodologies was the need to define, or take 
decisions on, milestones. These included the first and last day vessel activity is counted as 
“installation”: for example, the time for loading items in the harbour is included or not? [5]. 
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Graphical representation was a 
methodological element included in all 
articles, based on the premise that graphs 
can help quickly (and better) communicate 
a situation, and it can show more 
interrelated facts – as well as enabling the 
reader to extract his/her own conclusions. 
Figure 3 includes an example from article 
[5], where figure 3 showed how installation 
days per MW were reduced from around 5 
to below 1, and in combination with figure 
12 right in the same article (which shows 
the increasing size of the turbines and 
distances to shore), gives the reader a 
good impression of how big the effort has 
been: new technology made that larger 
turbines much reduced installation time 
despite installations being much further 
away from the shore.  
In another example from [6], research on 
the technological impact of repowering showed that both average power rating (figure 3 there) 
and rotor diameter (figure 5) increased throughout the period, but then figure 7 showed how 
both elements interacted with each other resulting in a clear downwards trend in turbine 
specific power.  
The methodology in the analysis of offshore wind installations [5] was based on the time it took 
vessels to install the foundations and turbines (or their different components) for every 
offshore wind farm, and defined as unit the “vessel-day”. Thus, for example, if one vessel 





Where Vdt is the number of vessel days per turbine installed; die is the date turbine installation 
ends; dis is the date turbine installation begins, and Nt is the number of turbines installed by 
the given vessel 
In the cases when more than one vessel has installed the given item or set of items, it is 
necessary to take into account the period that each vessel has been installing, and the formula 
is modified to: 
𝑉𝑑𝑡 =





Where n is the number of vessels installing any turbine items. For example, two vessels that 
installed the same item (e.g. turbines) during one week are counted as 14 vessel-days. 
These aspects were later analysed in terms of days per megawatt installed. 
Figure 3. Figures 3 and 12 in article [5] 
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The concept of "vessels" used for this analysis includes only large installation vessels able to 
install the heavy items (see below), such as purpose-built turbine installation vessels (e.g. Bold 
Tern [95] or Pacific Orca [96]); self-propelled jack-ups (e.g. Sea Installer [97] or Seajacks 
Leviathan [98]); jack-up barges which need tugs for propulsion (e.g. JB114 [99]); or heavy-lift 
vessels (e.g. Oleg Strashnov [100], Jumbo Javelin [101], or Svanen [102]). 
Items whose installation is considered separately, when information is available, include: the 
complete turbine or any of its parts; monopile, transition piece, gravity foundation, jacket, 
tripile and anchor piles (for jackets and tripiles).  
The research on repowering [6] required a different methodology. In this case, official data 
with technological details of old and new turbines and detailed annual production was 
obtained from [103] and [104]. A VBA macro for MS Excel was created to manage such 
enormous amount of data and to detect mistakes and gaps. Then, graphical analysis and 
parameters provided by Excel (e.g. R2) were used. The last part of this research, which focused 
in changes in performance, required the use of regression modelling tool Minilab. 
Regression analysis has been applied in the energy field e.g. by Lee & Yang [105], Fumo & Rafe 
Biswas [106] and Ma et al. [107]. In the wind energy field, Arias-Rosales and Osorio-Gómez 
[108] have applied regression analysis to wind turbines based on estimates of the cost of 
energy. 
Among the statistical models commonly used, linear regression analysis has shown promising 
results because of the reasonable accuracy and relatively simple implementation when 
compared to other methods [106]. Under the multiple linear regression approach, the 
selection of the explanatory variables is a key issue because irrelevant variables have negative 
effects on the process [109]. To ensure that the multiple linear regression approach is the 
appropriate methodology, it has been tested so that the input variables selected are linear 
(i.e., all of them follow a normal distribution) and independent from each other. 
The correlation between the technological changes brought about by repowering was explored 
(i.e., the increases with time in hub height, rotor diameter, and power rating) between the 
repowered and new turbines, and the increases in annual energy production (AEP) in each 
case. The regression analysis took AEP increase (ΔAEP) as the dependent variable and all other 
variables as independent variables. The reason for defining AEP as the dependent variable is 
that the final objective of repowering is increased production, which is also the natural 
consequence of the changes in technological variables. 
The regression analysis with Minitab statistical software considered the following predictor 
variables: 
Figure 4. Foundation types suction bucket, jacket, tripile, monopile and gravity-based. Courtesy TRADYNA [112] 
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ΔTR = Change in turbine rating (MW) 
ΔHH = Change in hub height (m) 
ΔSP = Change in specific power (W/m2) 
YR = Repowering year. 
The first analysis trials quickly showed that two variables were not statistically significant (ΔHH, 
YR), as the p-value was above 0.05 for these predictor variables. The two remaining 
independent variables (ΔTR, ΔSP) were found to be of statistical significance for the regression 
model. 
The coefficient of multiple determination, R2, takes an acceptable value of 93.37%, and 
adjusted R2 is 93.30%. A small Mallows' Cp value of 3.0 was obtained, indicating that the model 
is sufficiently precise. It was concluded that the model fitted the data well. 
Other assumptions that are required for multiple regression analysis to give a valid result were 
checked as well. They are shown in Table 2 of the article [6] and summarised here: 
• The independent variables are significant, as p-value is below 0.05 for both variables. 
• The variance inflation factor (VIF) is 1.29 for the two independent variables of the 
regression model, indicating that the predictor variables are not correlated. 
• The residuals show an approximate constant variance. 
• The residuals are normally and randomly distributed. 
It was noted that the ratio between turbine rating and swept area is a very important technical 
feature: it is a basic design parameter used by turbine manufacturers for products better 
suited for specific wind conditions. Because of this reason further analyses were carried out: 
the swept area (SA, m2) was tried instead of specific power (W/m2) in the regression analysis. 
Somehow, although R2 reached 95%, the results showed a VIF value of 7.83 for both 
statistically significant variables ΔTR and SA, indicating a possible problem of multicollinearity. 
Another analysis was based on the previous regression model result that change in hub height 
(ΔHH) was not significantly related to the increase in energy production. To explore this 
further, the data set was split into two subsets: from 2000 to 2005 and 2007 to 2015, to 
examine possible partial time correlation. However, the results of the analysis showed again 
that ΔHH remained a non-significant variable for the regression model. 
Because the research on globalisation [7] attempted to present a global situation, its 
methodology focused on the two main sector activities: manufacturing wind turbines and 
development of wind farms. Rather than using complex modelling, the key methodological 
approach was the contrasting of different sets of data in order to surface and explain the 
realities of globalisation in the sector. 
For example, the research compared installed capacity and energy produced and showed that 
wind electricity generation is more efficient in the US with a 33.9% capacity factor than in the 
EU (24.5%) and China (22.3%). The research further explored the reasons and proposed that 
grid limitations in China prevented the full exploitation of wind resources in the north, 
whereas the equivalent wind-rich area in the US, the Midwest, was well exploited. 
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Regarding wind turbine manufacture, a comparison of annual deployment from the Global 
Wind Energy Council and annual sales from industry intelligence showed that European 
companies have a global market share that nearly doubles the share of installations in the EU. 
For example, in 2016, European manufacturers installed around 44.4% of global installations 
whereas wind farms installed in Europe were only 22.9% of global installations. This is a 
success story. Further, the research compared and showed where income is produced and 
where employees are kept: European manufacturers obtain relatively little income in Europe 
but most of their staff is still in this continent. 
Finally, the article on globalisation explored the little-know wind farm developer market 
through global figures and corporate events such as mergers, memorandum of understanding 
and other. 
This research started a line of work that was later followed with the fourth article in this thesis: 
the internationalisation of turbine manufacturers. This was the result of data on where and 
when manufacturers had installed turbines, as shown in section 3.4 of [7]. 
The research on monitoring internationalisation required the definition of internationalisation 
indicators based on scientific literature in the area of economics, a personal challenge given 
my engineering-oriented background. In general, these can be classified as structural, 
performance-based and attitudinal [94], and composite indices have been created with the 
individual indicators [92], perhaps because there is not an individual indicator that 
satisfactorily measures the overall degree of the internationalisation of a firm [94]. The 
research proposed the use of several structural indices that help with assessment, lead to a 
useful analysis and together present a meaningful picture of the process. For a measure of the 
intensity of internationalisation, we focused on the ratio of the installed wind turbine capacity 
abroad (“exports”) to the company’s total installed capacity (“total sales”). This index is one of 
the three that constitute the more broadly-used transnationality index [25], and it is one for 
which the available data allows full research. This index can effectively measure the depth of 
the foreign expansion for each firm.  
First, we calculated this index for each year in the sample, from 1978 to 2017. Then, the 
intensity index 𝑰𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 was obtained for the total amount of the installed capacity by each firm 
in all 112 countries and territories. In addition, a second indicator ?̅?𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 was calculated, 













   (2) 
Where ∑ ∑ 𝑷𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎,𝒄𝒐,𝒚𝒓𝒄𝒐∈𝒇𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒚𝒓   is the installed capacity abroad by each wind turbine firm, 
in each country co, in each year yr, while ∑ ∑ 𝑷𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎,𝒄𝒐,𝒚𝒓𝒄𝒐𝒚𝒓  is the total installed capacity by 
each wind turbine firm, in each country co, in each year yr, including the domestic and foreign 
capacity. 
With regards geographic extensity, the number of foreign countries and territories in which 
each company has installed wind turbines is the relative worldwide spread of each firm [26]. 
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This spread is directly related to what can be called the width of internationalisation of a 
company, which is measured by the network spread index (NSI), a ratio for each firm of the 
absolute number of foreign countries where the firm ever deployed wind turbines to the 






   (3) 
There 𝑵𝒄𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 is the absolute number of different foreign countries that a firm has 
ever done business with. 
A firm whose foreign activity is diversified does business in each market in a balanced way. 
This balance protects the firm against the ups and downs of individual markets. This protection 
is unlike a firm whose business mostly depends on a few of its export markets. We propose the 
use of a geographic diversification index 𝑮𝑫𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 to measure how the activity is split among 
those countries. 
First, for every firm and year, we calculated the ratio of the installed capacity in each country 
(𝑷𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎,𝒄𝒐,𝒚𝒓) to its total installed capacity. Second, we used the well-known Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) [44] to obtain a measure of the diversification of the firm activity for 
each year 𝑮𝑫𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎,𝒚𝒓. Finally, we computed the mean of the annual HHI values to obtain an 
average value of the geographic diversification index of each company in the whole period 
𝑮𝑫̅̅ ̅̅ 𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎. This average index can also be calculated for a different number of years. 
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𝐺𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 =
1
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The index varies between 0 and 10,000, where 10,000 indicates that the company 
concentrates its sales in a single country, while values closer to zero indicate greater 
international diversification. 
Internationalisation studies using structural indicators do not usually include a measure of 
speed. However, this speed is an important issue and a key aspect of a firm’s international 
strategy [7,10]. Hence, we discuss here a set of indicators based on proposals in the literature 
that quantify the average speed at which the company has expanded internationally. 
Hilmersson et al. [19, 20] have suggested several possible indices to measure the speed of 
internationalisation: the mean number of markets exported per year since inception, the ratio 
of exports to total sales and the share of the firm's assets abroad. Concerning the first index, 
Mohr [21] has proposed a variation as the average number of foreign markets divided by the 
number of years since the firm's first international expansion. Using the date of the first 
international expansion fits better with the wind industry than the date of inception since sales 
abroad started after a long period of technology development.  
The ratio of exports to total sales constitutes internationalisation intensity as defined in 
Section 2.1. How this element evolved over time can be a useful indicator for the assessment 
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of the internationalisation dynamics of a firm. In the case of wind turbine manufacturers, the 
indicator is defined as the percentage of the foreign against the total rated capacity (in MW) of 
the turbines installed. 
Speed could also refer to the length of time until a certain milestone is achieved. The literature 
suggests using for this indicator between 10% and 20% of the total number of countries and 
territories exported to [33,45,46]. After analysing the historical data series from the database, 
we proposed this milestone to be 20%, as this figure reflects a significant number of exports 
for most companies in the sample. 
Therefore, the selected indicators to measure the speed of the internationalisation of wind 
turbine firms are the following: 
• The average number of new markets entered per year since the firm's first 
international expansion 
• The number of years between the first year of the internationalisation of the firm to 
the year when it reached the milestone of 20% of its final number of foreign markets; 
thus, for example, if a firm had exported to a total of 30 countries by the end of 2017, 
the figure in this indicator would be the years until it reached six foreign markets. 
• Internationalisation intensity over time 
The data about the installed capacity, in megawatts (MW), from each of the 15 primary wind 
turbine manufacturers in 112 countries and territories worldwide from 1978 to 2017 was used 
for the purpose of this study [34]. The database is nearly complete, as it includes a total of 
517.7 GW of wind turbines installed or commissioned during this period, including old turbines 
that have already been decommissioned. This figure is 96 % of the most accurate estimate of 
the worldwide installed capacity, 539.6 GW, by the Global Wind Energy Council [35]. The main 
gaps in the database correspond with Chinese installations; for example, a total of 32.6 GW of 
installations were assigned to Goldwind of China, whereas its actual installations were 42.7 
GW in China [36] plus 1.3 GW abroad. The installed capacity by the top 15 turbine 
manufacturers, also called original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), in the database was 
458.5 GW, or about 85 % of the worldwide installed capacity by the end of 2018. 
After having worked with wind installation databases from five different industrial intelligence 
suppliers since 2009, we found that the MAKE database is the most complete in terms of the 
number of installations (in MW) that are allocated to each turbine manufacturer. However, the 
database still retained some elements that had to be refined. This refining work consisted of 
screening the initial installations in the database against the company’s history on either its 
website or wind energy-related books of the 1990s [37,38] and against some of the other 
databases from industrial intelligence suppliers [39–42]. 
The data therefore allows the assessment of certain structural measures of the 
internationalisation of these wind firms. The indicators aid in understanding the evolution of 
market dynamics, firm expansion and the influence of the domestic renewable policy on 
boosting a firm’s global activity. Hence, we selected and applied the following structural 
indices to the analysis of wind turbine manufacturer internationalisation. 
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4.2. Discussion on techno-economic aspects of key cost-reduction issues  
The research on offshore wind installation [5] presented an assessment of the learning-by-
doing and technological improvements in installation of turbines and foundations of 
offshore wind farms achieved during the previous two decades. It showed that turbine plus 
foundation installation time decreased from 7.6 days in 2000–2003 to 5.9 days in 2016–
2017 for monopile-based projects. Interestingly, this reduction in installation times occurs 
despite the increase in distances to shore. 
It was demonstrated that the reduction in installation times was stronger when the effect 
of larger turbines was taken into account. Installation times for all wind farms with 
monopile foundations were reduced from just below 4 days per MW in 2000–2003 to 1.06 
days per MW in 2016–2017, a 71% reduction. This reduction was mostly caused by 
improvements in the installation of the foundations. Foundation installation times per 
megawatt improved by 87%, significantly more than turbine installation per MW (55%). 
However, the biggest effect was achieved by the increase in the size of individual turbines 
(to 8.25MW at the offshore wind farm Walney 3) and the corresponding increase in 
foundations size and reduction in the number of foundations and turbines for the same 
given wind farm capacity. 
This research found that the effect of economies of scale, measured based on wind farm 
size, was not significant in reducing the installation time for either foundations or turbines.  
A limitation of this study was that the effect of waiting-on-weather days has not been 
discounted, and it was strongly recommended some follow-up work to analyse this effect. A 
second limitation was that some of the dates corresponding to the oldest wind farms 
lacked the accuracy of data available for the newest projects. It was suggested that this 
research could be a starting point for thorough quantification of key technological and non-
technological elements behind the impressive offshore wind cost reductions of late. These 
include, e.g. other installation elements, mainly cable installation, or the impact of evolving 
financing rates and financing structures. The resulting research could be put together to 
fully understand how a technology that is subject to the strong force of nature has been 
able to manage and dominate it. 
The research on the technology effects in repowering wind turbines [6] was as well 
pioneering in assessing the technological effects caused by a large set of real repowering 
projects and their impacts on energy production on a turbine‐by‐turbine level. The average 
repowering occurred has brought nearly a three‐time increase in rotor diameter, or a nine-
time increase in swept area, and a doubling of hub height. New turbines were between 6 
and 11.6 times as powerful as decommissioned turbines, depending on how the average 
was taken. The results showed that repowering resulted in an increased capacity factor of 
7.1% on per turbine basis, or 9.7% on a per production basis.  
During the first years of repowering, new turbines had significantly higher specific power 
than the turbines they replaced, but this trend reversed in the 2014 to 2017 period. This 
was linked to changes to the financial support instrument being used at the time in 
Denmark, which from 2014 promoted turbines with low specific power. 
New turbines have a higher annual energy production compared with the removed 
turbines. On a weighted average, per-turbine production as a result of repowering 
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increased by 2.3 GWh between 2001 and 2003; by 6.7 GWh between 2008 and 2011; and 
by 7.7 GWh between 2013 and 2015. Because the annual electricity production remained 
relatively stable for the removed turbines, the increase in additional energy production was 
due to the sharp increase in performance of the new turbines. The average annual energy 
production achieved by new turbines was about 4.94 GWh, or 9.0 times the production of 
the removed turbines. Also, the study showed that specific energy production (per m2 
swept area) increased in 99% of the cases. On average, specific electricity production 
increased by 320 kWh/m2/yr. 
A regression analysis was performed to assess the impact of the underlying changes in 
technology on energy output. It showed that the increase in energy production was directly 
related to the increase in turbine rating and the decrease in specific power of the new 
turbines. On average, every additional kilowatt of rated power added 3.22 MWh to the 
annual energy production, and each W/m2 of lower specific power increased annual 
electricity production by 8.62 MWh. 
Further, this study analysed the effects of repowering on a turbine‐by‐turbine level. This 
was done to mitigate the influence of local variations in the wind resource. Of course, it is 
unusual that a repowering project substitutes each turbine with a newer, larger one. 
Repowering projects most often concern whole wind farms where both turbine and power 
grid upgrades are performed and wind farm configuration is optimised for energy 
production and levelled cost of energy, often by reducing turbine counts but approximately 
maintaining power density. A follow‐up to this study has been proposed to use empirical 
data to characterise the actual change in turbine density and energy production resulting 
from deployment of new modern turbines in place of older facilities at the end of their life. 
A further research question would also be to analyse the financial aspects of repowering: 
for example, was the repowering performed at the optimal time from a cost perspective? 
From a societal view point, and considering the growing market for repowering in the 
coming years, it is important to understand if market-driven repowering projects will also 
deliver the socioeconomic benefits to society. In particular, will the wind resource be 
utilised optimally? What are indirect economic impacts (e.g., on the value of land) of 
repowering? These questions need answers in order to determine if repowering could be 
more efficient or steered by policy instruments to bring the additional value for the 
economy and the society. 
4.3. Discussion on deployment aspects: globalisation and internationalisation 
Globalisation [7] goes hand-by-hand with localisation. In order to compete in large markets 
(India, China, US, Brazil), EU companies have had to grow local manufacture and a supply 
chain. The US is somehow the exception and this could be due to its openness as a market. 
Smaller markets are supplied from the main production centres (whether the EU or 
factories in China) and do not require localisation. 
Vestas, Gamesa, and other European companies to a lesser extent have been successful at 
localisation whereas Suzlon and Chinese companies are generally less able to localise 
supplies, perhaps due to the low-cost production achieved in their home countries. 
OEMs in the EU contribute to the economy significantly thanks to their exports, but China is 
emerging as a manufacturing hub for them. Eventually, this could result in Chinese 
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suppliers offering products of higher quality which risks increasing competition from 
Chinese OEMs using this modality of technology transfer. Whereas seven acquisitions of EU 
technology firms by US companies, and four acquisitions by Chinese companies were 
identified, no European company acquired a US or Chinese technology firm. This can be the 
result of the longer history of EU companies in the business, of the quality of their 
technology, of the successive crisis affecting the sector in Europe, of the availability of 
funding on the side of the American and Chinese, or a combination of these. Significantly as 
well, General Electric of the US has been the acquirer of all but one European technology 
companies bought by US firms. 
The European wind industry is a success story of worldwide reach that attracts jobs and 
growth for Europe. In order to ensure that this will continue to be so in the mid- or long-
term future, the industry may need the help of European and national policy makers with 
consented, well-targeted actions. Support programmes could help maintaining 
technological leadership through research, development and innovation programmes 
feeding on cross-industry knowledge and knowhow. They could support industrial 
leadership also in the manufacture of components. Instruments to financially and politically 
back the expansion of the industry to new and existing foreign markets may also be 
required. 
Further reflection of policy makers with developers, turbine manufacturers and other key 
players may be needed so as to increase the impact of the sometimes already existing 
programmes (e.g. Horizon 2020) and make their implementation more comprehensive. 
The wind energy technology manufacturing industry, as best represented by wind turbine 
manufacturers, is an industry with a very limited number of key players: the top 15 
manufacturers accounted for more than 85% of worldwide installed capacity by the end of 
2018. This level of concentration enabled the researchers to perform a very thorough 
assessment of the different business internationalisation models [8]. 
Business internationalisation indicators were applied to analyse the internationalisation 
effectiveness of the wind energy technology industry. Moreover, with the novelty of 
including an indicator of speed, this research combined four indicators in a way to shed 
additional light on the process.  
An intensity indicator provided evidence of how much the different companies have 
internationalised related to their total activity and the evolution of each firm’s international 
business relative to each other and to the global domestic business. The geographic 
extensity indicator revealed the range of countries that the companies expanded to and 
how apparently similar firms (in terms of depth of internationalisation) focus the range of 
their international business differently. The geographic diversification index exposed the 
quality of internationalisation and demonstrated that some firms narrowly focus their 
business on a limited number of countries, whereas the market leaders have a more 
balanced portfolio of sales per country. Finally, the speed indicator proved that first movers 
were slow in internationalising, but they paved the way for other companies to 
internationalise at a much faster pace. 
One company, Vestas, has led the internationalisation of this industry since the beginning, 
both in terms of depth (96% of sales abroad, as measured by the intensity indicator Ifirm) 
and width (73 countries entered). Vestas also led in the quality of internationalisation, as it 
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is the company with the lowest dependency on a small number of markets, as presented by 
the geographic diversification index with a 𝐺𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 value of 1,334. Close to Vestas is SGRE, 
the company resulting from the merge of Siemens Wind Power and Gamesa, currently 
presents similar figures in all these indicators (75% intensity, 70 countries and (𝐺𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 = 
2,420) after trailing behind during most of the growth period of the industry. Moreover, 
since 2011, SGRE has reached Vestas in the depth of internationalisation (sales of 45 GW vs. 
47 GW respectively) but not in the annual number of countries, with 27 and 33 countries 
respectively. Since 2014, SGRE has presented best-in-industry quality of internationalisation 
with an average 𝐺𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚= 1,068, closely followed by Nordex (1,254) and Vestas (1,407). 
Chinese companies, relative newcomers, are yet to enter foreign markets, although they 
are starting to do this and are led by Goldwind (𝐺𝐷̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚7,334 in the 2014-2017 period). 
These companies demonstrate that, in the wind energy sector at least, a strong rivalry 
pressure in the domestic market is not a guarantee for the international competitiveness of 
its highest performing firms. The findings suggest that other elements different from 
competitive forces highly influence the Chinese domestic market. 
The openness of the wind energy sector, in terms of international reach, suggests that one 
of the important questions for future research is whether the arrival of foreign companies 
in a country with incumbents increases competition and how it occurs. 
4.4. Conclusions 
The success story of wind energy is proven by its nearly-exponential expansion as an 
electricity generation technology, with installed capacity growing from 20 GW in 2000 [8] to 
650 GW in 2019 [110]. This success has been possible due to the support of the society, 
with global environmental concerns as the very root of this support. This support pushed 
governments to create the regulatory context necessary for the technology to expand when 
cost of generating electricity was more expensive than fossil fuel- and nuclear-based 
generation. This growth enabled large-scale innovation that eventually resulted in 
technology (and financial, and other) improvements reducing the cost of energy from new 
wind farms to the point that the technology nowadays regularly undercuts conventional 
generation in auctions around the world. 
This research has provided evidence and analysis of two key technological elements that 
have contributed, and will still contribute further, to reducing the cost of wind electricity. In 
the offshore subsector, the time necessary to install turbines and foundations was reduced 
very significantly, e.g. by 71% per MW in the case of monopile-based wind farms from 
2000–2003 to 2016–2017 [5]. In the onshore subsector, the repowering of old wind farms 
resulted in new turbines generating nine times as much electricity as the old turbines and 
an impressive increase of capacity factor of 7.1% on a per‐turbine basis, or 9.7% on a per‐
production basis [6]. 
The political support, the increase in deployment, innovations and the subsequent 
reductions in the cost of electricity transformed what was a very local sector into a global 
technological and industrial sector. Globalisation resulted in winners and losers: from an 
industrial point of view, small countries with small markets lack the market to develop its 
own industrial champions and even to attract manufacture from global champions. Large 
markets such as China, the US, India and the European Union have fostered local wind 
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energy technology companies and promoted them to global champion status [7]. However, 
these large markets produced companies that play in the global arena in very different 
ways, some are large enough in their home country and do not want to (or cannot) 
internationalise, and some were born directly with an internationalisation soul [8]. 
The research has presented evidence of elements proper to a normal, healthy industrial 
sector. From an initial political support, thanks to it and to technological innovation, the 
sector now produces electricity at prices competitive with other technologies. The sector 
has internationalised, fostered mergers and acquisitions. All-in-all, those elements, along 
with the continuous need to de-carbonise electricity production, bode very well for the 
future of the wind energy sector. 
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Appendix 
All articles that make up this thesis have been already published. 
Journals details 
The journals where the articles were published are listed below. 
• “Offshore wind installation: Analysing the evidence behind improvements in installation 
time” Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev., vol. 92, pp. 133–145, Sep. 2018. This journal JCR impact 
factor was 10.556 in 2018. Categories:  
o ENERGY & FUELS -- SCIE quartile 1 
o GREEN & SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY – SCIE quartile 1 
• “Technology effects in repowering wind turbines” Wind Energy, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 660–675, 
2020. This journal JCR impact factor was 3.125 in 2018 and 2.646 in 2019. Categories: 
o ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL – SCIE quartile 2 (2018) and 3 (2019); 
o ENERGY & FUELS – SCIE quartile 1 (2018) and 2 (2019) 
• “Globalization in the wind energy industry: contribution and economic impact of European 
companies,” Renew. Energy, vol. 134, pp. 612–628, Apr. 2019. This journal JCR impact 
factor was 6.274 in 2019. Categories: 
o ENERGY & FUELS – SCIE quartile 1; 
o GREEN & SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY – SCIE quartile 1 
• “Measuring the internationalization of the wind energy industry,” Renew. Energy, no. 157, 
pp. 593–604, 2020. This journal JCR impact factor was 6.274 in 2019. Categories: 
o ENERGY & FUELS – SCIE quartile 1; 
o GREEN & SUSTAINABLE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY – SCIE quartile 1 
 
Contributions 
The PhD candidate planned the research, carried out literature review, sought data, built and 
used models, led the discussions and extracted conclusions. In all cases, the PhD candidate led 
the research and was both main and corresponding author. Parts of the research were carried 
out in collaboration with other researchers, and therefore it is necessary to describe the 
respective contributions. 
More specifically, in the article Offshore wind installation: Analysing the evidence behind 
improvements in installation time [5], Dr José M. Yusta Loyo and Dr José Antonio Domínguez 
Navarro advised on the strategy of the research, data and model limitations, whereas the PhD 
candidate had responsibility over the definition of the research project, data collection, data 
analysis, modelling, results and conclusions. 
Regarding the research on Technology effects in repowering wind turbines [6], responsibilities 
were shared with Dr Andreas Uihlein and Dr José María Yusta Loyo. The former helped defining 
the research question as well as focused on German data and analysis; the latter set the 
regression model. The PhD candidate had exclusive responsibility over data collection and data 
analysis of the Danish part; setting the Visual Basic for Applications, Excel-based models. 
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The research leading to the article Globalization in the wind energy industry - contribution and 
economic impact of European companies [7] was full responsibility of the PhD candidate, as it is 
shown by his sole authorship.  
Its detailed follow-up, the article Measuring the internationalisation of the wind energy industry 
[8] was a joint effort with thesis supervisor Dr José María Yusta Loyo. The PhD candidate took 
exclusive responsibility over data collection and shared responsibility on data analysis, 
modelling, results analysis and conclusions. 
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